

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DISCOVERING CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

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MOSAIC OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLAM

DISCOVERING CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Editor: Abd. Aziz Faiz

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PREFACE

The Mosaic of Southeast Asian Islam

NEW ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR STUDY

Abd. Aziz Faiz
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The debates surrounding Southeast Asian Islam continues to emerge to this day, driven by the vast scope of studies encompassing various topics. Discussions on Southeast Asian Islam often emphasize its political and economic aspects, while social, cultural, and religious perspectives appear to be less explored. On the other hand, there are difficulties in establishing a periodization of Southeast Asian Islam's dynamics based on certain standards. The prevailing trend uses a political lens, such as pre-colonial, colonial, nation-state, and post-independence periods. Consequently, power dynamics often become the main framework for observing Islamic periods in the region. For example, it is rare to see Southeast Asian Islam examined through societal mental changes (ISAIs, 2018).

Southeast Asian Islam refers to a mosaic of Islamic practices, traditions, and interpretations in the region with

distinctive and unique characteristics compared to other areas. Historically, Southeast Asian Islam is a synthesis of Islamic practices that interact and blend with pre-existing local traditions and customs. Its character is moderate and inclusive, with diverse expressions that vary from one area to another within Southeast Asia itself. Its predominant form is influenced by Sufism. This diversity in practices and interpretations arises from various influences, including connections and networks with the Arab world, the Middle East, India, and Persia through trade and exchange, Western colonialism, and local beliefs and practices predating Islam's arrival in the region. Thus, Southeast Asian Islam has become a unique and distinctive Islamic mosaic.

The question that arises is: does Southeast Asian Islam have consistent characteristics? The answer is, of course, no. While the mosaic of Southeast Asian Islam can be generally identified, it encompasses complex issues. These range from the relationship between Islam and the state, radicalism, secularism, and tensions in some areas between Islamic values and ongoing modernization, minority rights, and inter-religious relations. These issues can be traced back to the problematic formation of nation-states, built based on colonial divisions. For instance, Malaysia, Southern Thailand, and Southern Philippines are linked through Malay cultural and linguistic roots but were fragmented by Portuguese, French, and British colonialism, leading to a sense of separation. In recent times, these relationships have tended to escalate rather than harmonize. As a result, these regions face tensions with their respective governments, struggling to achieve harmonious peacebuilding processes.

In Thailand, particularly in the southern regions bordering Malaysia, Islam is strongly associated with resistance and social movements. This situation arises from social discrimination against Muslim groups, compounded by economic disparities that leave them far from achieving ideal welfare and equality with other residents (Bayu; 2016, 35). In Indonesia, the situation is somewhat different. Although identity movements like Darul Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army (DI/TII) and the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) have historically posed threats to national unity and influenced the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia, the country has more recently developed a framework that allows Islam to integrate into various aspects of its social life (Faiz, 2016, XX). Meanwhile, the situation in Myanmar remains deeply troubling, marred by prolonged conflicts. In Malaysia, Islamic populism has gained significant traction, while Salafism has grown in Singapore. Even so, Southeast Asian Islam cannot be generalized, as it takes on different forms and characteristics based on each country's evolving dynamics.

Globalization and democratization have also driven minorities across Southeast Asia to demand equal treatment as fellow citizens, opposing past oppression stemming from majoritarian democracy and authoritarianism (Suaedy, 2014). This includes both individual and collective rights. Only three out of the ten ASEAN countries have Muslim-majority populations. Even in these three countries, certain states or provinces have Muslim minorities. Similarly, in countries with non-Muslim majorities, some regions have Muslim majorities but remain national minorities. In other nations, Muslim minorities often face fluctuating relations

with the majority and the state. The Rohingya Muslim community, for example, continues to endure unresolved displacement and suffering.

On another front, global changes not only demand equal treatment, as mentioned above, but also lead to new migration flows and widespread demographic shifts, among other impacts. Southeast Asian Muslim communities are now found not only within Asia but also across various countries such as Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, and others worldwide. These individuals include migrant workers and students in these countries. They engage with existing cultures in their host nations, negotiating and influencing local traditions. In this context, Southeast Asian Islam contributes to global culture, a direct result of globalization and migration flows.

Recently, the issues surrounding Southeast Asian Islam have become increasingly complex, ranging from populism in democracy, migration, literature, gender, culture, to legal matters. This book is a collection of essays by several academics and researchers that attempt to present the latest issues in the study of Southeast Asian Islam. The book is divided into three chapters, each addressing a different theme. The first section discusses Southeast Asian migration, citizenship, and human security. An essay by Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma and Theresia Octastefani explores the history of Muslims in Taiwan, where the population, once dominated by the Hui ethnic group, has shifted to predominantly Southeast Asian migrants, especially Indonesians. Although Taiwan is a non-Muslim country, it is notably Muslim-friendly, providing spaces for worship

and fostering an inclusive environment. Meanwhile, Izzul Haq examines the experiences of Southeast Asian Muslims in Canada, highlighting how they thrive in a secular society while freely practicing their religion.

In contrast to these welcoming environments, Faiz and Syaiful Bahri write about the Rohingya Muslim minority in Myanmar, who face persecution and violence from the military. To address this long-standing issue, the essay proposes the concept of "Bhinneka citizenship" as a potential solution to the conflict. The book also touches Islam in Singapore, particularly the emergence of far-right extremism, in an essay by Sheikh Farouq. This essay argues that extremism does not inherently stem from any particular religion and suggests that terrorism can be minimized through community building, education, and rehabilitation efforts. Additionally, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff and Muhammad Haziq Jani discuss the Salafi movement in Singapore within the context of modernity, emphasizing the varying interpretations among its followers on how to emulate the Salaf in contemporary life.

The second section shifts focus to populism, democracy, and Islamic law. This chapter begins with a discussion on cultural populism in Malaysia. In his essay, Wan Noor Khuzairey Bin Wan Mohtar argues that cultural populism threatens democracy by favoring Muslim Malays while treating non-Malay Muslims as second-class citizens. Meanwhile, Bima Jon Nanda and Inda Mustika Permata challenge the assumption that Islam is incompatible with democracy by presenting Indonesia as an example where the two coexist harmoniously in a Muslim-majority country.

This theme is further enriched with an exploration of the formation of religious authority in Lombok, Indonesia. In his article, Muhammad Said highlights factors influencing religious authority, such as the role of Islamic organizations, regime changes, political dynamics, and advancements in information technology. Additionally, Ibi Satibi examines the historical examination of the Dutch seizure of customary law in Cirebon in the 18th century, linking it to broader themes of governance and colonial influence. This chapter concludes with an essay by Anatansyah Ayomi Anandari and Dwi Afriyanto, which discusses climate change by integrating environmental jurisprudence (Fiqh), highlighting its application and mitigation efforts in East Java, Indonesia.

The final chapter of this book focuses on gender, culture, and religious moderation. An essay by Mardian Sulistyati explores how customary law and Sharia shape moral ideologies in Minangkabau society, challenging perceptions of female dominance within their matrilineal system. Meanwhile, Tika Fitriyah examines the novel *Fataat Qarut*, which challenges stereotypes of oppressed female characters in Arab literature by by portraying Indonesian women as intelligent and multifaceted. Further discussions explore the hijab as a symbol of piety, revealing how it can create discriminatory pressures on women who do not conform to social norms. In this article, Nurbayti and Stara Arsita also highlight how diverse communities are more tolerant toward women who do not wear the hijab compared to homogeneous ones.

Additionally, issues related to religious moderation are also discussed in this section. An article by Egi Tanadi Taufik examines the Jawization of Cambodian script, bridging linguistic diversity and fostering a shared Muslim identity while respecting local culture. Rahmat Hidayat and Raisatul Mufahamah discuss the Great Mosque of Sumenep, which serves as a site of memory for the Sumenep-Madura community and reflects religious moderation formed when santri became rulers. Lastly, an essay by Ahmad Suhendra highlights the coexistence of Boen Tek Bio Temple and Kalipasir Mosque, symbolizing Indonesia's long-standing tradition of interfaith harmony and cultural integration.

Considering the themes discussed above, the study of Islam in Southeast Asia is remarkably rich in significant issues. However, as a note, research on Islam in this region remains scarce at universities, particularly in Indonesia. Ironically, those most interested in seriously studying Southeast Asian Islam are individuals or institutions outside the region. Driven by their interest and distinct perspectives, these studies have predominantly developed abroad. As a result, Southeast Asian Islam is often defined externally rather than being defined by Southeast Asians themselves. Therefore, the presence of this book serves as a spark for further studies on Southeast Asian Islam, especially by Southeast Asian scholars. Enjoy the read!

Yogyakarta, 2025
Abd. Aziz Faiz, M.Hum

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CHAPTER 1

MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND HUMAN SECURITY

Reading on Southeast Asian Muslims in Taiwan

MIGRATION HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY LIFE

The dynamic and challenging world has triggered millions of people to migrate from oneplace to another, from one country to another. Many individuals leave their country of origin and live as immigrants or diaspora in another country. This migration is often driven by the hope of obtaining a better life in a new place. However, each person has a specific reason why they choose to migrate rather than stay in their place of origin. As stated by Hofmann *et al.* (2020) that international migration is caused by various factors, which needs to be understood individually but also

Bayu Mitra A. Kusuma
Theresia Octastefani

related to its role in a complex system of interconnectivity and interdependence.

Taiwan is one of the main destination countries for humans to migrate and become a diaspora. It could even be said that currently, Taiwan is one of the most immigrant-friendly countries. Taiwan's current openness was not achieved in an instant process. Taiwan has experienced developments in immigration policy since 1949 which have had an impact on demographic changes. Historically, Taiwan has strictly controlled the entry of 'low quality' people from Mainland China and Southeast Asia (Wang, 2011). A fact that its citizens may no longer remember in contemporary times. But wait, maybe some readers will wonder, is Taiwan a country? Isn't Taiwan part of China which is often called Chinese Taipei? These are common questions when discussing Taiwan as an entity. The answer will also be very multi-perspective depending on which position we look at.

In this brief article, we will not review Taiwan's status in detail because it is too long and complicated, and the final result will still trigger pros and cons. In this regard, it is fair to argue that Taiwan has developed its own *zig-zag* path of nation-building under the geo-political constraints set by global and regional powers beyond its borders (Chang, 2005). To simplify the discussion, the author will continue to use the term country because *de facto* Taiwan has aseparate government and armed forces from Mainland China. Therefore, let's refocus the discussion on Taiwan as a migration destination country.

The Influx of Muslim Migrants from Southeast Asia

In principle, the growth of the Muslim population in Taiwan cannot be separated from Muslim migration from Mainland China (Bao, 2019). There is a lot of literature explaining that the arrival of Islam to Taiwan from Mainland China began with Hui ethnic Muslim traders in the seventh century. However, a large-scale influx did not occur until centuries later. The first wave of migration occurred when Koxinga's troops from Fujian repulsed the Dutch occupation of Formosa in the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, the second wave of migration occurred during the mass migration of Nationalists after the Civil War. However, currently the Muslim population in Taiwan is not dominated by people from Mainland China, but from Southeast Asia. Considering that the literature explaining this fact is very limited, the influx ofMuslim migrants from Southeast Asia to Taiwan is very interesting to explore further.

The Southeast Asian Muslim community in Taiwan comes from Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Historically, Muslim migrants from Southeast Asia who first entered Taiwan came from Myanmar and Thailand. In the 1970s to 1980s, thousands of Muslims from these two countries migrated to Taiwan in search of a better life (Chang, 2014). Based on the history of Islam in Taiwan, their arrival is classified as the third wave of migration. They are descendants of Nationalist soldiers who fled Yunnan when the Communists took over Mainland China. Since entering Taiwan until now, the majority of them have lived on Huaxin Street in New Taipei's Zhonghe District and

Taoyuan City's Zhongli District. A small part also spreads across several other cities. The place that is the base of this community has earned the apt nickname "Burma Road" (Pelletier, 2014). Some of them opened culinary businesses. One of the famous ones is a small restaurant located on Huaxin Street. They sell cakes and serve beef noodles and unique homemade yogurt.

In 1989 or a decade after the third wave of migration, Taiwan implemented a policy that allowed more migrant workers to fill blue-collar jobs in the rapidly growing industrial sector (Tseng, 2013; Liu *et al.*, 1996). This opportunity invites immigrants from Muslim-majority countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia to come in droves. In this fourth wave of migration,Muslim migrants from Southeast Asia are dominated by Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. In fact, there are quite large numbers of Malaysian migrants in Taiwan, but most of them are Chinese. This condition is influenced by the large ethnic Chinese population in Malaysia so only a small portion of Malaysian immigrants in Taiwan are Muslim (Widyastuti & Sun, 2015). Currently, Muslim migrants from the three Southeast Asian countries have spread to almost every city in Taiwan.

Indonesia's Muslim Migrant Population Explosion

Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. Therefore, when many Indonesian citizens choose to migrate and become a diaspora in Taiwan, automatically the number of Muslims in Taiwan also increases dramatically. According to Bao (2019), the

number of Muslim migrants from Indonesia has reached 280,000 people or 96 percent of the total Muslims in Taiwan. In fact, this number has far exceeded the number of Hui Chinese Muslims, who are only around 8,000 people or 2.77 percent of the Muslim population in Taiwan. So what about Muslim migrants from other Southeast Asian countries? Still, according to Bao (2019), the number has actually decreased to less than one percent of the total population. They are classified as "other Muslim ethnicities" outside of Indonesia, HuiChinese, Pakistanis, Turks, Arabs, and Africans.

The increasing population of Indonesian Muslim migrants in Taiwan can be easily seen in industrial cities. One of the most striking occurred in Dayuan District, Taoyuan City. In this area, there is an increase in the number of Indonesian migrant workers who are dominated by Muslims. This increase was stimulated by the large income of those looking for work. This high income can reach four to six times more than similar jobs in Indonesia. In addition, the good relations between migrant workers and the local Taiwanese community are strengthened by the hospitality of the employers. In this case, many Indonesian workers find it easier to carry out their worship, especially Muslim workers who have to pray (Maksum *et al.*, 2020). Because of their high income and good relations, some of them then chose to settle in Taiwan and marry local residents. This phenomenon can be found in almost every city in Taiwan. According to data from the Indonesian Economic and Trade Office (IETO) in Taipei, there are more than 29,000 mixed marriages between Indonesian and Taiwanese citizens.

Apart from being a destination for many Indonesian Muslims to work, Taiwan is also a reference for many Indonesian Muslims to continue their higher education. Similar to East Asian countries in general, Taiwan is known for its competitive and high-standard education. In fact, according to the Institute for Management Development based in Switzerland, Taiwan is ranked the seventh most competitive country in the world (Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). To attract international students, Taiwan offers a choice of leading universities and from year to year provides more and more scholarships. The Taiwan government provides various types of scholarships through the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology, and top-ranking universities. With these facts, Taiwan is one of the countries that appears to be emerging in the internationalization of higher education (Lin, 2020). In a wider scope, apart from many Muslim students from Indonesia, Taiwan is also a reference for Muslim students from other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines.

Impact on Contemporary Life in Taiwan

The large population of Muslim migrants from Southeast Asia has a real impact on contemporary life in Taiwan. Their existence supports Taiwan's efforts to transform into a Muslim-friendly country. This influence can be seen through several aspects, including First, the growth in the number of mosques in Taiwan. Indonesian Muslim migrants have had a big influence on the growth of mosques in Taiwan (Asia Times, 2017). In 2013, an Indonesian

migrant worker who married a local Taiwanese man built the At-Taqwa Mosque in Taoyuan City. Then, a group of fishermen from Indonesia who worked at the Yilan County Seaport founded the Baitul Muslimin Mosque in 2014. Also in 2014, Indonesian migrant workers in Pingtung City succeeded in establishing the An-Nur Mosque Tongkang. Last but not least, in 2018 a group of Indonesian migrant workers founded the Al-Falah Mosque in Hualien County. Still in Hualien County, one year later, Indonesian migrant workers also succeeded in establishing the Nurul Iman Mosque. The comfort of Indonesian Muslims is represented by the existence of branches of the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (Maksum et al., 2020). These two organizations are not only a gathering place for many Indonesian Muslim migrants in Taiwan, but also a reference for Muslim agendas from other countries.

Second, the emergence of Muslim-friendly universities. The increasing number of international student arrivals requires Taiwanese universities to adapt to the diversity of incoming cultures, including in terms of religion. The presence of international students enriches university life. However, practicing Islam from a majority to a minority experience at Taiwanese universities is a constant navigation and adjustment on the part of Muslim students (Sodusta *et al.*, 2018). Even though there are some inconveniences, this process is still heading in a better direction. Not only in the scope of migrant workers, the Southeast Asian Muslim student community in Taiwan is also dominated by students from Indonesia. To accommodate their common interests,

they founded the Indonesian Muslim Student Forum in Taiwan (FORMMIT). This organization is able to be a good bridge between universities and Muslim students in fulfilling needs such as prayer rooms. With FORMMIT's assistance, Taiwanese universities increasingly understand the needs of Muslim students. In fact, several universities have given FORMMIT full access to the management of their prayer rooms. This is closely related to the moderate image of Indonesian Muslims.

Third, improving Taiwan's image as a halal tourism destination. The increasing migrant Muslim population is seen by the Taiwanese government as an opportunity to increase state revenue. Therefore, the Taiwanese government continues to promote itself as a halal tourist destination and a Muslim-friendly country. One of them is in the culinary industry, including increasing the promotion of Taiwanese street food (Octastefani & Kusuma, 2022). In this effort, Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia have made a significant contribution. This is because overall, the halal industry in Taiwan does not have a formal halal industry development policy, so there is no policy-making, intelligence, control, and coordination function in supporting a viable halal industrial ecosystem (Adham *et al.*, 2020). In these conditions, the Indonesian and Malaysian halal industry supervisory authorities stepped in to support capacity development. As a result, according to the 2022 Mastercard-CrescentRating Global Muslim Travel Index (GMTI), Taiwan managed to maintain second place in providing a Muslim-friendly tourism environment among non-Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) country destinations in the world. Still, according to the

same index, Taiwan was also named non-OIC Inclusive Destination of the Year at the 2022 Halal in Travel Awards. This achievement was achieved thanks to the hard work of the Taiwanese Government and the support of Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia.

Concluding Remarks

Taiwan has long been seen as a migrant-friendly country. Now, Taiwan is also seen as a Muslim-friendly country. In this country, the development of Islam is influenced by the growth of migrant communities. In the history of migration, the arrival of Islam was initially brought by ethnic Hui traders from Mainland China. Then, the large migration of Muslims from Mainland China occurred in two waves, namely when Koxinga's troops expelled the colonials from Formosa and after the civil war between nationalists and communists. However, currently the Muslim population in Taiwan is no longer dominated by the Hui ethnic group, but Muslim migrants from Southeast Asia. Gradually Muslims from Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines began to arrive in large numbers in Taiwan. In fact, Muslim migrants from Indonesia are currently the most dominant. Some of them choose to marry local residents and settle in Taiwan. Not only migrant workers, but the presence of students also increases the Muslim population in Taiwan. Their existence has an influence on contemporary life in Taiwan. This influence is clearly visible in the growth of the number of mosques, the emergence of Muslim-friendly universities, and the development of Taiwan as a halal tourist destination.

In the future, this trend looks like it will continue to grow. This is because the Taiwanesegovernment and society have accepted with open arms the existence of Southeast Asian Muslim Migrants in their country. Therefore, Southeast Asian Muslim Migrants must also maintain their image by continuing to provide a positive influence. As an important note, when this article was written, there had just been a mass clash involving two martial arts schools from Indonesia at Changhua Train Station. As a result of this incident, one person was declared dead and dozens of migrant workers were arrested by local police authorities. In response to this incident, IETO temporarily suspended all Indonesian community activities except religious matters. It is feared that incidents like this will create a negative perspective for migrants about the causes of trouble and crime. Similar incidents must not happen again in the future so that Southeast Asian Muslim migrants can continue to live side by side and receive respect from the Taiwanese local society.

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The Southeast Asian Muslim Diaspora in Canada

BETWEEN MULTICULTURALISM AND SECULARISM

The existence of Islam in Canada, alongside its various denominations, reflects the globalspread of the religion. Similar to many Western countries, including those in North America, Islam's presence in Canada presents both opportunities and challenges. Canada's multiculturalism policy has been established since the 1970s, and its open secular character, which emphasizes tolerance, has created an environment where ethnic and cultural diversity, including Islam, is accepted and celebrated. This has contributed to the growth of Islam and the increasing Muslim population

Muhammad Izzul Haq

in Canada. While this diversity suggests hope for cultural enrichment and social cohesion, it also raises concerns about accommodation, especially for Muslims.

History of Southeast Asian Immigration to Canada

Immigration to Canada from Southeast Asia began to increase notably after the 1970s, with various factors contributing to this trend. Southeast Asia comprises 11 countries; Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, East Timor, and Vietnam. The 1960s saw a wave of immigration from Southeast Asia to Canada, particularly from Indonesia. Political instability in Indonesia prompted many Indonesians, predominantly ethnic Chinese individuals, to immigrate toCanada. However, despite their ethnic background, they did not closely integrate with the Canadian Chinese community due to language barriers. Canada also welcomed numerous Southeast Asian students as part of the Colombo Plan, which aimed to provide educational opportunities to students from Commonwealth countries. This initiative brought in hundreds of students from various Southeast Asian nations to study in Canada. Beginning in the 1950s, Canada saw a significant influx of students from Malaysia, totaling over 80,000 individuals. While many initially came to Canada for education, several hundred decided to settle there. From 1973 to 1984 alone, 6,872 Malaysians immigrated to Canada, contributing to the growing Southeast Asian community in the country.

The immigration of Indochinese (Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian) to Canada occurred in multiple

waves, each influenced by various geopolitical events and policies. In the 1950s-1960s, some Indochinese, including Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian students, arrived in Canada. Many of these students decided to remain in Canada after completing their studies, contributing to the early establishment of these communities. By 1970, about 1,200 Vietnamese and several hundred Laotians and Cambodians had settled in Canada, particularlyin Quebec. The withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam and the fall of the Thiêu regime in South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, resulted in a massive exodus of Vietnamese people fleeing the country. In response, Canada accepted nearly 6,500 Vietnamese individuals as political refugees. The broader Indochina crisis in the 1970s led to a surge in refugees seeking asylum in Canada. The Canadian government responded by accepting and resettling tens of thousands of refugees from Vietnam, followed by those from Cambodia.

The data from the Canadian population census released in 2022 indicates that the Muslim population in Canada has experienced significant growth. From 2011 to 2021, the proportion of Muslim residents across Canada increased from 3.2% to 4.9% (Government of Canada, 2022a). However, when we specifically examine the Muslim population from Southeast Asia, we find that it constitutes only a small portion of the total Muslim population in Canada. As of the census data, there are approximately 11,935 Muslims from Southeast Asialiving in Canada, accounting for only around 0.67% of the total Muslim population in the country, which is reported to be 1,775,715. Among the Southeast Asian

countries contributing to the Muslim population in Canada, the top three countries are Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. There are 2695 Indonesians, 1965 Filipinos, and 790 Malaysians (Government of Canada, 2022b).

Traces, Progress, and Steps of Southeast Asian Muslims in Canada Philippine Muslim Diaspora

The Filipino Muslim diaspora in Canada is represented by organizations such as The Muslim-Filipino Association of Canada. This community largely consists of individuals originating from the Bangsamoro region in the Philippines. The term "Moro" or "Bangsamoro" refers to a collective of 13 Muslim-majority groups located in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. These groups have historical and cultural ties to the region known as the Bangsamoro. The Bangsamoro people are predominantly Muslim and represent the largest non-Christian population in the Philippines. They constitute approximately five percent of the country's total population ('Journey of a Muslim Filipina Immigrating and Settling in Canada', n.d.).

Alia Ceniza Rasul, a Toronto-based Filipino comedian and storyteller who has just published a collection of poems entitled "Super Important Filipino Thoughts", says: "Since I moved to Canada, I have noticed that a lot of what is presented as Filipino culture is actually Moro culture or the culture of the indigenous peoples of the Philippines. As part of an effort to reconnect with their roots, Filipino Canadians are returning to their ancestral heritage and in the spirit of decolonisation, abandoning those parts of their culture influenced by colonialism and reconnecting with their pre-colonial cultural practices; performing dances like

Singkil, using musical instruments like *Kulintang*, wearing woven cloth like *Pis Siyabit* and decoratingthemselves with tattoos." That is what Alia told the CBC (Person, 2022). The journey of Filipino Muslims immigrating and settling in Canada reflects the broader experiences of immigrants from diverse backgrounds, contributing to the multicultural landscape of Canadiansociety.

The Work of the Sister Sabria Foundation

Sister Sabria, also affectionately known as the "Mother Teresa of Montreal," is the nickname given to Sabariah Bint Hussein, who left Malaysia to settle in Montreal in the 1980s.Originally trained as a special educator, Sister Sabria discovered her true passion in volunteerism after arriving in Montreal. Sister Sabria became renowned for her tireless dedication to feeding the hungry in Montreal. Over the span of three decades, she haspersonally prepared more than 700,000 meals, often from her own kitchen. In addition to her work in providing meals, Sister Sabria also founded a shelter for women and has been instrumental in raising substantial funds for various humanitarian causes (*About SSF | Sister Sabria Foundation*, n.d.).

Sister Sabria's unwavering dedication to humanitarian causes has been recognized through numerous prestigious awards. In 2017, she was honored with the *Lifetime of Service to Humanity Award* by the RS Foundation, a Canadian organization committed to enhancing the quality of life for individuals in South Asia. Prior to this accolade, Sister Sabria received the *Lifetime Achievement Award* from the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations and

the Community Service Award from the Muslim Council of Montreal in 2005. Her exceptional contributions were further acknowledged in 2015 when she was presented with the *Women Who Inspire Award* by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women. In recognition of her remarkable service and impact on the community, Sister Sabria was awarded the esteemed *Order of Montreal* medal in 2018, underscoring her significant role in advancing humanitarian causes and fostering positive change in Montreal and beyond.

IICT Mosque, Indonesia's First Mosque in Canada

The Istiqlal Islamic Center of Toronto (IICT) was established on March 1, 2021, as a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting Islamic values of peace and harmony within Canada's diverse society. Drawing inspiration from the Istiqlal Mosque, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia situated in Jakarta, Indonesia, IICT endeavors to foster an environment of religious freedom and inclusivity. During the holy month of Ramadan in 2021, IICT achieved a significant milestone by acquiring a sold church and converting it into a mosque. This strategic move not only symbolizes the organization's commitment to expanding Islamic outreach but also serves as a beacon of religious tolerance and understanding in remote areas such as Ballinafad and Halton Hills, located on the outskirts of Toronto. The establishment of IICT was spearheaded by members of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora residing in the GreaterToronto Area, highlighting their proactive efforts to contribute positively to their local community and promote the values of Islam in Canada.

Two years after its opening and renovation, on May 13, 2023, amidst the festiveatmosphere of *halal-bihalal* 1444 Hijriah, the Istiqlal Mosque in Toronto hosted a launching event in the form of an *Open House to Connect Communities*. The event welcomed esteemed guests including the Indonesian Ambassador to Canada, the Indonesian Consul General in Toronto, local government officials from the city of Halton Hills, police representatives, interfaith leaders, and members of the wider community. Diplomats, officials, dignitaries, representatives from various religious and cultural backgrounds, journalists, and visitors fromnear and far attended the event, highlighting the mosque's growing presence and significance in the community. In its ongoing efforts to serve the community and promote inclusivity, the Istiqlal Mosque has developed a variety of programs and initiatives. During the holy month of Ramadan, the mosque hosts a range of activities including tarawih prayers, daily iftar gatherings, and the distribution of *zakat fitrah* in collaboration with the Canadian Islamic Union. Additionally, the mosque organizes events to commemorate Islamic holidays such as the Prophet's birthday, and offers free tax clinic services to assist community members. Regular recitations of Surah Al-Kahf are held every Friday night, and the mosque partners with the Muslim Welfare Center Mississauga to distribute sacrificial animals for Eid al-Adha (*IICT*, personal communication, 2023).

Indonesian *Pengajian*: Funnels for Religious-Cultural Diplomacy

The Southeast Asian Muslim diaspora, particularly Indonesian Muslims, has established various study groups

and associations across different regions of Canada, serving as cultural ambassadors and promoting Indonesian Islamic culture. These groups play a vital role in fostering religious and cultural diplomacy in Canada. In the Pacific West Coast region of Canada, there is IMA-BC (Indonesian Muslim Association in British Columbia). In theprovince of Alberta, there is IMCE (Indonesian Muslim Community of Edmonton) and Pengajian Calgary. In the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) there is MIIT (Indonesian Islamic Society in Toronto) and in Canada's capital there is Pengajian Ottawa. In the French-speaking province of Quebec, there is Syiar Montreal. These study groups and associations collaborate through a WhatsApp group, with the Counsellor of Political, Social, and Cultural Affairs of the Embassy of Indonesia in Canada (Pensosbud KBRI Ottawa) serving as a partner. Together, they contribute to the promotion of Indonesian Islamic culture and strengthen the bonds within the Indonesian Muslim diaspora in Canada (Haq, 2023).

In terms of the legalization process, the MIIT, IMA-BC, and IMCE have been recognised by the provincial government as not-for-profit organizations, which means that with their legalstatus, the three above-mentioned study organizations can issue donation receipts that can be used to claim tax deductions for donors.

The presence of Indonesian Muslim organizations such as ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Scholars Association) Chapter North America, IMSA (Indonesian Muslim Society America), and PCINU US-Canada (Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama in the US and Canada) significantly contributes to the spread of moderate Islamic

preaching in Canada. For activity programs, sometimes each mass organisation moves and works alone, but also often works with other community organisations or with other local *pengajian* groups to carry out hybrid activities. These organisations play various roles in promoting Islamic teachings, fostering community engagement, and advancing the interests of the Indonesian Muslim diaspora.

Conclusion

Given the growing demographic trends, coupled with the continued growth of Islamic da'wah in Canada, supported by the diaspora community through both religious organizations and Islamic *pengajian* centers, we can hope that in the future there will be an increase in the visibility of the South Asian Muslim diaspora following their active role in social and religious life in secular and liberal Canada. The presence of these Southeast Asian Muslim diasporas has colored the mosaic of multiculturalism in Canada and will thrive thanks to secularism in this country.

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Southeast Asian Muslims Minority

THE CONDITION OF MYANMAR, ROHINGYA, AND BHINNEKA CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship and Minority Problems in Southeast Asia

The intricacies of the minority problem in Southeast Asia are profound and multifaceted (Iwata, 1967). Across the region, various minority groups, including religious minorities, grapple with distinct challenges unique to each country. Simultaneously, the responses and treatment of these minorities by the respective states add an additional layer of complexity to this intricate issue. Compounding the complexity are the diverse cultural factors and social conditions prevalent in each Southeast Asian nation.

Abd Aziz Faiz
Syaiful Bahri

In the Southeast Asian context, the relationship between minorities and the state undergoes continual complications, further intensified by the aftermath of modern nationalism and the establishment of nation-states—a trajectory that originated in Europe (Safman, 2007). This historical evolution has contributed to dynamic shifts and redefinitions of the concept of nationhood. As Southeast Asian nations navigate these dynamics, the handling of minority issues becomes increasingly nuanced and varies across the region, giving rise to a spectrum of challenges and responses.

Southeast Asian nations with Muslim-majority populations grapple with the emergence of new religious movements, commonly referred to as new religious sects (Makin, 2016). These movements often prompt state intervention in their management. In Indonesia, a country with diverse religious landscapes, the challenge extends beyond new religious groups to include indigenous religious movements (Faiz, 2019). The Indonesian government, displaying a degree of opportunism, has responded to radical demands by accommodating the aspirations of these religious groups through legislative and policy measures. Contrastingly, Brunei Darussalam takes a more stringent stance against new religious movements. Defined by a sharia constitution and bolstered by a strict Islamic authority (Müller, 2018). Brunei enforces a robust approach in addressing these developments. In Malaysia, the response involves laws and government policies that, at times, appear repressive. This approach is underpinned by the strict institutionalization of citizen definitions and associated identities, contributing to the diverse strategies employed

by these nations in managing the challenges posed by new religious movements.

Countries with Muslim majorities in specific regions, such as Mindanao and Patani, grapple with a historical legacy of colonial domination and the dynamics of hegemonic majority democracy (Suaedy, 2014). Primary concerns in these regions include challenges related to the transfer of land ownership, the monopolization of natural resources, and the autonomy to govern themselves (Shobron et al., 2020). In contrast, Muslim populations in countries where they are a minority face different dynamics. They often find themselves more dependent on the political system and ruling groups. Cambodia, for instance, exhibits a relatively accommodating stance due to Prime Minister Hun Sen's personal and party relations with Islamic groups. In Vietnam, similar to other communist nations, the situation reflects unique dynamics within the political landscape (Suaedy, 2014).

Myanmar, currently undergoing a transition to democracy, faces a particularly challenging situation, especially for minority groups like the Rohingya Muslims. Buddhist leaders in the country have exacerbated the difficulties faced by these minorities. The plight of the Rohingya Muslim ethnicity remains a prominent topic of public discussion in Southeast Asia (Suaedy & Hafiz, 2015). Recently, their situation has taken a darker turn as they seemingly find themselves stateless (Rahman & Mohajan, 2019). In recent times, three major issues have intensified the challenges for the Rohingya Muslim community. First, they were expelled from Myanmar's Rakhine State. Second,

they fled from refugee camps in Bangladesh, seeking refuge in various countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia. The third issue revolves around the rejection of these destination countries in Southeast Asia, leaving their fate increasingly uncertain. The refusal of these countries to provide refuge further complicates an already dire situation. At the core of this intricate problem lies the fundamental issue of citizenship. The Rohingya Muslim ethnic group, among other minority groups in Myanmar, is a tragic victim of an incomplete conception of citizenship.

Myanmar and the Rohingya Muslim Minority

Why has the Rohingya minority conflict in Myanmar become increasingly complex, and why has the issue of Rohingya Muslim citizenship remained a problem? This article aims to provide a comprehensive perspective, examining different angles to explain why the conflict remains unresolved and has persisted over time. It is important to recognize that this analysis serves as a macro-level overview, drawing insights from multiple perspectives. While the complexity of the issue requires more data and in-depth scholarship, this paper attempts to provide a preliminary understanding. The information presented here is drawn from various sources and informal discussions with researchers specializing in the Rohingya issue in Myanmar. While a more exhaustive investigation is warranted, this article provides a basic account of the conditions in Myanmar and the contextual factors contributing to the ongoing conflict. By elucidating the state of Myanmar and delving into the citizenship predicament faced by Rohingya

Muslims, we aim to provide a macro-level explanation for the persistence of this unresolved conflict.

In the context of Myanmar and the ongoing conflict, there are several key points that can be highlighted in this article; First, Myanmar is a country with myriad intricacies, making it remarkably complex. This nation has long been under the control of a military junta. Despite the recent emergence of the democratic figure Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel laureate, the atmosphere of militarism remains deeply entrenched in the country. The military culture, driven by a desire for stability and discipline, perceives any disruptions as anomalies that must be promptly addressed. This is particularly evident in the conflict that unfolded in Rakhine State, where the Rohingya Muslim community resides. Myanmar's conditions lead to our imagination as to how this country is operated.

Amidst the dominance of the military junta in governing the country, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a beacon of hope. However, Suu Kyi's journey was far from easy. Initially, she faced criticism for appearing inactive and choosing silence during the ongoing conflict in Rakhine. Some media observers suggest that Suu Kyi's silence was a strategic move to assert control over the military. Her perceived strategy aimed at taming the military first, as her only opportunity to uphold justice in the country rested on establishing trust with them. Suu Kyi found herself in a precarious position, where speaking out specifically about the Rohingya could jeopardize everything she had achieved. There was no guarantee that the country would improve if she resigned or openly addressed the Rohingya issue,

risking expulsion by the military junta. However, ultimately, Suu Kyi confronted the military, leading to her removal from power and subsequent arrest on various charges. These charges ranged from corruption to illegal possession of walkie-talkies and violations of Covid restrictions (Firnas and Rizky, 2023).

Second, when examining the state's perspective within Myanmar, the insurgent forces of its own people come to the fore. Mr. Ito Sumardi, former Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar, provided an explanation circulated on social media that in Shan State, Myanmar faced the forces of the Shan Independent Army, which was supported by China. In Kachin State, which is known for its abundant natural resources such as minerals and gems, the challenge came from the Kachin Independent Army (Htung, 2018). Meanwhile, in Irawady, the force was the Wa Ethnic Army (Lintner, 2019), a group with enhanced capabilities, including the ability to manufacture its own weapons. In the Kokan region, Myanmar faced the forces of Khun Sa (Meehan & Dan, 2023), who controlled the Golden Triangle with modern weapons obtained from Thailand.

In Rakhine State, Myanmar is grappling with two significant armed rebellions; the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (Lee, 2021) with Islamic identity, and the Arakan Independent Army (Bashar, 2019) with Buddhist identity. As a result, Wening Fikriati from ISAIs (Institute of Southeast Asian Islam), during a visit to Kong Jour Refugee Camp, one of the refugee camps in northern Thailand near the Myanmar border, encountered not only Muslim refugees

but also Buddhist refugees from Shan State, where another rebellion base is located. This highlights that the complexity of the ongoing conflict extends beyond Islam and the Rohingya, indicating that Myanmar, with its military junta government, faces serious challenges within the country. Some researchers perceive the events in Myanmar as part of the country's transition towards democracy (Suaedy & Hafiz, 2015).

The conflict in Rakhine State, involving the Rohingya, is just one among several ongoing conflicts in Myanmar. Nonetheless, it has garnered significant attention for several reasons; 1) Historical Sentiment: The conflict has deep historical roots, contributing to its prolonged nature. 2) Involvement of muslim ethnic minorities. The conflict involves Muslim ethnic minorities, adding a layer of complexity to the situation. 3) Escalation and size of conflict. The conflict tends to escalate frequently and on a large scale, drawing attention to its severity. 4) Religious aspect. The Rohingya conflict has gained increasing attention due to reactions from Muslims in the ASEAN region, who perceive it as a religious conflict. While Islamic solidarity is a notable response, condemnation of violence is not limited to Islam; groups from various religions, including Buddhism, denounce the violence. 5) Regional disinterest in Rohingya refugees. The regional situation shows a lack of concern for Rohingya refugees, leaving them stateless and without a country. This statelessness exposes them to violence and denies them access to basic human rights. Greg Constatine, a U.S. photographer, vividly captures the plight of the Rohingya through his project "Nowhere People,"

showcasing their struggles in countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.

Third, concerning the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, there are indeed unresolved historical issues tied to the country. The historical narrative of the Rohingya is a subject of ongoing debate among historians, particularly with differing perspectives from the state. The official stance of the state towards the Rohingya ethnic group appears not to fully acknowledge them as integral to Myanmar (Suaedy & Hafiz, 2015). The government often refrains from using the term "Rohingya" and, more frequently, employs the term "illegal immigrants." This terminology is also adopted and propagated by some individuals in Myanmar, both directly and through social media channels. Due to this unsettled historical context, various state policies have effectively marginalized the Rohingya, particularly in matters related to their nationality.

The Myanmar Military Junta enforces an extremely strict population system, as outlined in the 1982 population law. This law defines Myanmar's population as ethnic groups who have resided permanently since 1185, considering the Rohingya as having arrived later. To become a citizen under this law, individuals must prove their lineage up to the third generation, indicating that their great-grandfather must be of native Myanmar ethnic descent (Arief; Rohingya Who Are They?). However, Rohingya Muslims find it exceedingly challenging to meet these criteria. Not only is their ethnicity not officially recognized, but also their archaeological evidence, dating back to the 7th century, has been intentionally destroyed—a form of systematic

marginalization. Abuy Tahay, a Rohingya native and activist, emphasized during a conference held with ISAIs friends that historical records, including the 1872 census by British Burma, the Indian census in 1911, and the 1942 Indian Immigration report, once recognized the Rohingya as one of the original ethnicities of Burma (Myanmar), using the name "Ras Arakan Muslim." However, over time, they were subsequently marginalized and labeled as illegal.

Fourth, this unresolved history has been further complicated by the contest for natural resources in the region, involving major nations. In the Rakhine State, where the Rohingya reside, an estimated 5.6 trillion cubic meters of gas has been discovered, slated for exploitation over the next 30 years (Erizely Jely Bintaro). In the competition for these resources, significant countries like China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have become involved, with China and Russia being particularly assertive. Both nations are known to provide military equipment assistance to the Myanmar military junta. Notably, China has extended economic infrastructure aid, and there is a clear ambition to complete the construction of a 2,300 km oil pipeline from the port of Sittwe, Bay of Bengal, to Kunming in southern China. This underscores China's substantial influence on Myanmar, not just in terms of resources but also in altering the regional constellation and geopolitics when these resources are controlled.

Fifth, from a social perspective, resolving the Rohingya problem faces formidable challenges due to three main factors; 1) Ethnic image. Within Myanmar, there is a prevailing perception that the Rohingya are not part of the

country's history, often referred to as Bengalis. However, this term is offensive to the Rohingya, who reject being labeled as Bengalis. The term Rohingya itself can trigger phobia among some Myanmar people due to its association with separatist rebels who have caused the loss of numerous lives. 2) Religious relations. Myanmar has Buddhist communities, some of whom follow Bikkhu Ashin Wirathu, with around 2000 followers. Wirathu vehemently denies the existence of Muslims in Myanmar, leading to difficulty in reconciliation between his group and Muslim communities. 3) Persistent poverty and low social services. Prolonged poverty and inadequate social services have fueled challenges. This has led to an increase in drug smuggling by rebel groups and/or the community in Rakhine, as highlighted in the Kofi Annan report. The question that arises is how to address these issues, which seem to be escalating and becoming more complex. Compounding the situation, Rohingya Muslims have sought refuge in various neighboring countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia. Their arrival has sparked controversy, as some residents in the destination countries reject them, adding an additional layer of complexity to the already challenging situation.

Rohingya Muslim Refugees and State Rejection

The Rohingya Muslims faced two significant events: expulsion from their homeland and subsequent forced displacement. These events have become a matter of concern in Southeast Asia as Rohingya Muslims sought refuge in countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Abu Tahay, in his explanation, highlighted that the Rohingya Muslim community faced serious threats stemming from

inflammatory rhetoric fueled by ultra-nationalism and racism. Anti-Muslim sentiment was manipulated as a political tool by various factions within Myanmar society, creating a detrimental atmosphere that dates back to 1993. This hostile environment has led to the implementation of restrictions on various aspects of Rohingya life, including movement, access to higher education, health services, marriage, and the upkeep of mosques and religious schools. Since the eruption of violence in 2012, their rights have been severely curtailed, limiting their ability to worship freely in mosques, engage in religious practices, and pursue education. This has resulted in a significant impact on the daily lives and well-being of the Rohingya community.

In recent years, dire circumstances in Burma (Myanmar) and Bangladesh have compelled the Rohingya to resort to desperate measures, including paying brokers to smuggle them by boat from these two countries to Malaysia and beyond. This perilous journey of Rohingya boat people, marked by the tragic deaths of hundreds each year, has garnered the attention of governments across the region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has acknowledged that the Rohingya's inability to secure citizenship is not solely a problem related to Burma but also a broader regional issue with widespread implications. Despite this recognition, concrete measures to address the plight of the Rohingya and improve their situation have been slow to materialize. The ongoing challenges faced by the Rohingya population, including those attempting dangerous sea journeys, underscore the urgent need for collaborative and effective regional solutions to alleviate their suffering and protect their rights (Yasyid, 2017).

Initially, the Bangladesh government responded positively to the Rohingya ethnic community by allocating special camps for them. However, over time, the number of Rohingya refugees continued to increase, largely due to ethnic and religious similarities (Adelia, 2013). In subsequent periods, there was a shift in attitude within Bangladeshi society, marked by visible rejection of the Rohingya. This change in sentiment became noticeable in 2009, when an anti-Rohingya campaign was initiated by the media and political elites for the first time, reaching its peak in 2010. This rejection created a space for the marginalization and discrimination of the Rohingya ethnic group, extending beyond Bangladesh to several Southeast Asian countries. Repeated rejections were often rooted in the perception of the Rohingya as a growing population seen as immigrants, posing a perceived threat to the social and economic stability of local communities. This complex situation reflects the multifaceted challenges faced by the Rohingya community in the region.

The policy of tightening border controls in the Southeast Asia region has led to the rejection of Rohingya ethnic boats, creating new concerns about the plight of Rohingya refugees who may be stranded at sea, facing difficulties in reaching other countries. This situation poses serious challenges, giving rise to various problems and objections in several countries in the Southeast Asian region (Yazid & Lie, 2020). The tightening of border controls is influenced by the general perception among the international community regarding refugees, often associating them with negative connotations and considering them as potential threats to

security. Consequently, a number of countries in the region frequently refuse the arrival of refugees, citing reasons related to maintaining domestic security stability. This broader issue highlights the need for comprehensive and humane approaches to address the plight of refugees, particularly the Rohingya, while considering the complexities and challenges associated with regional border policies.

Indonesia, as an ASEAN member country, plays a significant role in advocating and actively supporting efforts for a peaceful resolution between Myanmar and the Rohingya ethnic group (Alunaza & Juani, 2017). Indonesia has been notable for accepting Rohingya ethnic refugees, driven by a commitment to humanitarian values and a shared religion. Notably, Indonesia stands out as the only country that continues to open its doors to Rohingya refugees, even during the challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, it's important to note that there has been a shift in public sentiment in Indonesia, with some people expressing concerns about the increasing number and prolonged stay of Rohingya refugees. This change in perception can be attributed to two key issues; some individuals are worried that the growing number of Rohingya refugees may lead to territorial challenges, with concerns that their extended stay might impact local communities and also there has been a shift in people's perception of Rohingya Muslims. Initially seen purely as refugees to a group that fled from their camps in Bangladesh.

Malaysia has expressed limitations in accepting additional Rohingya refugees. Many Rohingya refugees in Aceh, Indonesia, initially intended to go to Malaysia but

were deceived by parties claiming to provide assistance, resulting in them being stranded in North Aceh. This situation, while somewhat fortunate for them, highlights the challenges faced by Rohingya refugees. Previously, the Malaysian authorities had rejected the presence of Rohingya refugees, employing practices such as pushing them back into the sea, a method also used by Thai authorities. This practice received sharp criticism from international humanitarian observers, who described the treatment of ethnic Rohingya refugees as akin to being "ping pong balls" that were rejected by various ASEAN member countries (Budaya, 2017). Adding to the complexity of the situation is the lack of legal certainty for the Rohingya ethnic group provided by the UN and ASEAN organizations. This leaves them in a precarious situation, akin to being like chickens without a mother. On one side, they lose their citizenship identity in their home country, and on the other side, they face rejection in the destination country. These challenges trigger new problems related to the welfare and well-being of the Rohingya ethnic group who have sought refuge in countries like Indonesia. The need for coordinated regional efforts and a comprehensive approach to address the plight of Rohingya refugees remains evident.

Rohingya Muslims and Bhineka Citizenship

The root of the Rohingya Muslim conflict in Myanmar lies in the lack of equal treatment, leading to the problematization of their existence. The absence of fair treatment contributes to the fostering of separatism among the Rohingya, a perspective that is more apparent from a military and problem-centric standpoint rather than

addressing citizenship issues. This results in minimal, if not almost non-existent, state communication and dialogue with the citizens, creating an unhealthy citizenship relationship in Myanmar. Why is that? because a community is truly healthy when all its members, not just a select few, thrive together. A socially healthy society takes into account the legitimate needs and aspirations of all its groups, promoting the general welfare of humanity. The concept of the common good, however, does not seem to be a fundamental value in Myanmar's public life today, particularly when considering the Rohingya Muslims. At first glance, it appears that the prevailing formula is one rooted in ultranationalism, emphasizing the greatest good for the greatest number, rather than adhering to the more inclusive formula of the greatest good for all (Abu Tahay, 2014). This perspective sheds light on the challenges Myanmar faces in fostering an inclusive and harmonious society that respects the rights and well-being of all its citizens.

The question that needs to be asked is; What is the core problem of the complexity that occurs for Rohingya Muslims? The core problem underlying the complexity faced by Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, as well as other minorities in Southeast Asia, is the crisis of the meaning of citizenship (Suaedy, 2018). In the context of the Rohingya issue, it is imperative to scrutinize and address the implementation of citizenship principles that go beyond merely respecting the rights of individual citizens. The focus should extend to encompass the entire cultural heritage and traditions that constitute an integral part of their identity. This consideration becomes particularly crucial when dealing

with vulnerable groups such as marginalized minorities that experience discrimination from both majority groups and the state (Suaedy, 2018). The crisis in the understanding and application of citizenship principles underscores the need for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive approach that recognizes and upholds the rights and identity of all citizens, fostering a sense of belonging and equality within the broader society.

An important concept that can be proposed in addressing various cases of minorities in Southeast Asia, including Rohingya Muslims, is the concept of "Bhineka Citizenship". This concept is derived from the combination of citizenship and "bhinneka tunggal ika," a phrase from the Indonesian national motto that means unity in diversity. Ahmad Suaedy, former director of ISAIs (2014-2019), abstracted this concept from his research based on Papua and Aceh conflict. The Bhineka Citizenship concept operates on the basic principle that problems and conflicts involving minorities should be seen within the framework and treated as issues of citizenship. This principle is crucial as it encourages communication and dialogue in various forms. The concept can be broken down into several important principles; First, cultural basis for conflict resolution. Placing traditions, culture, and beliefs as the foundation for conflict resolution. This approach fosters mutual trust between the state and minority groups. Second, citizenship perspective. Viewing separatist activists not as enemies but as citizens and potential dialogue partners. Implementing this second concept faces challenges in places like Myanmar, where the dominant ideology of militarism shapes the state's relations with the Rohingya Muslim minority.

Third, it is essential to facilitate open dialogue and negotiations with minority residents in conflict. This involves engaging third parties, such as specific international communities, within a humanitarian framework and maintaining trust in the dialogue between countries and citizens with aspirations and demands. Fourth, it is crucial to provide protection, uphold freedom of speech, and organize and conduct negotiations openly. These four principles of citizenship can only be effectively implemented within a framework where minority communities, with all their differences and conflict dynamics, are recognized, considered, and treated as citizens (Suaedy, 2018). Myanmar as a country and the ASEAN association as a regional community should adopt these principles as part of efforts to resolve conflicts. Failing to do so may perpetuate the challenges faced by Rohingya Muslims, becoming an enduring burden for Myanmar itself and ASEAN as a whole.

Myanmar has long had fundamental agreements aimed at establishing the principles of citizenship, encompassing three key principles; 1) The unity of the Myanmar people and its territorial integrity. 2) The right of various constituent groups of a country to express ethnic, cultural, and religious differences. 3) Equality for all ethnic groups (Safman, 2007). However, these concepts have proven to be highly controversial, especially when attempts are made to translate these broad principles into actual policy statements. The challenge arises because the logic of democratization and equal citizenship is not fully evident. Instead, the prevailing logic and rhetoric often reflect ultranationalism and militarism. Proposing and formulating

a bhineka citizenship model in state policy could be a constructive step. This is crucial because Myanmar's policies seem have not only led to discrimination and restrictions on living space but have also indicated the effective expulsion of the Rohingya ethnic group from their origins, forcing them to become refugees in Southeast Asia. The need for a more inclusive and equitable approach to citizenship and diversity remains a critical aspect of addressing the complex issues faced by minority groups in Myanmar.

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The Far-Right Phenomenon and its Impact on the Security Landscape in Singapore

Introduction

The rise of far-right extremism is said to be the fifth global wave of terrorism since the late 19th century after the "religious" wave that has largely shaped our security landscape (Auger, 2020). The recent arrest of the 16-year old youth has informed us of the global and local threats posed by such ideologies. It also shows that the far-right phenomenon extends beyond what is typically perceived as a purely 'white' agenda. Instead, it informs us of the intersectionality of human prejudice that can

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manifest with ease in other traditions and society as long as there exist platforms and opportunities that enable it to flourish (Hedges, 2021). However, a significant body of research produced in security studies on radicalism tend to pathologise individuals and essentialise them in a reductive manner. It disregards the cultural and political nuances, such as unpacking the colonial baggage from our current understanding of radicalism and extremism.

Against this backdrop, this piece will first provide a brief historical analysis of far-right extremism. It will then identify some of the key trends in the far-right movement to show its malleability and understand the ecosystem that normalises far-right rhetoric. The paper will conclude by suggesting the need to build on Singapore's current CVE (countering violent extremism) strategy to prevent obsolescence. It needs to be aware that the threat goes beyond Islamism and militant jihadism (Hedges, 2021).

Deconstructing Far-Right Extremism

Like many concepts, it is not easy to pinpoint a particular definition of the far-right as scholars have offered different ways of thinking about it. The Institute for Economics and Peace describes the far-right as a political ideology inclined towards authoritarianism linked to populist elements. It is inherently exclusivist, such as homophobia, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia. (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020). However, far-right extremism is not simply a political ideology (Davey & Ebner, 2019). It is driven by extreme right-wing rhetoric wedded with a distinct Christian theological worldview that is supremacist

and buttressed by a peculiar reading of history that sees the perennial clash between the civilised "West" against the barbaric "East" (Hedges, 2018). The process of othering did not appear overnight. Historically, it is rooted in structures that project a particular reading of Western colonial and Protestant (Christian) history onto the world (Hedges, 2021). This European biblical imaginary is centred upon white supremacy that condemned indigenous communities as inferior and subhuman. Furthermore, far-right groups tend to think of themselves as superior to others. Selected manifestos from far-right attacks over the last decade clearly outline white supremacist or neo-Nazi views to justify their atrocities (Ware, 2020). Nonetheless, the recent far-right case in Singapore is particularly interesting. Though the local youth self-identifies as a Christian protestant and is reported to be inspired by the Christchurch attacker, he presumably did not draw inspiration from white supremacist narratives as he is of Indian ethnicity. It can be argued that his ideological underpinning as a Christian might draw similarities with Brenton Tarrant's exclusionary version of Christianity. However, it also informs us that white-supremacist ideology can influence far-right movements in other parts of the world that do not necessarily find resonance with the "great replacement theory", which sees the ongoing threat of indigenous white Europeans being replaced by non-European immigrants (Obaidi et al., 2021). However, the tendency to romanticise a glorious past wedded with a 'siege mentality' is something that all far-right movements share regardless of their geographical location.

Key Trends of far-right extremism

The malleability of White Supremacy

According to Ebner, extremist actors share a common goal that cuts across the political- ideological spectrum, which is to instigate radical political or societal change often through the strategic polarisation of society (Ebner, 2020) As mentioned above, white supremacy can gain a foothold in some societies due to existing ecosystems historically rooted in racist structures produced by European colonial rule (Said, 1993). In this regard, far-right ideologues can mobilise society by exploiting notions of ethnic or religious victimisation propelled by the existential threat of"violence" from the "other" (Mohammed, 2021). In short, what makes the far-right compelling is its appeal togrievances couched in religious language that are deeply exclusivist wedded with a racialisedelement. It will accordingly transpose itself beyond the idea of White supremacy into a racialhierarchy. Unfortunately, what they also share in common is a powerful in-group thinking that refuses to engage with those who differ from their worldview. What follows is that the "other" becomes the target for dehumanisation that justifies their hatred and, to some extent, violence (Volkan, 2006).

Far-right extremism in this region is primarily religio-ethnocentric that is not directly inspired by white supremacy but shares the same method of reasoning, such as the BharatiyaJanata Party (BJP) in India (Ramakrishna, 2021). Hindu nationalism (Hindutva) is a political ideology that claimsreligious justification but is not strictly a religious ideology itself. One of its leading ideologues, V.D. Savarkar, whose writings laid the foundations for militant Hindutva,

was an atheist and influenced by European Nazi attitudes towards the Jews rather than building on indigenous tropes that are arguably more inclusive (Hedges, 2021). The BJP continuously articulates this version of Hindutva that regards the presence of Muslims as an extension of Muslim imperialism from thousands of years ago. Unsurprisingly, the British colonial power played a part in creating this consciousness of separation that paints Muslims as despots and religious invaders that threaten the Hindu state and its people (Waiker, 2018). However, it is not to say that Muslims are free from guilt. There have been incidents where religious minorities, including Hindus, are subjected to discrimination in Pakistan, a Muslim majority state (Hadi, 2015). It demonstrates that violence on one sidecan evoke a similar response from the other side.

Reciprocal Radicalisation

Political scientist Roger Eatwell coined the term cumulative or reciprocal extremism, which suggests how one form of extremism feeds off and amplifies other forms of extremism (Eatwell, 2006). In the case of the far-right phenomenon, Douglass Pratt describes this as "reactive co- radicalisation" where violent Islamophobic acts of the far-right prompt further discourse and acts of violence from Islamists (Pratt, 2015). Particularly in the West, we see groups and individuals responding to what they see as an encroachment of the Muslim population on their lives and cultural norms (Busher and Macklin, 2015). This sentiment builds on fear of immigration, xenophobia and Islamophobia that has grown exponentially over the past decade due to domestic and foreign policies in the Global

North. However, it is important to not isolate radicalisation or terrorism from the broader workings of society and understand its power dynamics. What we probably see todayis not simply a process that feeds on "otherisation" but an evenly balanced relationship betweenhow groups feel and express hate and indignation for each other in different social contexts leading to radicalisation on both sides of the divide. This indignation grows with every interaction between both groups resulting in a permanent sense of animosity (Abbas, 2020). In short, the far- right and Islamists feed off each other, launching tit-for-tat attacks in response to each other's activities, as was the case of the teenager's arrest who plotted the attack following the Islamist extremist attack in Nice, France, last year (Chew, 2019). In this context, policymakers and security experts need to understand the radicalisation of both ends of the spectrum as a complete social theory and not in isolation. As much as religious literacy is crucial in combatting Islamist extremism, it is equally essential to scrutinise structural Islamophobia that colours policy thinking and forces individuals and states to see the world in binaries. More so when there are emerging technologies that have been designed to normalise such divisive rhetoric.

Mainstreaming Far-Right Phenomenon

While in the past, the far-right rhetoric has always been on the fringes of society, the rapid rise of digital media over the past decade has changed the status quo by allowing such ideas to be accessible to anyone as long as they have a smartphone or computer (Schroader, e.d). Social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook allow far-right extremists to build ecosystems to radicalise and even live

stream their attacks, as was the case of the Christchurch attacker. According to an investigation conducted by the Guardian, it reveals how Facebook not only fuels far-right rhetoric but it profits from the proliferation of hate speech (Knaus et al, 2019). More recently, Frances Haugen, a former employee of Facebook, revealed that the company is misleading the public on countering hate speech and misinformation as it embraced algorithms that amplify such rhetoric (Murphy & Duffy 2021). Such actions are unsurprising as the internet has created a world without borders that led to the democratisation of knowledge and freedom of information. However, what followed was an unintended consequence that allows extremist groups to exploit this *laissez-faire* medium by waging propaganda wars through algorithms and offer an illusion of a better "reality". It also shows the importance of understanding how algorithms work. Although it is not necessarily bad, the lack of literacy on algorithms will inevitably pull us into a filter bubble that is intellectually isolated and reinforces our prejudices that can provide a seedbed for normalising "otherisation" and militant extremism.

Broadening Singapore's Security Landscape towards extremism.

A multidimensional approach to extremism

The security landscape of the past decade, both regionally and locally, has been primarily shaped by threats of Islamist extremism post 9/11. However, as discussed in this essay, extremism knows no race, ethnicity or religion**.** What is required is a multidimensional approach in tackling extremism. To speak of the far-right extremism only in

terms of its Islamophobic rhetoric without recognising its nationalistic and colonial dimension would be to misrepresent the nature of the movement. The anti-Muslim sentiments need to be read along with the historical and geopolitical context that created and continue to produce it.

Regulating the digital sphere

Social media has accelerated globalisation to influence the localisation of radicalisation. Therefore, security experts and policymakers must look beyond the region and prepare for previously isolated threats in the Global North. Contrary to the *laissez-faire* approach of many countries in the Global North, Singapore took a firm position to regulate social media companies by passing a law to counter foreign interference, also known as Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA). This act allows the government to hold social media companies accountable by directing them to take necessary action to restrict the dissemination of hostile information. However, there is an existential concern that the vagueness of the term 'hostile information' would be taken advantage of by the government to clamp down on dissenting voices even though they might not necessarily enable extreme actions. Therefore, it shows that blocking access to content through the government's legal arm might not be the most effective or sustainable way.

Strengthening Civil Society

In addition to working closely with big tech companies, the government must work with civil society organisations (CSOs) to create borderless ecosystems that inculcate inclusivism and human flourishing. Research has also

shown that most extremist groups, regardless of ideology, share similar narrative elements (Yeo & Nasir, 2021). Perhaps the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) model of rehabilitating Muslim detainees can be expanded to include other faithgroups and youth networks in developing a more holistic P/CVE approach in Singapore. Likewise, upstream efforts such as the SGSecure that aims to sensitise the community's response to the threat of terrorism should also equip Singaporeans with a specific skill set that allows more thoughtful and critical engagements online. It would also help social-media companies avoid the strong-arm of the state.

De-pathologizing Muslims

The September-11 attacks prompted an amplified interest to study Islam through a security lens. Such an approach is problematic as it tends to essentialise the narrative of extremism that lacks historical and cultural nuances that the humanities offer. According to Farish Noor, many works from security studies have presented Muslims in reductive ways that reinforce colonial tropes of Muslims as barbaric and inherently fanatic. Such an old-fashioned way of thinking is dangerous as it disregards the discursive experience of Muslims in negotiating diversity. It has created policies that benefit the arms industry and surveillance systems built by governments who wish to maintain social order through anxiety and fear. He further argues for the need to re-centre the humanities in conceptualising P/CVE strategies. It provides the ability to build a holistic counter-narrative by studying the subject matter from multiple vantage points (Noor, 2021).

Conclusion

Reports have shown that far-right extremism has significantly outpaced other forms of terrorism today (Jones, Doxsee, & Harrington, 2020). This article has briefly explained the complex relationship between religion and extremism, suggesting that extremism is not solely rooted in a specific faith. The broader messages of ethnoreligious chauvinism make it a malleable ideology that appeals to hardline groups despite the specificities of their socio-political milieu. Furthermore, the article contends that social media platforms have played a significant role in normalising far-right sentiments, thereby disrupting the social fabric of societies globally. This necessitates the creation of broad-based alliances with social media companies and civil society. Such collaborations could empower individuals to confront polarisation organically, reducing reliance on state intervention through its legal instruments. The article concludes by suggesting the need to re- centre the humanities to facilitate a multidimensional approach in tackling extremism. The current landscape of security studies often relies on reductive heuristics that struggle to address the complexities of modern threats. This calls for a shift in perspective, one that mobilises our collective capacity to think through an alternative humanising lens that is crucial in creating an inclusive society. Singapore's commendable approach in tackling terrorism through community building, education and rehabilitation can offer important insights for other countries facing the fifth wave of extremism.

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Salafism in Singapore

DEVELOPMENT AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Global acts of violence by terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State brought global attention to Islam and Muslims. Academia and policymakers sought to explain these acts of violence as well as other issues such as increasing conservatism and identity politics in Muslim-majority societies, and the integration of Muslim migrant communities in Europe. Rightly or not, the international export of Saudi Wahhabism became a popular starting point for discussion and Salafism became commonly assumed to be linked with conservative attitudes, exclusivism, extremism and jihadism.

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Unsurprisingly, Salafis in Singapore became the subject of public attention and concern. After all, Singapore prizes religious harmony and social cohesion as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. Salafism was thrust into the spotlight when individuals who happened to be Salafis were detained for radicalism or were barred from teaching. In August 2016, two Singaporeans who were detained for their involvement in terrorism-related activities were listeners of Radio Hang, a Salafi radio station based in Batam, Indonesia (Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2016). In June 2017, the first female Singaporean to be detained for radicalism under the Internal Security Act (ISA) claimed she was looking for a Salafi or an IS supporter to marry (Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2017). Later that month, a Singaporean Salafi preacher was barred from teaching in Singapore. His teachings were allegedly exclusivist in nature and promoted enmity, strife, and potentially, violence not only towards Muslims, but also other religious communities and the state (Au-Yong 2017). Nine of his books were also banned. Singapore also banned two books written by Salih al-Fawzan, a Saudi Salafi Scholar (Tham 2017). Although the Singapore government did not put the spotlight on Salafism as a problematic sect of Islam, these actions added on to the assumption that Salafism was linked with jihadism.

The rise of jihadism and religious extremism also amplified the enduring discourse between Salafis and non-Salafis in Singapore, where Islam has traditionally been Ash'ari in *'aqida*h and Shafi'i in fiqh (Aljuneid and Hussin 2005). In response to global concerns, Sunni religious leaders from the Middle East (Abbas 2016) convened to define the

'true' Sunni Muslim identity, rejecting certain Salafi practices like excommunication (takfir). In 2017, the Singapore Islamic Scholars & Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS) held a conference addressing the entrenched religious debates within the country, aiming to reconcile differences amidst heightened scrutiny of Salafism (PERGAS 2017). Concurrently, a Facebook group, 'Singapura Tolak Fahaman Wahabi/Salafi' (Singapore Rejects Wahabism/Salafism), released a list of Salafi-affiliated religious figures, mosques, and educational institutions.

The Development of Salafism in Singapore

The evolution of Salafism in Singapore is a nuanced tale that begins in the early 1900s, catalyzed by seismic shifts within the global Muslim world amidst the backdrop of Western dominance (Saeed 2013: 27-41). Singaporean modernists, inspired by the intellectual developments of the era, sought to chart a course that would reconcile Islamic tradition with the exigencies of the modern age (Saeed 2013: 32-36). Foremost among them were the founders of al-Imam magazine, including luminaries such as Syed Sheikh Ahmad al-Hadi and Sheikh Muhammad Tahir Jalaluddin. Their vision was clear: to revitalize Islamic education and advocate for the rights of women within the Muslim community (Hamzah 1991: 109-114).

The modernists' call for reform resonated deeply in a world grappling with the ramifications of colonialism and rapid societal transformation. At its core was a desire to return to the 'pristine' Islam of the salaf, the pious predecessors of the faith, whose example served as a beacon of guidance for

subsequent generations. Drawing inspiration from figures like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, the modernists articulated a vision of Islam that wasboth faithful to tradition and adaptive to the challenges of modernity (Hamzah 1991: 109-114).

In 1906, the modernists took a significant step forward with the establishment of al-Imam magazine, a seminal publication that would serve as a platform for their ideas. Modelled after the influential Egyptian journal al-Manar, al-Imam became a conduit for disseminating modernist thought and engaging in critical discourse on religious matters. The magazine espoused a puritanical interpretation of Islam, emphasising the need to rid the faith of perceived innovations and return to its original teachings (Hamzah 1991).

Central to the modernists' agenda was the reform of Islamic education, which they saw as crucial to the community's intellectual and spiritual development. In 1907, they founded the Madrasah al-Iqbal, the first modernist madrasah in Singapore, as a beacon of progressive learning (Hamzah 1991; Aljuneid and Hussin 2005). Rejecting the traditional pondok system as antiquated and inadequate, they envisioned a new model of education that would prepare students for the challenges of the modern world. Despite its eventual relocation in 1908, the Madrasah al-Iqbal left an indelible mark on Singapore's educational landscape, paving the wayfor future reforms (Aljuneid and Hussin 2005).

The modernists' concerns extended beyond the realm of education to encompass broader societal issues, including the status of women within the Muslim community. Troubled by high divorce rates and social inequalities, they advocated for legal reforms that would recognize and protect women's rights. Their efforts culminated in proposed legislation aimed at regulating polygamous marriages, promoting women's education, and combating social injustices. Through their advocacy, they sought to empower women and foster a more equitable and inclusive society (Hamzah 1991).

Despite their pioneering efforts, the modernist movement in Singapore faced numerous challenges, including financial constraints and internal divisions. The founders of al-Imam were forced to relocate the Madrasah al-Iqbal and their publishing house due to limited resources, leading to a decline in their influence. Moreover, the absence of a cohesive organizational structure meant that the modernists' ideas were not effectively institutionalized, leaving their legacy vulnerable to erosion.

In the decades that followed, the torch of reform was carried forward by a new generation of activists inspired by the modernist ethos. In the 1930s, a loose community of modernists, influenced by Salafi principles, coalesced around the Singapore Muhammadiyah movement. Drawing inspiration from the Indonesian organisation of the same name, they sought to purify the local Muslim community from perceived deviations and superstitions. Through their advocacy, they aimed to foster a more orthodox understanding of Islam that adhered strictly to the Quran and the sunnah (Aljuneid 2011; Tukimin 2015).

The emergence of the Singapore Muhammadiyah marked a significant milestone in the evolution of Islamic reform in Singapore, signalling a renewed commitment to the ideals of the modernist movement. However, the path to reform was fraught with challenges, as the Singapore Muhammadiyah grappled with internal divisions and external opposition. Despite facing resistance from conservative elements within the Muslim community, the Singapore Muhammadiyah persevered in its mission to promote a more authentic and rigorous interpretation of Islam.

The global landscape of Islam underwent profound transformations in the latter half ofthe 20th century, driven by geopolitical upheavals and ideological shifts (Voll 2013: 56-67). The rise of political Islam in the Middle East, coupled with the ascendancy of Saudi Arabia as a major regional power, exerted a significant influence on the trajectory of Islamic reform movements worldwide. Saudi Arabia's efforts to propagate Wahhabism, a puritanical form of Islam rooted in the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, reshaped the contours of Islamic discourse and practice, including in Singapore (Hasan 2008: 247-274).

The spread of Wahhabism, now commonly referred to as Salafism, had a profound impact on the development of Islamic reform in Singapore, particularly within the Singapore Muhammadiyah movement (Aljuneid 2011: 295-296). Saudi funding bolstered the organization's activities and facilitated the education of cadre members abroad, leading to the emergence of the influential "Mamlaka Alumni" group (Ittihad Mahasiswa Singapura Al Mamlakah

Al Arabia As Saudia N.D.). Inspired by their experiences in Saudi Arabia, some members of the Mamlaka Alumni became vocal advocates for Salafism within the Singaporean Muslim community, espousing a purist interpretation of Islam that rejected perceived innovations and deviations.

By the 1990s, Salafism had emerged as a distinct and influential strand within Singaporean Islam, challenging prevailing orthodoxies and igniting debates over religious authority and doctrinal interpretation. However, the rise of Salafism also precipitated tensions within the Muslim community, as adherents clashed with more traditionalist elements over matters of theology and practice. Despite these challenges, Salafism continued to gain tractionamong certain segments of the population, reshaping the religious landscape of Singapore in profound and enduring ways.

In conclusion, the development of Salafism in Singapore is a multifaceted phenomenon that reflects the interplay of historical, global, and local dynamics. From its roots in the early modernist movement to its consolidation within the Singapore Muhammadiyah and subsequent spread through the influence of Saudi Arabia, Salafism has emerged as a potent force shaping the contours of Islamic reform in Singapore. While its rise has sparked debates and divisions within the Muslim community, it has also brought renewed attention to questions of orthodoxy,authority, and interpretation in the practice of Islam in Singapore.

Contemporary Salafism in Singapore

In an earlier study (Alkaff and Bin Jani 2021) conducted from 2016-2018, we conducted interviews

of prominent Salafis to understand their religious, social and political attitudes separate from the dynamics of Salafism in Saudi Arabia and to do so whilst aware of the limitations of the lenses provided by other Saudi-centric, security-focussed or transnational studies of Salafism. The qualitative interviews were conducted with 10 individuals who either self-identified as Salafis or were publicly labelled as Salafis. They ranged from prominent members of Salafi-labelled institutions to alumni of universities in Saudi Arabia and comprised different age groups. The interviews were supplemented with analyses of Salafi publications including the al-Imam magazine (1906-1908).

The study found that there was no coherent Salafi social or religious movement apart from their *manhaj*. The broad category of Contemporary Salafis in Singapore aspires for "authenticity" in religious practices, doctrines, and rituals. Authenticity is often expressed as "following the Qur'an and Sunna" or "following the (thinking or practices of) the Salaf al- Salih". What further distinguishes Salafis from non-Salafis in Singapore is their approach towards interpreting Qur'anic verses relating to God's physical attributes. They do not practice ta'wil (allegorical interpretation) and prefer a literal reading of verses regarding God's attributes, which is referred to as *isbat sifat-Allah*. As a consequence, most Salafis believe in tafwid (deferring interpretation to God) when the literal interpretation of the verses of the Qur'an could lead to tajsim (anthropomorphism). Some Salafis, in the isbat sifat-Allah, reject ta'wil and are unclear on their tafwid. Consequently, this small number of Salafis is controversial because their approach to isbat sifat-Allah seems to verge on tajsim. All Salafis in Singapore believe in

Tawhid Tiga. They are *Tawhid rububiyya, Tawhid uluhiyya, and Tawhid al-asma' wa-l-sifat*.

Salafis in Singapore could be grouped into three categories (1) Kaum Muda (Modernist Salafis), (2) Singapore Muhammadiyah and (3) Mamlaka Alumni. Within the Mamlaka Alumni, there are (3a) Inclusivist Salafis and (3b) 'Quietist' Salafis. These groupings do not take into account lay Salafis who may be part of overlapping networks of Salafi groups as they may obtain religious knowledge from various sources, online or "offline".

The Modernists – particularly the founders of Al-Imam periodical – introduced the Salafi *manhaj* in Singapore. This *manhaj* emphasised referencing the Qur'an and Sunna and the practices of the salaf al-salih to purify the religion from 'deviant' practices. The modernists were more concerned with education, social progress, economic participation and women's issues. The Salafi *manhaj* was purposed towards their modernist concerns. They made room for rationality to reform the Malay-Muslim culture, instead of pushing for reforms that would exclusively and meticulously emulate the salaf in literal terms. There was more emphasis on purifying religious practices because they were impractical or in the way of social progress rather than because they lead to kufr (disbelief or apostasy). For the modernists, emulating the salaf meant elevating the community towards socio-political success. The salaf were upheld because of their religious, social, political, economic and military successes. After the demise of the al-Imam publication, there were no modernist organisations and institutions. Subsequently, the modernist movement devolved. Today, Modernist Salafis exist, but not

witha coherent identity. They are only identifiable based on their strong progressive approach to modernity and strong inclusivism.

The emphasis on rationality and ijtihad set the Muhammadiyah movement in Singapore apart from the 'purist' Contemporary Salafis, just like the broader category of Modernist Salafis. Like the Modernists, in their quest to 'purify' Islam, the Singapore Muhammadiyah use the Salafi *manhaj* to justify the need to reinterpret Islam to fit the current needs of the society using rationality and ijtihad. They are against taqlid and regressing into an interpretation of Islam that hinders social and political progress. The Singapore Muhammadiyah also do not engage in takfir, which they consider a harsh and unappealing approach to educating the Muslim society.

What also differentiates the Singapore Muhammadiyah from both 'purist' Contemporary Salafis and the broader category of modernists is the use of Indonesian resources as a reference, particularly after the establishment of the organisation in 1957. For instance, according to another Singapore Muhammadiyah pioneer, Abdul Rahman Harun, membership to the organisation is not considered valid until a prospective member reads and owns Soal- Jawab Agama, a fiqh compendium written by Hassan Bandung (Tukimin 2015). Hassan Bandung remained an important reference until recently, when the Singapore Muhammadiyah organisation started to refer to Himpunan Putusan Tarjih Muhammadiyah. Aside from Hassan Bandung, Singapore Muhammadiyah members also referred to other modernist works, but theywere mostly written by local or Indonesian

authors linked to the broader Muhammadiyah movement. Using resources in the Malay Language or Bahasa Indonesia was preferred because it allowed members to think in the language that they understood; only then could they be able to fully utilise rational thinking and practice ijtihad.

The Singapore Muhammadiyah agree with the Modernist Salafis in their understanding of what it means to 'purify' Islam. Both Singapore Muhammadiyah and Modernist Salafis focussed on the return to the Qur'an, Sunna and the salaf al-salih as important references for religious practices in order to purify the local Muslim society from deviance. A 'purist' Contemporary Salafi would address the purification of religion by correcting and educating Muslims regarding the 'right' *'aqida*.

Although the Singapore Muhammadiyah are reflective of Modernist Salafism, the organisation has been open to other types of Salafis. This trend began when the Singapore Muhammadiyah started sending its cadres to further their Islamic education overseas. Some of its cadres returned with the Salafi *manhaj* which was aligned with Singapore Muhammadiyah's call to return to the salaf. However, this resulted in tension between Quietist and Modernist factions within Singapore Muhammadiyah. The heated debate eventually resulted in the Quietist faction - whose leader, Rasul Dahri, had criticised the movement and excommunicated non-Salafi scholars - breaking away from Singapore Muhammadiyah. This episode may have encouraged the Singapore Muhammadiyah to reappraise their modernist spirit and method of da'wa. Current Singapore Muhammadiyah members would consider the

'Quietist' Salafis to be harsher in their approach towards da'wa. In recent years, the Singapore Muhammadiyah have started to use the Himpunan Putusan Tarjih Muhammadiyah as one of their corereferences.

The Mamlaka Alumni consist of graduates from universities in Medina, Makkah, Qassim, Riyadh and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. Mamlaka refers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – al-Mamlaka al-Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya. The graduates of the Islamic University of Medina were the first to organise themselves as the Siswa Universiti Islam Madinah (SISMA; or the Graduates of the Islamic University of Medina). When the group wanted to include the alumni of other Saudi universities, they expanded and formed the Ittihad Mahasiswa Singapura Al Mamlakah Al Arabia As Saudia (IMAM; or the Association of Singaporean Undergraduates of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) in 2008.

Most of the Mamlaka Alumni returned with the Salafi *manhaj* and *'aqida*, influenced by Saudi Salafism. Despite sharing a common *manhaj* and *'aqida*, individually they have a wide range of positions on different issues. There are two streams of Salafis that can be distinguished among the Mamlaka Alumni – the "Moderate" Salafis and the 'Quietist' Salafis. "Moderate", as opposed to "extremist", is a label popularised by Singaporeans to describe a person whose religious opinions are inclusivist and does not transgress local norms of cohesionand religious harmony (Yong 2017). We prefer the term Inclusivist over Moderate because the latter term may give a different understanding to different readers.

The Mamlaka Alumni themselves displayed a wide range of views on the different ideas we discussed. When they returned from their studies in Saudi Arabia, some of them realised that what they had learned could not be applied to the Singapore context. A few of them, having been warned by their traditionalist teachers of the "dangers of Wahhabism" did not adopt the Salafi *manhaj* and *'aqida*. As a result of the dissonance between the context of Saudi Arabia and Singapore, most of them became Inclusivist Salafis by rejecting religious opinions of Quietists in Saudi Arabia that did not fit into the context of a multi-religious and multi-cultural society, with a mainstream Islam that is Shafi'i in madhhab and traditionalist in *manhaj*.

Several structural constraints contributed to additional motivation for the Mamlaka Alumni to reconsider what they had learned in Saudi Arabia. In 1990, Singapore passed the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA). The MRHA allows the government to make a restraining order against any person, official or member of a religious group or institution when such a person is found to have, among others, caused feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different religious groups (Singapore Attorney General's Chambers 2001). Together with other legislations, such as the Sedition Act (Singapore Attorney General's Chambers 1985), and Undesirable Publications Act (Singapore Attorney General's Chambers 1998), Singapore's leaders and political culture do not tolerate the propagation of exclusivism and enmity among religious groups. Furthermore, since the 2000s, the phenomenon of global jihadism securitised extremist religious teachings that some

Salafis (and non-Salafis) may havebeen exposed to (Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore 2003). Starting January 2017, any provider that offers Islamic education programmes is required under Section 87 of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) to be registered with the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) (MUIS 2017). All religious teachers would be required to adhere to a Code of Ethics that states that they have to practice Islam in the Singaporean context of religious diversity (MUIS 2017).

The "Moderation" of contemporary Salafism in Singapore is also a result of programmes by the Mamlaka Alumni, MUIS, and PERGAS, which altogether emphasised these contextual constraints. Our interviewees mentioned that, in addition to these programmes, social interactions also played a role. Senior Mamlaka Alumni and non-Salafi religious teachers nuanced their understanding of Salafism. Their non-Salafi peers also serve as a reminder that Salafism is not the only true form of Islam, even if they feel that they are the "most correct".

Broadly, Inclusivist Salafis are softly progressive and believe that Islam is compatible with modernity, embracing life in a prosperous, secular, meritocratic, and democratic country. Most of the Salafis in this group are strongly inclusivist. They believe that Islam is the only true religion, but that all other humans are deserving of respect. They were not taught to hate the religious 'other' or to practice takfir in their universities. According to them, such an understanding of bara` was either from an individual's own interpretation or was taught in reading circles outside of the university. Bara`, according to our interviewees, meant

hatred towards matters that lead to kufr, shirk or sins. The concept was only ever loosely referenced during lessons and was not used to justify any further ideas – political or extremist. In terms of cultural practices, all Inclusivist Salafis we interviewed were confident of their local culture and found no issue with being Malay or Singaporean. They did not see wearing Arabic clothes or taking on Arabic cultural practices as contributing to being a Muslim or Salafi. Cultural practices only become debatable when such practices were being encouraged or justified in religious terms. Consequently, if such a practice was a form of TBC, it would be rejected. The Inclusivist Salafis we interviewed did not raise any concerns regarding the cultural practices of Malay-Muslims in Singapore, except the tahlil (ritual to remember the deceased; also known as kenduri arwah) and maulid (prophet's birthday celebration); both are still part of the Salafi discourse since the advent of the Modernist Salafis in the 1900s.

This may be because the Modernist Salafis and Singapore Muhammadiyah have already advocated against such practices – including the kenduri arwah, mandi safar (bathing festival in the Muslim month of Safar), visiting of the maqam (graves), and the keeping of tangkal or taweez (talisman). A Singapore Muhammadiyah interviewee expressed relief that the Inclusivist Salafis took over the baton of purifying Islam in this aspect from the Modernists and Singapore Muhammadiyah.

Inclusivist Salafis are softly apolitical. This means that they do not advocate for political participation or debates. They are not opposed to living in a democratic system

with party politics and would be agreeable to the manner in which politics is conducted in Singapore and participate as voters in elections. They do not reject the political system in Singapore. None of them were obsessed with any conspiracy theories regarding the West and does not view the West as the enemy of Islam, even if they may disagree with Western foreign policy towards Muslim countries.

Just like the Modernist Salafis, Inclusivist Salafis reject blind taqlid. However, Inclusivist Salafis acknowledge the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, which is the madhhab which Singaporean Muslims follow. When they returned from Saudi Arabia, they preferred to emulate religious rulings and practices which they had learnt and experienced in Saudia Arabia. However, they softened their stance after being approached by their non-Mamlaka peers, the religious authorities and leaders in Singapore and their seniors.

While Modernist Salafis are strongly progressive, Inclusivist Salafis are softly progressive. Inclusivist Salafis do not see being progressive as contributing to their emulation of the salaf in all aspects of life. They have given up advocating emulating the salaf in literal terms in order to reconcile with modernity. Hence, they prioritise educating the public of the Salafi *manhaj* and *Tawhid* and accept modern advancements in education, thinking, and sciences to do so.

Another difference between the Modernist and Inclusivist Salafis is the references they use for religious knowledge and to arrive at religious rulings. Modernist Salafis often refer to the works of modernists from

the Middle East, including Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad'Abduh, Rashid Rida and Sa'id Hawwa among others. They are also known to be open to using scholarship from the region as references, including Prof. Dr. Haji Abdul Malik bin Dr. Syekh Haji Abdul Karim Amrullah (Hamka). Inclusivist Salafis would refer to – other than the Qur'an and compilations of the Sunna – scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al- Wahhab, Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz, Muhammad Ibn al-'Uthaymeen, and Salih al-Fawzan. However, the extent to which they refer to such scholars as authoritative sources differs as some of the views of these scholars can be exclusivist or unacceptable in the Singapore context.

'Quietist' Salafis reject both peaceful participation "through political parties and organisations" and violent opposition in politics as religious innovations without precedent" in the Sunna and the practices of the salaf al-salih (Wiktorowicz 2006: 220). While they may be labelled as 'Quietist', they have strong opinions regarding political activities and discourse; thus, they may be said to have a loud political voice. In the Singapore context, there is a sub- group of Quietist Salafis who are distinct from the Inclusivist Salafis. They are perceived to be "extreme" and "isolated" from the broader 'purist' Salafi community. They are labelled as Madkhalis because they were supposedly influenced by the works of the Saudi scholar Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. Inclusivist Salafis in Singapore do not accept the views of al-Madkhali and of other 'Quietist' scholars who strongly reject participation in the local democratic political system, and are exclusivist towards non-Salafi Muslims and the religious 'other'.

According to seven of our interviewees, there are at least four preachers who are believed to be influenced by the works of Rabi' al-Madkhali. They have also been referred to as the "Great Four" by their community because of their "exclusivist ideas". Despite being labelled as Madkhali by others, only one of them, Rasul bin Dahri, publicly claimed to have learned from Rabi' al-Madkhali during his time in Umm al-Qura' (TVSUNNAH 2011). Another refers to Rabi' al-Madkhali as among the recommended references for Salafi knowledge (Bin Jummat 2015). Other than the "Great Four", other preachers were also grouped together as Salafi Madkhali because they were considered 'strict', even though there was no evidence to show they were inspired by Madkhali ideas.

These Quietists are reactionary in their desire to emulate the salaf. For instance, one of them argues that Muslims should emulate the salaf in literal terms and revive the political and social institutions that were present during the time of the salaf – which he considers as a 'Golden Age' (Bin Jummat 2014). For him, modernity caused the decay of Muslim civilisation. The Salafi *manhaj* will supposedly reverse this decline. His solution to emulating the salaf in modernity is the Salafi *manhaj* itself and to purify *'aqida* by rejecting ta'wil and rationality, purifying fiqh from blind taqlid, ijtihad that does not adhere to the Salafi *manhaj*, and rejecting Isra'iliyyat, fabricated hadith and weak hadith. One example of how this is to be practiced is when a Salafi preacher instigated that a student should not shave his beard for National Service as it was "his struggle (perjuangan)". The student was believed to be sent to the detention barracks; the preacher denied he ever expressed such an opinion.

Quietist Salafis are strongly apolitical in action but have strong opinions regarding political activities and discourse. They reject modern political systems altogether. They argue contemporary Muslims are drowned by Western influence and political thought. They consider all contemporary politics as dangerous for Muslims, except if politics were to emulate the salaf in form and practice. In their opinion, legitimate political leaders are those who are guided bythe 'ulama who are of Salafi *manhaj*. Rasul Dahri rejected the idea of a secular state and calls on Muslims to establish an Islamic State (Ministry of Communications and Information Singapore 2017). In this regard, National Day celebrations in Singapore, to them, should not be celebrated because it had no precedence in the Sunna as the Prophet did not celebrate the Conquest of Makkah (Said 2016). These Quietists are also suspicious of the West and are conspiracists. Rasul Dahri, for instance, believes that democracy is the product of "Western imperialists and greedy capitalist Jews" (Lars 2017).

This group of Quietist Salafis is strongly exclusivist. Most of them argue that other religions have no truths, labelling them as false beliefs. They do not agree with mainstream Muslims in respecting other religions by rejecting the acceptability of non-Islamic holiday greetings. For example, participating in Chinese New Year celebrations are prohibited for Muslims and constituted an element of nawaqid al-Iman (nullification of Iman) (Bin Abd al- Wahhab 1976). They had also advocated against wishing others "Merry Chrsitmas" and participating in the celebrations. While wishing others on their days of religious

celebration does not necessarily excommunicate a Muslim, they argue that it is still forbidden for Muslimsto do so.

Such arguments further extended to the extent that Muslims cannot show respect to non-Muslims who have passed away except family and close relatives. They also excommunicated (practiced takfir on) the Naqshabandi sufi order and those who visit graves. They also reject Shi'ism and label them as Rafidis. For those who practice religious rituals thatare considered as TBCs, Rasul Dahri likens them to Jews and Christians and argued that thereis a place in hell for them (Lars 2017).

This group of Quietist Salafis believes that only *Tawhid* Tiga leads to the correct understanding of God. There is no room for ta'wil or rationality in understanding the nature of God. To them, this is a matter of usul in iman that determines whether someone is a Muslim or otherwise. The Quietist Salafis are the only group to have incorporated nawaqid al-iman in their discourse but do not openly practice takfir on others. One of the Quietist Salafis posted a Facebook note with religious opinions that support the argument that it is obligatory to kill apostates, but he did not go as far as to define who those apostates are (Said 2016).

With regards to the influence of Quietist Salafis, our interviewees from the Mamlaka Alumni felt that those who studied Salafism independently are more vulnerable to "extremist"teachings, whether in a Madkhali halaqa outside of the university or on a popular Quietist Salafiforum. Their example is that lay-Salafis who did not even study in Saudi Arabia are more defensive regarding their beliefs than the

Mamlaka Alumni. In this respect, the Inclusivist Salafi preachers of Mamlaka Alumni have tried to foster relations with selected Quietist Salafis in an attempt to moderate the latter's views. However, they have yet to succeed. The Inclusivist Salafis were agreeable to Singapore's stance with regards to religious extremism. They were willing to work together with the authorities to eradicate extremism. They were supportive of the banning of extremist books despite anxiety that they might be targeted eventually for something they may have said or published before they became inclusivist. The same cannot be said for non-Mamlaka Salafis. There was noticeable discomfort at the banning of the books and the barring of populist Salafi preachers from entry to Singapore.

Conclusion

Despite being united by a common *manhaj*, there is an incredible diversity within the relatively small Salafi community in Singapore. Many structural layers influence the individual Salafis as they manoeuvre through life in Singapore. These include the modernist and progressive roots of Salafism in Singapore, the secular and multi-religious socio-political context, religious institutions in Singapore and elsewhere, as well as the local Muslim community and its idiosyncrasies. At the same time, Salafis in Singapore displayed agency in deciding how to interact with their context; how to reconcile Salafism with modernity, a strong secular state and with the most religiously diverse society in the world.

The Salafi movement has been around long enough for its adherents to come to different conclusions regarding

how they are to emulate the salaf in all aspects of life in light of modernity. Salafis who have studied in Saudi Arabia may have been exposed to ideas that espouse being reactionary to modernity and exclusivist to non-Salafis and the religious 'other'. However, in order to come to terms with the reality of contemporary life in Singapore, most of the Salafis understood the need to adjust their stances, or to become 'moderate', to participatein modernity – even if they still view being reactionary and exclusivist as applicable in a moreideal context.

Yet, there are Salafis who insist on emulating the salaf in literal terms in all aspects of life. This small group of Quietist Salafis – strongly reactionary and exclusivist – are those that have trouble fitting into the social fabric of Singapore. In the background to our paper, we highlighted some recent incidents that seem to problematise Salafism. This false assumption has resulted in defensiveness among the Modernist and Moderate Salafis as well as some non-Salafis who feel that their ideas are being targeted. This defensiveness shows the extent of the overlap of some ideas – regarding social and political life – among Salafi groups as well as between Salafis and non-Salafis. Since these ideas are fluid, they are not fundamental to Salafis in Singapore. The experience of the Moderate Salafis showed that Salafis could perhaps develop their ideas further while reflecting on the structural constraints around them. Contemporary Salafism in Singapore may evolve into something altogether different from the reactionary and exclusivist aspects of Saudi 'Purist' Salafism, just as Saudi Salafism itself is transforming into what many have termed as Post-Salafism.

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CHAPTER 2

POPULISM, DEMOCRACY, AND ISLAMIC LAW

Cultural Populism in Contemporary Malaysia

THREATS TO DEMOCRACY

"Sahabatku,
Suatu bangsa Merdeka
yang kita impikan
Terasa masih jauh dari
kenyataan
Kemarahanku menjadi
kepedihan
Bila kita dipisah-
pisahkan"

_Usman Awang

Introduction

In Malaysia today we are witnessing a mounting expression of cultural populism. The rise of the Malay political right asserts *ketuanan Melayu* (Malay supremacy) and *ketuanan* Islam (Islamic supremacy) by both Malay dominated parties led by Bersatu and Islamic party, (Parti Islam SeMalaysia).

Wan Noor Khuzairey Bin Wan Mohtar

The intense political competition between these parties and Pakatan Harapan (PH) resulted in religion and politics becoming the main issue in Malaysian society. PH which is led by Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), alongside the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Amanah advances a multicultural approach in politics and governance. This politics of contestation has spilled into the domain of the social and cultural life of Malaysians. Indeed we are witnessing today's cultural populism.

Defining Cultural Populism

Cultural populism amongst Malay interest groups sees the present status quo as invariably attempts to undermine the status of Malays as *Bumiputera* (son of the soil) and Islam as the official religion of the federation. Several Malay NGOs which harp cultural populism such as Ikatan Muslim Malaysia (ISMA), Pertubuhan Kebajikan dan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia (PEKIDA), Persatuan Pengguna Islam Malaysia (PPIM). These groups often are vocal in projecting themselves as a defender of Malay rights and Islamic supremacy. Another circle at the forefront of cultural populism are Malay academics such as Soleha Yaacob, and Mat Rofa Ismail, and popular young writers under the publication house called Patriot. These academics and writers have been active in online media and book publication. Over the years their ideas gained so much popularity that where public, students, and even artists flocked to them for their "feel good" rhetoric. Cultural populism has asserted several effects and impacts on society. Among others it: (a) infuses the sense of superiority (b) ignites fear of the Other, (c) propagates prejudices, (d) legitimises exclusivism,

(e) demeans democracy, (f) attacks and dismisses pluralism, (g) romanticises history and nurtures supremacism; (h) claims of religious authenticity which therefore makes their own group as a legitimate group. All these in their various manifestations are undermining democracy in the short and long run, as fellow citizens are not accorded equal rights and status theoretically under the law.

Democracy under Threat

The rise of political rights all over the world has shown to be a real threat to democracy.Political rights which is the main course of cultural populism are obviously a threat to democracy. This is further problematic when political parties with the righties bend are elected to power. Malaysia in a period of the premiership of Muhyidin Yassin (2020-2021) was a case in point. Muhyidin Yassin's (2020-2021) and Ismail Sabri's premiership (2021-2022) which affirm the Malay-Islamic leadership saw the intensification of cultural populism and Malay rights. Malay-Islamic cultural groups supporting this Malay-Islamic-led government harp on the threat of the Malays by non-Malay and non-Muslim groups. The opposition namely DAP and PKR was targeted as the enemy of the Malay-Islamic interest. The Malay population was told that if the opposition came to power, Malays would lose their *Bumiputera* rights and Islam would be no longer the official religion. Henry A Giroux one of the prominent thinkers in education commented on this issue. According to Giroux:

> *"Right-wing populism is defined largely by its authoritarian. Embrace of bigotry, nativism, racism, and "scapegoating foreigners for social problem…the*

signpost of growing fascism at home and abroad is clear. Across the globe, politicians spew out inordinate incitements of hatred and bigotry, while legitimating, and often overly supporting racism" (Giroux, 2021).

Reasons for the Emergence and Prominent of Cultural Populism

Cultural populism emerged and gained prominence because of several factors: (a) The rise of political and religious right post 2018-the rise of political right especially after PakatanHarapan (PH) came to power PH government promoted multiculturalism and combated ethno- religious politics; (b) which gave rise to the Malay ultra-right opposing to the multicultural PH's agendas (c) segments of the Malay dominated academia moving inclined towards Malay rightist propaganda; (d) the entrenchment of middle-class conservatism lead by groups such as(ISMA, PEKIDA) that played out of religious and ethnic sentiment in Malaysians politics andsocial life.

Another important dimension in explaining the rise of cultural populism is the existence of a great number of marginalised poor, both in urban and rural areas, attracted to sentiments propagated by the religious conservative and the ultra-Malay-right. They attracted to rhetorics that claimed Malays are threatened with extinction (*Melayu akan terhapus*), Islam is under threat, (*Islam terancam*), and DAP will dominate Malaya (DAP *akan memerintah Tanah Melayu*). In this context, it creates fear and anxiety amongst the Malays, and the mobilization of cultural populism is seen as providing security and protection for them.

Manifestation of Cultural Populism

In this paper, I will be focusing on (a) Soleha Yaacob's so-called historical lectures and readings that claimed to provide authentic versions of Malays/Islamic histories; and (b) the recent production of a Malay movie titled Mat Kilau which hit the box office in 2022. ProfessorSolehah Yaacob is a lecturer in the Arabic Language, Literature, and Linguistic Department at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM). She challenged the dominant narratives which deny Islamic centrality in Malay civilisation. A number of her statements challenged the historical account which then invited criticisms by some Malay academics and even religious figures. She claimed among others that: (a) the Malays were descendants of Keturah who was one of the wives of the prophet Abraham; (b) the Malays were never Hindu-Buddhist as claimed in the conventional historical account. In fact, there were believers of monotheism, professing the religion of Hanif, referring to believers of monotheism in the pre-Islamic era (c) The Malay sultanates in the region were theoretically under the Ottoman Caliphates.

Soleha's Sensational Claims

Soleha has made a number of sensational claims delivered on various social media platforms. In one of her lectures posted on YouTube (dated: 30 November 2022) She narratedthat the Malays are the descendants of Prophet Abraham's wife. Her statements and video emphasize that Islam is the major influence in that its link since the time of Prophet Abraham:

> "Apabila diarahkan ke timur jawa itu, apa yang dikatakan oleh dua beradik itu (Medan dan Median) Ayahnda, ayahnda mahu menghantar kami ke tempat jauh, ke tempat kam tidak biasa…kenapa kami yang dihantar? Mengapa Ismail dan Ishak bersama kami?... Maka apa yang nabi ibrahim jawab itulah yang diarahkan olehku. Kamu pergilah ke sana, kamu ajarlah orang-orang di sana.. Kemudian Medan dan Median datang ke sini (Tanah Melayu) ketika dia datang itu saya sebagai seorang pengkaji dia mesti melalui Sungai Batu, di sinilah bermulanya sejarah Sungai Batu." (Yaacob, 2020a)

> *"When directed to the east of Java, what the two brothers said (Medan and Median) Your father, your father wants to send us to a far place, to a place we are not used to...why are we sent? Why are Ishmael and Isaac with us? So, what prophet Abraham answered is what I directed. You go there to teach the people... Then Medan and the Median came here (Tanah Melayu) when he came I as a reviewer believed he had to gothrough Sungai Batu, this is where the history of Sungai Batu began."*

In the video (dated: 14 July 2022), Prof Soleha tries to claim that the Malays were neverHindu-Buddhist as claimed in the conventional historical account. In fact, there were believers of monotheism, professing the religion of Hanif, referring to believers of monotheism in the pre-Islamic era. As she mentioned:

> "Bangsa Melayu itu bangsa tua. Bagaimana ingin membuktikan kita adalah agama Tauhid? Data yang telah ditunjukkan oleh catatan Yahudi, bahawasanya "World as people decendent from Noah, dan disebut bahawasanya dibahagikan kepada tiga iaitu Sam, Ham dan Yafits… Berdasarkan pembahagian ini kita termasuklah orang Melayu,orang Parsi, Aryan mereka

> tergolong dalam orang Semetik. Orang Melayu berada di Kawasan ini." (Yaacob, 2020b)
>
> *"Malay has been around for a long time, to prove that the Malay is tauhid, we should look at the Jewish record that mentions the world as people descendent from Noah…This means all of us including Malays, Persians, and Aryans were part of Semitic people (Sam the descendent of Noah)"*

She also claimed that the Malay sultanates in the region were theoretically under the Ottoman Caliphates. In the video (dated: 2 October 2023) She claimed that Uthmaniyah and Malacca have known each other for so long. In fact, long ago Tanah Melayu adopted Islam astheir religion without thinking about the history of other religions such as Hindu-Buddha beforeIslam came in.

> "Kerajaan Uthmaniyah menguasai kita (Tanah Melayu) tetapi dalam bentuk sopan santun…Alam Melayu sebagai Anatolia kecil digelarkan sebagai Anatol. Sejak awal kerajaan Melaka (Kerajaan Islam) mempunyai pengaruh dengan kerajaan Utmaniyah (Yaacob, 2020c)
>
> *"Alam Melayu as the minor Anatolia called Anatol… The Turks have colonized us, but with politeness… from the beginning, Melaka Sultanate (Islamic rule) had influence with the Ottoman Empire"*

All this above claims made by Soleha point to one fundamental issue: that the Malays from thevery beginning of history are somehow like chosen people protected by god against idol worshiper and that they had submitted to the religion of Hanif even before the religion of Islam

Mat Kilau the Movie: Invoking Malay-Islamic Sentiments

The fight against colonialism has been part of Malay nationalism. Over the years especially in the period of heightened political rights the resistance against colonialism is also associated with jihad against the Christian British and the foreign collaborators namely the Chinese and Indian immigrants. The movie Mat Kilau expressed those sentiment explicitly invoking the idea that the Malays were not only facing the colonial aggression but also threads from the non-Malays. Three main important themes that could be traced from this movie. These are: (a) Malay are the indigenous and rightful successor of Tanah Melayu and all non-Malay immigrants (pendatang) have no rights to claim over Malaya (b) Islam as the religion of the Malays is the unifying force against British colonialism and non-Malay/non-Muslim immigrants. (c) that Malay leadership as the guardian protector of the Malay-Islamic rights. The movie gained broad support from both Malay leadership and grassroots, especially from those with a conservative political and religious outlook (Malay Mail, 2022).

Mat Kilau as the Iconic Defender of Malay/Islamic Rights

In the movie, Mat Kilau was projected as the defender of Malay rights in the interior ofPahang. He resisted British Colonial rules which had penetrated into Pahang in the late 19th century. The British imposed a Residential System where the British ruled indirectly in the name of the Sultan. The British controlled the taxation and administrative structure in the state, leaving the Sultan to administer over Islamic religion and Malay customs. Mat Kilau was one of the many Malay chiefs who are affected by the new taxation structure.

Mat Kilau defended the Malays because the British as depicted in the movies were tryingto undermine Islam apart from controlling the resources of the Malays. Very clearly the movies depicted Chinese businessmen as Colonial collaborators and the Sikhs sepoy as an aggressive force against the Malay population. Mat Kilau rebelled and launched a jihad war against the British. Many Quranic verses and pious statements are quoted in the movies to emphasize this *jihadi* act. Malays are made to be seen as the victims of non-Malay immigrants. The only force that could save the Malays was the religion of Islam and the Malay feudal leadership as the protector of the Malay people. This is exactly the narrative that has been given by cultural populists—that Islam and Malay-Islamic leadership as guarantees to Malay rights and dominance.

In the film, the episode when Rokiah, the wife of Mat Kilau was faced with death, she told her husband to save the homeland: "Don't stop in the fight. Save our Malay homeland" (Kilau, 2022). Such a statement resonates with the often-repeated rhetoric of "Tidak Melayu Hilang di Dunia" [The Malays will not Perish from this World]. In the movie, the Malay Sultan was regarded as the protector of the Malays, rather than one who had allowed the British to establish a residential system in order to secure his rule. An episode in the movie depicts the supposedly scene of confrontation between the Sultan and British officers. The Sultan's representative warned Syersthe British officer:

> *"You have violated the Malay law and also challenged the Sultan…your role here is to develop this land, not to oppress and violate our rights! And do not forget the special privileges of the Malay, Syers!" (Kilau, 2022).*

Clearly, the Sultan and Malay feudal chiefs are made to be seen as the protector of the Malays (Muzaffar, 2020). Their role in bringing British rule was silenced. Instead, all Malay chiefs were part of the jihad to combat against the British.

Indeed, this film invites many critics, especially towards racial tension. This film was aired a few months before the 15th general election, which directed to invoke racial tensions on social media. One of the critics, Rais Hussin opines:

> *"The locally produced movie "Mat Kilau" has certainly made history by collecting a record revenue, for the Malaysian filmmaking industry, in a record time, pointing to a sensational viewership outreach. But, at the same time, thesalient single-dimensionality of the movie in the sense that it portrayed every non-Malay character as a villain helping the British colonialists plot and committheir atrocities against the Malays causes serious concerns for its consequencesto the unity and harmony of our multi-ethnic nation. And this is at the momentwhen the nation needs that unity the most to defend its land once again from colonialists – only, this time, elite political supremacists-colonialists" (Hussin, 2024).*

The Effects of Cultural Populism

Cultural populism as manifested and promoted by Malay ultra-right claimed that they are the sole owner of Tanah Melayu (Malaya) from the claim of indigeneity (*Bumiputera*) to supremacy (*ketuanan*) this rhetoric has hardened over the years. Supremism means only the Malay rights matter and all other ethnic groups have no say over

the political, economic, and cultural rights. The claim of supremacism in multicultural settings means the denial of minority rights. This is against the spirit of democracy. Cultural populism accentuates the group's supremacist outlook at the same time spreading fear-mongering amongst the people to see other ethnic and cultural groups as adversaries. Today in Malaysian discourse *ketuanan Melayu* equates to seeing Chinese and Indians as *pendatang* (immigrants) who are all set to take away all Malay rights and privileges. In fact, some ultra-religious groups claimed that Christianity would replace Islam as the dominant religion of Malaysia. Such a claim is of course unfounded and meant to create anxiety. Democracy can only flourish when there is a sense of freedom, tolerance, respect for others, and acceptance of diversity. However, cultural populism that are been generated by the Malay ultra-right is the opposite of the above dimensions. This kind of cultural populism created a series of unproductive ideas and practices that are against democracy because it allows for (1) blatant expression of supremacy, racism, and religious exclusivism; (2) anti-intellectualism which is on the rise in cultural and academic discourses. (3) cultural narcissism which infuses authoritarian ethics as identified by many social thinkers (Fromm, 1994).

Conclusion

Cultural populism will limit the imagination for a democratic society, human rights, and plurality as it only accords an exclusive right to one group while denying the others. Cultural populism manifested in the Malaysian case is a threat to civil society and democracy since it only gives

sole rights to Malay Muslims while treating non-Malays as second-class citizens, if not as total alien altogether. Its narcissistic posture made the Malays see the need to rally behind Malay-Islamic leadership (*kepimpinan Melayu Islam*) and that a multiracial democratic Malaysia has very little place for Malay rights. Overall cultural populism is intellectually damaging, ethically distortive, and politically disruptive. It has serious ramifications for Malaysian nation-building. Herein lies public education in the social and cultural spheres to forge democratic citizenship that respects civil rule, public morality, and respect of diversity. Cultural populism needs to be scrutinised for its excesses. Malaysia has a history that celebratesand recognises multiculturalism. In post-independence Malaysia, the literary laureate Usman Awang called for unity and respect for multicultural Malaysia. His poem "Sahabatku (1979)"appeals to the latter (Awang, 2016).

"Bilakah kita dapat memadamkan

Perbezaan keturunan yang kian membakar kita

Dan membiarkan curahan minyak yang kian menyala
Oleh mereka yang sering bermuka dua?

Bilakah kita dapat mempertaruhkan nasibAnak-anak kita yang tak berdosa

Dan generasi akan datang keturunan kita Menjadi mangsa keturunan yang berbeza

Oleh mereka yang mementingkan laba dan kuasa?"

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Islam and Democracy

READING ON INDONESIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Indonesia in 2009, she stated that Indonesia is a living example of how Islam, democracy, and modernity can co-exist but thrive (Thompson, 2009). It is an interesting comment coming from Hillary about Indonesia, especially due to Islamic societies are considered an obstacle to democratization according to Huntington (1991). The concept of Indonesia as a place where Islam, democracy, and modernity could go hand in hand started when President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono take helm as Indonesia's

Bima Jon Nanda
Inda Mustika Permata

President (Anwar, 2011). This concept arose in the time when the world entered post 9/11, where Islam faced an extremely negative image from Western societies. Amidst the rise of religious extremism and terrorism activities in the world, the international community has viewed Indonesia as an alternative face for Islam. As the third-largest democracy after the United States and India and the country with the largest Muslim population, Indonesia's unique identity plays a significant role in shaping its foreign policy.

In Search of a Foreign Policy Focus

After the end of the Suharto regime of dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia began to experience a dawn of democracy. Following a series of protests conducted by Indonesian students, Suharto stepped down as Indonesia's longest-serving president and was replaced by Habibie. In its early years of democracy, Indonesia faced some confusion about its foreign policy focus. Because of political tension after the democratic transition and Indonesia's recovery from the economic crisis that hit Asian countries in 1997, President Habibie did not have a clear foreign policy focus. Azra (2015) then argued that during the transition of President Abdurrahman Wahid replacing President Habibie, Indonesia was also failed of creatingmomentum to have an influential role in international diplomacy.

Historically, Indonesia had played an influential role in international diplomacy especially in the Southeast Asian region. Not only was Indonesia the important country in the conception of the Asia-Africa Conference, but also contributed to stability and security in Southeast

Asia (Emmers, 2014). As Rattanasevee (2014) argued that Indonesia played a leading role in regional stability and security and also the forefront actor in the creation of Southeast Asia regionalism, ASEAN. Anwar (2021) also stated that Indonesia helped Southeast Asia to transform from a highly divided and unstable region becoming a secure community.

During President Megawati's term, Indonesia indeed played a crucial role in creating Bali Concord II as the backbone and reason for democracy and human rights entering the ASEAN lexicon. However, in President Yudhoyono's term, Indonesia clearly established its foreign policy focus. The focus point was influenced by Indonesia's important identity as a democratic country with a Muslim majority. Indonesia has become a persistent actor in promoting democracy and its values in the Southeast Asia region (Nanda & Permata, 2024).

Indonesia's foreign policy focus that puts its identity as a democratic country and acts as a democracy promoter in the region has been discussed by several scholars, especially regarding its motives. As Karim (2017) argued that Indonesia's motivation for promoting democracy is driven by a desire for international prestige. Sukma (2011) explained that promoting democracy strengthens democracy at home, while Grzywacz (2020) argued that Indonesia's role as a democracy promoter could facilitate improved relations with Western countries following its democratic transition. Regardless of its motivations, democracy has become a crucial aspect of Indonesia's identity.

As the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia's democratic identity also plays a crucial role in public diplomacy. It is interesting to note that while democracy has been embedded in Indonesia's identity since 1998, religion has been an essential part of the nationalideology since its independence in 1945. Indonesia *Pancasila* (Five Principles) is Indonesia's important ideology, where the first principle is *Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa (*Belief in Almighty God), underscoring the importance of religion in Indonesia's identity and values. Therefore, the coexistence of democracy and Islam becomes a significant part of Indonesia's identity. As Barton (2010) noted, "The success of the world's third largest democracy is all the more remarkable because it is also the world's largest Muslim country." Indonesia's unique positionas a place where democracy and Islam thrive enhances its attractiveness. Since democracy is acrucial pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy, the coexistence of Islam and democracy becomes avaluable asset in its public diplomacy. This coexistence appeals to the international communityand serves as a soft power resource for Indonesia.

Islam and Democracy as Soft Power

Soft power term coined by Joseph Nye that explains public diplomacy is a means of promoting a country's soft power. The objective of soft power is achieving interest through attraction rather than through coercion. Furthermore, Nye (2008) stated that a country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies. Based on Tuch's (1990) explanation public diplomacy is a 'government process of communicating with foreign publics to understand its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions

and culture, as well as its national goals and policies. Based on Nye's argument, Indonesia's coexistence of democracy and Islam is one of its soft power assets. While mirroring Han Tuch's argument, Indonesian public diplomacy will bring understanding to the foreign public about Indonesian values where democracy and Islam could exist and develop at the same time and place, coexist, and thrive.

According to Huijgh (2017), Indonesian public diplomacy is characterized by three key features: its reciprocal relationship with international policy democratization; its niche narrative of the coexistence between Islam, democracy, and modern society; and its "intermestic" approach. Then Indonesia upholds its image as a place for moderate Islam, where tolerance becomes the main highlight of Indonesia's public diplomacy narrative. This narrative could be found in the statement of Hassan Wirajuda (2019), Indonesia's foreign minister during President Yudhoyono's term at the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. He stated that "We (Indonesia) have come to be known as the world's third-largest democracy, the land where democracy, Islam, and modernization not only go hand in hand but also thrive together". As noted by James Hoesterey (2023) the success of Indonesia in becoming a democratic, moderate Muslim society has shocked Western diplomats, journalists, and political pundits. Indonesia serves the living evidence that democracy could also coexist in Islamic societies. This has become Indonesia's most valuable resource for soft power and public diplomacy.

Countering the Negative Image: Interfaith Dialogue and Public Diplomacy

The coexistence of democracy and Islam is an important resource of soft power for Indonesia, as it can counter the negative image of the country as a breeding ground for terrorism (Huijgh, 2017, 772). Indonesia has demonstrated that democracy and Islam can coexist, challenging the assumption by Western scholars that Islam is a barrier to democracy. Indonesia has positioned its soft power resource of the coexistence between Islam and democracy to project itself as a tolerant and moderate Muslim-majority country. This image is reinforced through the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF), which Indonesia initiated in 2008. The BDF is an annual, inclusive, and open intergovernmental forum focused on the development of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region" (Bali Democracy Forum, 2022).

The importance of the synergy between Islam and democracy was highlighted by President Joko Widodo in his opening speech at the 9th BDF in 2016, where he emphasized that governments should encourage the synergy between religion, democracy, and pluralism. President Jokowi stressed that religion teaches compassion, while democracy is essential for prosperity and peace (Rosyidin, 2020, 15). This stance is clearly articulated by Indonesia's political elites, who assert the country's image as a tolerant and moderate Muslim-majority nation. Indonesia also achieves this image through interfaith dialogue or interfaith diplomacy. This becomes an important aspect of Indonesia's public diplomacy that utilizes Indonesia's soft power values of Islam and democracy coexistence since the image that

Indonesia established is tolerant and moderate for Muslim majority countries. Interfaith dialogue can contribute to four types of public diplomacy goals: global public goods, national image, engagement diplomacy, and conflict resolution (Zhang, 2022, p. 222). Indonesia uses interfaith dialogue to foster tolerance and harmony among different religious groups (Blakemore, 2019, p. 80). As noted by Huijgh, much of Indonesia's public diplomacy initiatives have congregated in this interfaith sphere (Huijgh, 2017, p. 772).

In the last couple of years, Indonesia has intensified its interfaith dialogue efforts to reinforce its image as a tolerant and moderate Muslim-majority country. For instance, in 2019, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted the ASEAN Women Interfaith Dialogue. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, stated that this forum aims to empower women as agents of peace, tolerance, and prosperity (Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia, 2019). Additionally, Indonesia has engaged in various interfaith dialogues with many countries ranging from Pakistan to Denmark.

Despite Indonesia's efforts to portray itself as a tolerant and moderate Muslim-majority country where Islam and democracy can coexist, challenges and skepticism among political pundits persist. In 2017, Indonesia faced a serious threat to its religious freedom and democratic practices, attracting international attention. This was evident during the Jakarta gubernatorial election, where blasphemy accusations against one of the candidates, Ahok, led to his imprisonment. This charge is caused by Ahok's comments

on Quranic verses during the campaign in 2016 (Blakemore, 2019, 81). Therefore, Indonesia still needs to address domestic challenges related to religious tolerance and radicalism to fully leverage the coexistence of democracy and Islam in its public diplomacy.

Conclusion

Islam has been considered an obstacle to democracy, a perspective famously argued by Samuel Huntington in his widely cited work, *The Clash of Civilizations*. Political pundits havebeen sceptical about whether Islam could coexist with democracy. However, Indonesia's transition to a democratic nation following the fall of Suharto in 1998 demonstrates that Islam and democracy can coexist and thrive together. Indonesia has utilized this new identity as a democratic country and Muslim majority country as one of its foreign policy focus and publicdiplomacy practices. The coexistence of Islam and democracy has helped cultivate an image of Indonesia as a tolerant and moderate Muslim-majority nation.

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The Making of Religious Authority in Lombok, Indonesia

ISLAM, DA'WAH, AND POLITICS

Introduction

Early Islamization in Lombok was influenced by Islamic practices from various regions of the archipelago, including Java, Sumbawa, Palembang, and Makassar (Ariadi, 2017). However, since the invention of steamships in the 18th century, the Sasak people, through Labuhan Haji in East Lombok, began to cross many oceans to Mecca-*Haramain* (Ariadi, 2013).Since then, the wave of the Sasak people mobilizing to Mecca has become increasingly crowded, both for performing the Hajj and for studying

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Islam in Mecca (Jamaluddin, 2011; Jamaluddin and Khaerani, 2020). The mobility of the Sasak people studying Islam in Mecca cannot be separated from the role of the Sasak Muslim middle-class families, who were actually landlords with sufficient financial capabilities. These families became the backbone of the transmission of Islamic knowledge along the Middle East-Lombok axis. Upon their return to Lombok, they are given the title of *Tuan Guru*.

So far, studies on Islam in Lombok and the dynamics of Sasak Muslims tend to focus on three main areas. First, the polarization of Islamic orthodoxy and heterodoxy in the form of Islam Wetu Telu vis-a-vis Wetu Lima, as explored by Sven Cederroth (1981), Erni Budiwanti(2000) (Budiwanti, 2014), Burthemelow (2001), Abdus Syakur (2006), David harnis (2006), Fathan Aniq (2011), Maria Platt (2017), Suprapto (2020) and others. Second, scholars have concentrated on the dynamics of the role of *Tuan Guru* and *pesantren* in strengthening Islamic*da'wah* and education, such as those conducted by Fawaizul Umam (2009), Jamaluddin (2011), *Haramain* (2012), Fahrurrozi (2015), Adi Fadli (2014), Jeremy Kingsley (2018), Agus Dedi (2016), Muhammad Makki (2021), Nurul Wathoni (2021). These studies have produced more character study models for *Tuan Guru* figures, such as the research conducted by Adi Fadli, Fahrur Rozi, Harapandi, and others. Third, there have been analyses focusing on Islamic mass organizations or groups, such as research on Nahdlatul Wathan, Nahdlatul Ulama, and Muhammadiyah as civil society in West Nusa Tenggara. Previous scholars, such as Hirjan Nahdli (2012), Saiful Hamdi (2014, 2015, 2018), Munawir Husni (2015),

and Bianca Smith (2013) have examined Nahdlatul Wathan from multiple perspectives, including *da'wah*, education, politics, and even internal conflicts within these Islamic mass organizations. In subsequent developments, the study of Islam in Lombok revolves around the study of Salafi- Wahhabi groups, exploring the dynamics of Islam in Lombok amid the penetration of Wahhabi ideology. This includes research conducted by Yusuf Thantowi (2000), Saparuddin (2012), Faizah (2014), Muhammad Said (2019), and Muharrir Alwan (2022).

The three trends mentioned above indicate that research on Islam in Lombok still centers on observable phenomena, including the study of Islamic figures and groups, and the contributions of Islamic boarding schools to the dynamics of Islam in Lombok. This article aims to address the gaps in previous research, focusing on the formation and fragmentation of religious authority in Lombok within the context of current dynamics. Specifically, this paper seeks to demonstrate that the construction of religious authority in Lombok has links with the agencies of Middle Eastern alumni, particularly from *Madrassa* Shaulatiyyah Mecca, Al-Azhar Egypt, the Islamic University of Madinah, and Islamic universities in Yemen. Furthermore, this paper argues that democratization following the New Order has created opportunities for Islamic groups, especially elite figures, to express their understanding of Islam through *da'wah* and politics.

This study is a field research project using qualitative methods with an ethnographic approach. Data sources were obtained from observation, interviews, and literature

review. The main locus of this research is in East Lombok. This research employs Max Weber's theory of authority and Fajrie Alatas' theory of religious authority. In the context of Lombok, the authority of *Tuan Guru* is formed through the social capital they possess. Therefore, the authority of the *Tuan Guru* largely depends on these social capitals. The authority theory will be used to see how religious authority is formed within the culture of Muslim communities in Lombok, and how it relates to ideology and politics.

Discourse on Religious Authority

Discussing authority certainly cannot be separated from Max Weber's theory. Therefore, this paper aims to analyze the meaning of religious authority from Weber's perspective. For Weber, authority and power mean almost the same thing although they are distinct (Weber, 1947). Power is defined as the ability to overcome resistance from others, specifically in influencing their behavior (Weber, 2019b). Thus, someone who has authority must possess power, but someone who has power does not necessarily have authority (Weber,2019).

Furthermore, Weber identified three types of authority. First, traditional authority refers to power rooted in traditional beliefs and practices. A person can hold traditional authority due to a genetic relationship (kinship) with individuals who had traditional authority in the past (Weber, 2019). Secondly, legal-rational authority, which is formed based on a belief in the legitimacy of the laws and rules of society or the state. An example of this type is the authority of leaders or presidents in democratic countries, where authority is guaranteed by

the constitution (Weber, 1924). Third, charismatic authority, derives from an individual's exceptional personal qualities, leading to obedience, admiration, and idolization by society. This type of authority can be seen in great figures such as Prophet Mohammed, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Siddhartha Buddha, and others.

To analyze the meaning of religious authority, Weber's version of authority must be connected to the concept of religious authority offered by Fajrie Alatas. Because Alatas' theory is structured from the anthropological reality of Indonesian Muslim society, especially in the culture of Javanese Muslim society. Alatas introduces the term *"articulatory labour"* in describing religious authority. Articulatory labour refers to the intensive effort made by a figure in articulating the understanding of Islam according to local contexts and addressing the real issues faced by the *jamaah* (Alatas, 2021). Alatas asserts that one cannot possess religious authority before preaching; transmitting and realizing the Sunnah according to the context and needs of the *jamaah* (congregation). A person's activity in *da'wah* and its intensity determine the quality of his religious authority in the eyes of society. Thus, a figure's consistency in building and caring for society significantly influences the quality of his religious authority. For example, figures build their relationships with society through the recitation of *Majlis Ta'lim*, helping those in difficulty, and constructing public facilities such as mosques, madrasas, and Islamic boarding schools. Therefore, religious leaders who have large congregations are those who consistently engage with worshippers daily. In this context, Alatas sees

religious authority as being formed through the continuous involvement of a figure in thedaily lives of their followers.

Based on the arguments presented by Alatas, individuals who do not possess qualified intellectual credibility have the opportunity to attain religious authority in society, provided they diligently engage in articulatory labor (Alatas, 2021). Kiai Kampung, who lead simple lives and possess standard knowledge, for example, become figures who are heard and obeyed by their surrounding communities. This aligns with Hannah Arendt's argument that authority must function as a role model (exemplary) (Alatas, 2021). In this context, Kiai Kampung acts more as an example than as a teacher of high and complex religious discourse. They teach everyday matters to meet the practical needs of the ummah.

In addition, Alatas provides an example of how religious authority is formed. For instance, Habib Luthfi built his authority (assembling authority) by linking himself to various genealogies, networks, and traditions of Islamic scholarship. Alatas refers to this process as "genealogical adoption" (Alatas, 2020). This term describes how an individual attempts to connect with the prophetic past through several genealogical channels, such as heredity and sanad science. The variety of mobility routes allows a scholar to bind himself to various isnad and genealogies that link him to his prophetic past, resulting in varying forms of religious authority. In the case of Habib Luthfi, his religious authority was established through the "infrastructure" of Sufi orders, namely through JATMAN (Alatas, 2021). Alatas reveals that the Sufi tariqat organization led by Habib Luthfi functions as an infrastructure that cultivates

the social terrain in building hierarchical relations between a murshid (Islamic tariqat leader) and his students (Alatas, 2020). Thus, it can be said that religious authority is not something given, but something one constantly pursues, especially through Islamic activity and social- prophetic agendas.

Tuan Guru and the Making of Religious Authority in Lombok

The title of *Tuan Guru* in Lombok is equivalent to *Kiai* in Java, *Teungku* in Aceh, *Buya* in Padang, and *Anjeungan* in Sunda land. *Tuan Guru* are individuals who are considered to have charismatic authority because of their capacity for religious knowledge, piety, and traditional leadership within society (Jamaluddin 2011). Thus, *Tuan Guru* is a title of *Ulama* (Islamic scholars) who becomes *ummah* leaders, mediators, inspirations, and actors of peace (Kingsley, 2012). Etymologically, the word *Tuan Guru* comes from two words: "tuan" and "guru." *Tuan* refers to people who have performed the Hajj pilgrimage, while *Guru* denotes people who possess extensive religious knowledge (Fahrurrozi, 2018; Icol Dianto, 2019; Safinah & Arifin, 2021). From an anthropological perspective of the Sasak Muslim community, the requirements for becoming a *Tuan Guru* are quite strict. First, the *Tuan Guru* must be an alumnus of a Middle Eastern institution. Second, he must possess extensive religious knowledge (*tafaqquh fiddin*). Third, he must gain broad recognition from the local community. Fourth, his religious authority is further established if he is affiliated with certain Islamic organizations such as NW or NU (Jamaluddin, 2011, 2016; Jamaluddin & Khaerani, 2020).

Since the 18th century, the term *Tuan Guru* has symbolized the emergence of a new social class in the socio-religious landscape of Sasak Muslim society. Furthermore, in modern Sasak society—namely the late 19th and early 20th centuries— *Tuan Guru* became the highest social class in the social hierarchy of Sasak society, surpassing traditional Sasak aristocratic positions such as Lalu and Raden titles (Kumbara, 2008). *Tuan Guru* are the main actors in shaping the Islamic expression and ideology of Sasak society. Notable figures from the early 18th century include *Tuan Guru* Umar Mbun Timbe, *Tuan Guru* Abdul Gaffur Sumbekah, *Tuan Guru* Amin Sesela, *Tuan Guru* Mustafa Sekarbela, and *Tuan Guru* Umar Kelayu (Fadli, 2016; Jamaluddin, 2016). These figures came from middle-class Sasak Muslim families, which enabled them to access Islamic education in Mecca. Generally, in the context of the development of Islamic *da'wah* in Southeast Asia, most prominent figures in the Islamic *da'wah* movement were born into Muslim middle-class families. As Bradley explains, the role of Muslim middle-class families in the chain of Islamization and *da'wah* activities in Nusantara-Southeast Asia (including Lombok) is the most important factor in the formation of Islamic identity and ideology in the region (Bradley, 2019).

The term Tuan Guru and its typology cannot be separated from changes in socio- cultural and political structures. During the colonial era, for example, the title Tuan Guru was synonymous with individuals who had studied in Haramain (Mecca and Medina) and later became mursyid tariqa in Lombok. The main role of the Tuan Guru

during this phase was as leaders of the ummah and leader of the resistance movement against colonialism (Bruinessen, 2013). In post-independence Indonesia, the term Tuan Guru became associated with Haramain alumni who managed madrassas or Islamic boarding schools and were affiliated with Islamic mass organizations such as NU and NW. In contrast, after the reformation era, the role of Tuan Guru was not only shaped by their social capital as Middle Eastern alumni, owners of madrassas, and affiliations with mass organizations but also by their involvement in local political power (Oktara, 2015; Anwar, 2018; Sarman, 2005; Muhajir, 2015; Fitriani, 2016). For example, Zainul Majdi, known as TGB (Tuan Guru Bajang), gained wider popularity and religious authority when he succeeded in the local political arena, becoming Governor of NTB (West Nusa Tenggara) for two terms (2008-2019).

Reclaiming Authority and Rivalry Within Nahdaltul Wathan

The struggle and competition for religious authority within the Nahdlatul Wathan (NW) Islamic organization took place between the two grandsons of *Tuan Guru* Zainuddin, the founder of NW: *Tuan Guru* Zainuddin Tsani, an alumnus of *Madrassa* Shaulatiyyah, Mecca, and TGB Zainul Majdi, an alumnus of al-Azhar University, Egypt. In reclaiming authority, Zainuddin Tsani's primary asset was the direct title granted by his grandfather when he was very young, titled *Tuan Guru Bajang* (TGB). Many NW followers believed that Zainuddin Tsani was the rightful heir to the spiritual leadership and mass organization of NW (Wawancara AB, 2022). Moreover, Zainuddin Tsani's authority is supported by the majority of *Tuan Guru* from

the *Shaulatiyya* alumni network. This support significantly influenced public opinion, convincing many that Zainuddin Tsani was the most entitled to inherit his grandfather *Tuan Guru* Zainuddin's authority and leadership. To further strengthen his legitimacy, Zainuddin Tsani employed a Sufistic approach, often claiming that he received guidance from his grandfather (*Tuan Guru* Zainuddin) through dreams. He asserted that his *da'wah* and leadership activities within the NW organization were always based on his grandfather's guidance, as revealed in dreams.

From Alatas's perspective, the phenomenon of dreams is one type of guardianship (*walayah/wali*) tool believed by traditionalist Muslims. For instance, Habib Luthfi's dreams are considered a source of information for tracing Islamic history in Java. His dream codes can provide clues for finding the tombs of unidentified *wali* in Java (Alatas, 2020). The case of *Tuan Guru* Zainuddin Tsani's dreams can perhaps be understood within Alatas's framework. Despite the controversy surrounding his dream claims, Zainuddin Tsani successfully established his religious authority through this method.

Meanwhile, Zainul Majdi did not receive a title directly from his grandfather, *Tuan Guru* Zainuddin. Instead, he received the title of TGB from the community. This title was bestowed upon him after he returned from Al-Azhar University, Egypt, in 1997. Since his return, he quickly became a popular young preacher in Lombok (Wawancara ZK, 2022). Thus, Zainul Majdi's authority was shaped culturally through his intensive preaching and extensive mastery of exegetical literature.

Borrowing Alatas's argument, it can be asserted that Zainul Majdi established his authority through articulatory labor, specifically via his *da'wah* activities across various regions of Lombok. Another factor underpinning Zainul Majdi's religious authority is the Al- Azhar alumni network. Al-Azhar alumni in Lombok are the main supporters of TGB Zainul Majdi in promoting Azhar-style Islamic *Wasatiyah da'wah*. Zainul Majdi even established an Azhar mediator, a guidance institution for students who want to study Islam at Al-Azhar University in Egypt. Consequently, the network and influence of Al-Azhar alumni have strengthened in Lombok. This alumni network has increasingly dominated the Islamic public space in Lombok through *da'wah* councils.

Zainul Majdi also established his authority through political channels. In 2004, Zainul Majdi was elected as a legislator in the DPR RI (Indonesian House of Representatives) through the Islamic Party, Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). Thus, borrowing the concept of Muhammad Iqbal, Zainul Majdi became two elites at once, both a man of prayer and a politician. In 2008, Zainul Majdi ran for Governor of NTB (West Nusa Tenggara) and won the election for the 2008-2013 term, subsequently securing a second term from 2013-2018 (Hamdi, 2011). In this context, Zainul Majdi has successfully established his authority as both an ulama (scholar) and an umara' (leader).

The role of NU and Religious Authority in Lombok

In the 1950s, NU's da'wah activities in Lombok were notably influential. The villages of Bagik Nyaka and Masbagik emerged as central loci for NU's da'wah movement in the

East Lombok district with two charismatic figures: Tuan Guru Abdul Mannan and Tuan Guru Mahsun. In Central Lombok, the prominent figure was Tuan Guru Faisal, while in West Lombok, Tuan Guru Shaleh Hambali played a significant role in advancing NU's religious activities (Putu Wijaya, 2017). During the New Order era, NU was excluded from the political scene, positioning itself as an opposition to the New Order regime. This exclusion led to NU being marginalized in terms of access to state resources (Mubin, 2020). The marginalization experienced by NU was pervasive across all its branches in Indonesia, including Lombok. Consequently, during the New Order period, the development of NU in Lombok remained stagnant.

The establishment of religious authority among NU elites in Lombok parallels is almost the same as the NW elites, primarily through the alumni network of the Shaulatiyyah Madrassa in Mecca, because some of NU Lombok's Tuan Guru are alumni of this institution. In this context, the religious authority of NU figures, borrowing from Alatas's concept, is formed through the genealogical adoption of the scientific isnad of Mecca scholars, particularly via sheikhs in the Shaulatiyyah Madrassa and halaqas in the Grand Mosque (Masjidil haram). This pattern of authority establishment is consistent throughout the archipelago, as explained by Azra in his discussion of the network of Nusantara Ulama since nearly all scholars of the 18th- 19th centuries in the Nusantara region are connected with the scientific isnad of Mecca Ulama (Azra, 2012; Bistara, 2020). For instance, Tuan Guru Abdul Mannan, an elite NU figure, established religious authority within his

family through an Islamic studies network in Mecca. His three sons, Tuan Guru Husni, Tuan Guru Luthfi, and Tuan Guru Abdul Manar, all became Tuan Guru. The authority of Tuan Guru Mannan and his sons led to the village he inhabited being called Bagik Nyaka Santri village, indicating that his religious authority is recognized by the community. Similarly, other prominent NU figures, such as Tuan Guru Mahsun, Tuan Guru Saleh Hambali, Tuan Guru Faisal, and Tuan Guru Turmudzi Badarudin, have also established significant religious authority (Fadli, 2016).

After the fall of the New Order, Indonesia's political landscape underwent significant changes, creating a new environment for NU in Lombok, particularly in its da'wah activities. The NU preaching movement became more free and less constrained compared to the New Order era. Consequently, NU in Lombok began to rejuvenate, with its leaders reorganizing their da'wah and political strategies to better engage with public space. Given that the radius of religious authority—which serves as cultural capital—is primarily confined to NU's internal community, it needed to be bolstered by political power, especially in the local politics of West Nusa Tenggara (NTB). As a result, several NU Tuan Gurus participated in local politics in Lombok, both in district and provincial DPR elections. Recently, under the two terms of Jokowi's administration, NU's relationship with politics has become increasingly strategic. Notably, during his second term, Jokowi selected Ma'ruf Amin as his deputy. Ma'ruf Amin's election significantly expanded NU's access to political resources and power, positively impacting the development of NU da'wah in Lombok.

NU Tuan Guru in Lombok began to establish their religious authority through their involvement in structural positions within PWNU NTB. They played significant roles and occupied strategic positions in Lombok. For instance, they took on leadership roles at UIN Mataram, the NTB Regional Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and served as administrators of MUI NTB. Through these religious institutions, the authority of NU figures strengthened within the social landscape of the Muslim Sasak community in Lombok. At this juncture, NU figures in Lombok successfully built their authority through the type of legal- rational authority described by Weber, which is an authority formed based on legal legitimacy through state power.

Along with these developments, NU's da'wah in Lombok appears to be expanding. NU has begun consolidating efforts to re-strengthen the Nahdliyin bases in various villages throughout Lombok. Efforts to fortify NU's da'wah nodes and ta'lim councils are being synchronized with the distribution of NU educational institutions across the region's villages. The aim is to reinforce Islam Aswaja An-Nadliyah in Lombok (SR interview, 2022). Borrowing from Alatas' perspective, NU figures in Lombok are engaging in "articulatory labor," which involves building and re-strengthening their da'wah base through the establishment of pesantren in Lombok. The presence of NU Islamic boarding schools in villages will serve as a foundation for reinforcing Aswaja in Lombok.

Later, a new pattern emerged in the formation of NU religious authority in Lombok. The new generation

of NU teachers sought genealogical adoption through the knowledge isnad of trans-local routes with Javanese scholars, particularly via pesantren networks in East Java. For instance, many NU Lombok students pursued their studies at Salafiyah Syafi'iyah Islamic boarding schools in Jombang and other major Islamic boarding schools in the East Java area. Alumni from these East Java pesantren have become influential preachers within the Sasak Muslim community. The presence of this new generation of NU East Java alumni has further strengthened NU's militancy in Lombok. They continue to disseminate NU ideologies on the island through their da'wah efforts. Thus, the religious authority of the new generation of NU in Lombok follows a somewhat different pattern from that of the previous generation. However, it is important to note that the new generation also continues to choose the Middle East as a destination for Islamic learning, with institutions such as Egypt's Al-Azhar and various Islamic universities in Yemen remaining popular choices.

Wahhabist Clerics as New Type of Religious Authority in Lombok

In Lombok, the first wave of Wahhabi presence began around the late 1980s, spearheaded by Tuan Guru Husni (Faizah, 2017; Said, 2019). The presence of Salafi-Wahhabi da'wah serves as an antithesis to the Islamic practices of mainstream groups in Lombok, namely the Islamic culture of NU and NW. The proliferation of Salafi-Wahhabi teachings in Lombok signifies the emergence of a new religious authority that rivals the established NU and NW figures. The success of Salafi-Wahhabi proselytizing

groups can be measured by the development of educational institutions they have established across the region. Some prominent Salafi-Wahhabi Islamic boarding schools include East Lombok Imam Muslim Islamic Boarding School, Abu Hurairah Islamic Boarding School, Mataram, West Lombok Abuzar al-Gifari Islamic Boarding School, Ma'had Islah Bina al-Ummah, As-Sunnah Islamic Boarding School in Bagik Nyaka, and Anas Bin Malik Islamic Boarding School in Wanasaba, East Lombok (Muharrir, 2022). These institutions serve as ideological apparatuses for the proliferation of Salafi-Wahhabi teachings in Lombok. Furthermore, Salafi-Wahhabi groups have been actively constructing new mosques in rural areas. This strategy can be viewed as an infiltration tactic aimed at promoting da'wah among rural community groups on the island (Said, 2019).

Several factors contribute to the acceptance of Salafi-Wahhabi ideology by the people of Lombok. First, the philanthropic movement. Salafi-Wahhabi groups have adapted their strategies in managing da'wah, moving beyond merely vocal opposition to issues of bid'ah (heresy) and shirk (polytheism). They have sought to win the sympathy of the Sasak Muslim community through philanthropic efforts, such as providing borehole assistance, donating water pipes, offering nutritional aid for stunted children, compensating underprivileged families, and providing scholarships for students to continue their studies at the Islamic University of Madinah. Second, the provision of health services, specifically through health clinics. These clinics offer medical fee waivers to the general public, thereby gaining the appreciation and support of many community members

who benefit from these services. Third, assistance in the development of mushollas and mosques in remote rural villages, enabling Salafi-Wahhabi groups to influence local populations to adopt Wahhabi teachings.

In the context of establishing religious authority, Wahhabi figures have adeptly adapted to technological developments and new media to reach a broader audience, thus ensuring a more effective proliferation of Wahhabi ideology. The Wahhabi groups have utilized new media for da'wah in Lombok, allowing Wahhabi ustaz to rival the traditional religious authority of the Tuan Guru through consistently and massively produced virtual lectures. Furthermore, new media have facilitated the rejuvenation of ulama within the da'wah landscape of the Sasak community. The growing popularity of Wahhabi figures has introduced a politics of distinction to clerical terminology in Lombok. Unlike traditional scholars who use the title Tuan Guru, Wahhabi scholars prefer the title Ustaz, reflecting an identity resistance and rebranding of clerical terminology. This rebranding distinguishes Wahhabi scholars from traditional Islamic groups such as NU and NW, highlighting the evolving dynamics of religious authority within the Sasak Muslim community.

Conclusion

From the description above, it can be concluded that the establishment of religious authority in Lombok involves a multitude of variables and evolves alongside social changes within the Sasak Muslim community. The formation of religious authority is influenced by complex relationships,

including the power of Islamic mass organizations, regime changes, political opportunity structures, and the revolution in information technology. The religious elites of traditionalist groups such as NU and NW established their authority through the scholarly isnad of Mecca's Sunni scholars and the Islamic educational institutions they managed. In certain contexts, NU and NW circles have also reinforced their religious authority by leveraging political access and building relationships with the state. In contrast, the Wahhabis have adapted to technological developments in establishing their religious authority, particularly through virtual lectures aimed at the Sasak Muslim community.

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Colonial Politics and Efforts to Seize Customary Law Hegemony

CODIFICATION OF CIREBON'S LAW IN 18TH CENTURY

Introduction

The historical background of the law book in Cirebon in the 18th century A.D. reflects a unique historical continuity involving Javanese, Islamic, and foreign traditions from previous centuries. The condition of Cirebon during this period is closely tied to three fundamental elements: territorial conditions, the formation of the Cirebon Sultanate, and social, economic, and political dynamics. Many works of literature indicate that Cirebon in this century was under the hegemony of the VOC (Verenigde Oostindische

Ibi Satibi

Compagnie). Initially engaged in economics as a Dutch trading company, the VOC gradually metamorphosed into a political movement. Consequently, the legal domain is suspected to be an entry point for hegemonic political efforts in various fields.

The social situation in Cirebon in the 18th century A.D. was influenced by the presence of the VOC in the arena of the Cirebon sultanate. The VOC's influence had a profound impact on the sociological landscape, leading to the emergence of four distinct groups: the palace community that cooperated with the VOC, the palace community that resisted VOC influence, the agricultural community integrated into the VOC's trade monopoly system, and the community that rebelled against the co-optation of the government company in Cirebon.

Despite the challenge to prove these four communities based on historical data, the impact of the trade monopoly policy carried out by the VOC could suppress traders, especially the natives. According to Sharon Siddique, this can be evidenced by the repressive power of the VOC, exemplified by the construction of forts and the complete control over the port. The port at this time was not only a symbol of the accumulation of VOC economic activity, but it also influenced the social structure that had previously been fragmented to the authority of the Cirebon sultanate. The controversy over the VOC's presence in Cirebon led to rejection and rebellion against it, often causing the palace elite to choose to live in the countryside (Shiddique, 1997).

One of the conflicting parties used this political condition to ask for VOC's assistance in resolving the internal political crisis of the Sultanate. Recognizing an opportunity, the Dutch government responded positively, stepping in to negotiate agreements. For the VOC, these political accords were a form of formal diplomacy that would later become binding, with significant implications for both parties. In addition to helping resolve the conflict between the sultans of Cirebon and the arrest of robbers, the VOC entered into an agreement with Cirebon on January 7, 1681, A.D. The first agreement or contract was established between the ruler of Cirebon and the Dutch and was intended to strengthen VOC's authority in Cirebon (Hoadley, 1975).

The VOC and the Quest for Political Hegemony

The codification of the book Papakem Jaksa Pipitu in the 18th century A.D. had a connection with the VOC's efforts to seize the political hegemony of the Cirebon sultanate. M.C. Ricklefs identifies the beginning of the 17th century A.D. to the 19th A.D. as a period of struggle for hegemony. Throughout this period, the condition and political situation of the archipelago experienced a decline, as a result of the arrival of Europeans on these islands. The penetration of these Europeans can be observed from the phases of the VOC's struggle and the Dutch in seizing hegemony based on the geography of the archipelago, namely: the first phase, eastern Indonesia in 1630-1800; the second phase, western Indonesia between 1640-1800; the third phase, Java from 1640 to 1682; the fourth phase, carried out in eastern Java and Madura around 1680-1754; and the fifth phase took place in Java in 1754-1792

(Ricklefs, 2001). The last two phases that focused on Java were carried out as an effort to consolidate colonization and expand its scope, not only in the economic field through the expropriation of trade monopolies, and royal legislation but also in the religious field (Ricklefs, 2001) as had been done by its predecessor, the Portuguese (Hadikusumo, 1978).

Unlike Ricklefs, Sharon Siddique divided the periods that significantly shaped Cirebon's political landscape during the colonial era into two distinct phases: 1570-1681 and 1681-1940. According to Siddique, these two periods connected Cirebon with Islamic kingdoms, pre- existing kingdoms, and the arrival of European nations. The initial period was marked by the sustainability of the Cirebon Sultanate after the leadership of Sunan Gunung Jati and the political dynamics of the Sultanate. The period began with the Cirebon Sultanate as an independent entity, later influenced by the Mataram kingdom, affected by VOC administration in Priangan, and engaged in communication with the sultanates of Demak and Banten. The second century showed the political map of the Cirebon sultanate in colonial penetration. The phases of colonization according to Sharon Siddique began with the first agreement of the Cirebon sultanate with the VOC in 1681.

Sharon's periodization (1977) according to Sri Margana is considered inappropriate. According to him, the colonization of the archipelago, more specifically Java, took place after the fall of the VOC caused by the economic recession at the end of the XVIII century. Sharon Shiddique's studies resulted in at least two main characteristics that distinguished each other's periods. The first period from

1570 to 1681 is referred to as the period of "The Cirebon Sultanate as Power Monopoly". In this period, the sultanate of Cirebon was shown as an independent Islamic kingdom and had bilateral relations with several other Islamic kingdoms, especially Demak, Banten, and Mataram. In contrast to the first period, the second period which lasted from 1681 to 1940 placed the Cirebon sultanate under the influence of colonialism. Sharon Shiddique called this three-century condition the "Deterioration of the Cirebon Sultanate under Colonialism".

However, Sharon found different mappings related to the colonial system, especially between 1681 and 1809 and 1809 to 1940. The range of the first mentioned year was marked by the beginning of the agreement of the Cirebon sultanate and the Dutch hegemony efforts against Cirebon, starting from the field of trade which impacted other fields, such as social, political, and law. Meanwhile, the range year from 1809 to 1940 was marked by the opening of the Dutch government in carrying out full colonization of Indonesia. This step was carried out in line with the condition of the Dutch trade alliance incorporated in the VOC experiencing significant bankruptcy. Finally, the Dutch royal government took control of colonization in Indonesia.

The Justice System during Colonial Co-optation

The history of justice in Cirebon can be traced to the origins of the judiciary in this region during the second half of the 15th century A.D. and its court processes. In the early days of the Islamic kingdom in Cirebon, there were at least two terms that were often used to indicate

the existence of a judiciary: the penghulu (ruler) and the jaksa (prosecutor). The term penghulu appeared during the Islamic period, yet there is not much literature explaining its function and role in Cirebon. The term penghulu and the system of kepenghuluan were practiced in the Surambi court of Sultan Agung in Mataram. In the Surambi court, a king no longer holds and presides over the upper house of the judiciary, he is only involved in decision-making and is restricted to his decisions not to contradict the advice of the Surambi court (Isma'il, 1997). The role of employees under the power of the penghulu in its development is narrowing. It only consists of five functions, namely leading prayers, khatib in charge of sermons, muazzin, modin, and marbut. These functions clearly show that penghulu's authority is limited to the realm of religious rituals alone, no longer having a broad enough role, especially in the field of law. This is different from the many chronicles or sagas that are sometimes found in the terms qadhi and penghulu to indicate the position of judicial leader and matters related to religious activities.

In contrast, the term jaksa (prosecutor) in Cirebon can be found in several pieces of literature. Prince Sulaiman Suledraningrat who wrote the History of Cirebon, for example, noted that the term prosecutor had been used in 1464 A.D. At that time, Syarief Abdurrahim was appointed by Prince Cakrabuana who was serving Kuwu Cerbon as prosecutor (Sulendraningrat, 1968). The literature does not explain the role and function of the prosecutor at that time. In its development until now, the term prosecutor in Cirebon has a place in the community. Besides being enshrined as

one of the sub-districts in the city of Cirebon with the name of the Kejaksaan (prosecutor's office), the figure of Syarief Abdurrahim in the past was the first person in Cirebon to be awarded the title of prince of the Kejaksaan (prosecutor's office).

In addition to the terms penghulu and jaksa above, the judicial process in Cirebon that was carried out during the reign of Sunan Gunung Jati can be used as evidence of the strength of the legal process and institutional settlement. No name specifically describes the judicial process involving the guardian council and the accused, Sheikh Lemahabang also known as Sheikh Siti Jenar. This trial was presided directly by Sunan Gunung Jati and held at the Great Mosque (Sholikhin, 2004). This judicial process was carried out openly, placing four people as communicators or loudspeakers. These four people were at four different locations: the door of the mubalagoh, the foyer of the mosque, the gate of the mosque, and the middle of Pakungwati Square, aiming to broadcast the proceedings of the court to the general public (Sulendraningrat, 1968). Such judicial proceedings show that Islamic law is accepted in the Cirebon court. The mosque in this judicial process serves not only as a place of worship with theological significance but also as a locus for seeking justice for the Islamic kingdom of Cirebon and its people."

The situation described above differs from Cirebon's position under the influence of Mataram. The judicial system operated in a dualistic arrangement, with civil cases handled directly in Cirebon through the prosecutor's institution. At this time, the prosecutors played a significantly broad role,

prosecuting individuals for their actions and imposing the applicable punishments of that era. Meanwhile, criminal cases must be sent to Mataram to be tried under the Susuhunan Mataram judicial system known as the Surambi court (Tresna, 1975).

Different conditions were shown in the judicial system after the Sultans ruled the Sultanate. This period began in the early 18th century, namely in 1705 which became the momentum for the liberation of Cirebon from Mataram rule. However, the judicial system gradually came under the influence of the VOC's government. The massive economic movement carried out by the company expanded its penetration in the field of law in Cirebon. In the early 18th century M., the condition of the Cirebon sultanate was in a position to be responsible for several agreements made between the Cirebon sultanate and the VOC's government. The company was very visible in placing this area of law as the object of gradual penetration since the Cirebon sultanate opened to make a treaty with the VOC in 1681 A.D. This marked the round of cooperation between these two political institutions until the end of the 18th century A.D. following the bankruptcy of the VOC in Indonesia. Vlekke said that in the early 18th century A.D., legal conditions in Cirebon began to be contested between customary law that must be followed in judicial assemblies and opposing the interference of priests or clerics. To strengthen the basis of his opinion, Vlekke refers to the writings of Jan Fredrik Gobius in 1717 A.D. In the book, Gobius who at that time ruled Cirebon as a resident revealed "I always ask judges in Cirebon to follow pre-Islamic customs and oppose the interference of imams" (Hubbertus & Vlekke, 2008).

The Politics of Agreement as an Early Era of Penetration

There have been at least six agreements or contracts made between the sultanate of Cirebon and the VOC, namely in 1681 A.D., 1688 A.D., 1699 A.D., 1708 A.D., 1765 A.D., and 1768 A.D. These contracts marked the era of the company's penetration of the Cirebon sultanate. The economic and political fields take place intertwined to seize hegemony in the Cirebon region.

The first contract was signed on January 7, 1681, A.D., and spearheaded by the company, Jacob van Dyck. This contract placed the princes in the sultanate of Cirebon as part of a friendship with the company. However, this friendship appeared to be more economically beneficial, positioning the company (VOC) as a trade monopoly power in Cirebon. In fact, outside the economic sphere, the company's government had the right to erect fortifications that served as defenses of the Dutch housing complex and was entitled to the process of evaluation and continuation of subsequent agreements (Siddique, 1997).

The second contract is carried out as a continuation of the previous contract. This contract was carried out on September 8, 1688, A.D. From the sultanate side, the contract was signed by Sultan Sepuh I, Sultan Anom I, and Panembahan I. According to Molsbergen, as quoted by Sharon Siddique, in this contract, the company began to carry out double-standard politics. The trade politics that he had been carrying out gradually expanded its influence within the sultanate and the legal field by intervening in judicial procedures in Cirebon. Evidently in this contract, the company's government placed itself in an unequal

bilateral relationship with the sultanate of Cirebon. The initiation in positioning Sultan Kesepuhan as a sultan who was considered senior could not be separated from the influence of the company. With this strategy, the company was able to exert a wider influence both within the sultanate and the residency government. This influence, for example, is in his involvement in the procedure and implementation of law in Cirebon. Such as the practice of Saturday's judiciary in the square of the Kasepuhan palace and the determination of law executors from each sultanate, Kanoman, Kesepuhan, and Panembahan which are called institutionally "Seven Prosecutors". Outside the legal field, the company government also had a strong position in the selection of Shahbandar, the party with authority in the management of the Cirebon seaport (Siddique, 1997).

The third contract was carried out after the death of Sultan Sepuh I in 1697 A.D. According to the VOC company government, the contract made on August 4, 1699, M. had a strategic position in penetrating the Cirebon sultanate. For the VOC, the momentum of two years after the death of Sultan Sepuh I was made as a justification for the need to bring up one of the sultans as a representative of the Cirebon sultanate. Therefore, Brandes, as quoted by Sharon Siddique said that this contract not only placed Sultan Anom I as the senior sultan, but also the power of the land. In addition, the position of Sultan Sepuh I was divided among the two eldest sons, namely Prince Dipati and Prince Aria. The first prince occupied the position of Sultan Sepuh II and Prince Aria who became the trust of the company government for cooperation matters. The

company government compensated the sultanate for half of the income from the port and agricultural income from the palace's lands. In addition, the company's power expanded geographically to the Gebang and Priangan regions (Siddique, 1997).

The next contract was made on February 17, 1708. This contract was a follow-up to an agreement in 1705 between Mataram and the VOC on the division of territory. First, the company's territory included Indramayu and Gebang; second, the power of the Cirebon sultanate held Kandanghaur, parts of Indramayu, Cirebon, Majalengka and Kuningan; third, the Cirebon-Priangan region encompassed Galuh, Limbangan and Sukapura. In addition to strengthening the division of these fiefdoms, the contract of 1708 A.D. sought to assert a more senior position among the sultans.

After a long period of not making a treaty, the company and the sultanate finally made a treaty again on January 18, 1752, A.D. This agreement was nothing more than the company's attempt at internal interference in the palace, such as the company's right to succession in the palace and the rule about a person being appointed sultan, the one born to be the eldest son of a sultan's consort (Siddique, 1997).

Several agreements after 1752 A.D. were made to strengthen the company's penetration base against the Cirebon sultanate in the field of law. There are two related treaties, namely on February 4, 1765, A.D. and April 18, 1765, A.D. The first momentum is more referred to as a milestone of VOC approval of the law book that became a reference

for the court in Cirebon, while the second agreement, His Majesty Tuan Sultan approved the compilation of the Javanese law book as a legal guide in the Cirebon court. This momentum is recorded directly in the codified customary law book with a fairly complete narrative. As recorded by Sudjana (1981) the narrative was "Lagi ing sasih Pebruwari, tanggal ping sakawan, ing taun 1765, kalayan malih titiyang ageng ing seratipun: Ing sasih April tanggal ping wolulas tunggil taun wau wonten dening kang nyuthat: Ki Tumenggug Kartadireja, Ki Tumenggung Anggadireja, Ki Tumenggung Raksadingrat, Ki Tumengggung Secadipura, kalayan Jaksa Pipitu, jaksaning Kanjeng Sultan Sepuh dhateng Kanjeng Sultan Anom, dhateng kanjeng Sultan Carbon, dhateng kanjeng Panembahan." "In February, the 4th of 1765, the great men in Batavia had agreed to it, and His Majesty Tuan Sultan had also said in his letter on April the eighteenth of the same year, and also in the records of those who extracted it, such as Ki Tumenggug Kartadireja, Ki Tumenggung Anggadireja, Ki Tumenggung Raksadingrat, Ki Tumengggung Secadipura, and Attorney Seven, Attorney Your Majesty Tuan Sultan Sepuh, Attorney Your Majesty Tuan Sultan Anom, Attorney Your Majesty Tuan Sultan Carbon, and Attorney Your Majesty Tuan Panembahan."

Conclusion

The presence of foreign nations in Cirebon, especially the Dutch company government, played a significant role in transforming the social and economic structure of the Cirebon region in the 18th century AD. Changes in the political structure led Cirebon to have two bases of government: the

kingdom (sultanate) and the resident government (VOC). The presence of the company government also influenced trade dynamics, strategic policies, and socio-religious structures in Cirebon. A historical review of the early 18th century shows that Cirebon was no longer solely ruled by the sultanate but was under the control of the company government, which had established an office as the Resident of Cirebon. The condition of these two governments has influenced the field of law and several related regulations. Consequently, the political codification of Papakem Jaksa Pipitu's law book was primarily initiated by the company's government. This was reinforced by two colonial political strategies: the company's co-opting of the judicial system and the agreements made between the Sultanate of Cirebon and the company government, marking further colonial penetration.

The Company was successful in its attempt to seize political hegemony over customary law. The codification of the code of laws in Cirebon was influenced by economic factors through unequal bilateral relations between the Cirebon Sultanate and the company government, which penetrated the political field and co-opted the legal field. The field of law became an object and factor to obtain certainty in reality, and it was full of intertwined political configurations and dynamics.

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Integration of Environmental Fiqh and Climate Change

MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION IN EAST JAVA

Introduction

Climate change is an undeniable threat to human health, particularly for communities already facing increasing social inequality, political and economic uncertainty, and a series of concurrent environmental challenges. Archaeological data on past climates and environments provide important sources of evidence about the potential challenges faced by humans and the long-term outcomes of short-term adaptive strategies (Schug et al., 2023). Adaptation to climate change is a major issue in economic

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development policy (Mbaye et al., 2023). In fact, adaptation to climate change has been a focus for scientists and policymakers for decades. Today, humanity faces complex global environmental challenges, including climate change, global warming, drought, air pollution, forest destruction, biodiversity loss, and other environmental damage. These issues represent the most severe ecological degradation humanity has experienced throughout the history of civilization (Mubarok & Haryanto, 2020).

The cause of these problems is ecological imbalance, which results in imbalances in the relationship between humans and nature. Although nature cannot counteract the impacts caused by humans on environmental damage, humans also become victims in this context (Kramm et al., 2017). The term climate refers to the general condition of various weather elements over a long period, including rainfall, temperature, air pressure, wind, humidity, and evaporation in a region (Malino et al., 2021). Climate change is an urgent global issue that needs to be addressed. The impacts of climate change can include environmental damage, droughts, floods, and other natural disasters that affect human life and the sustainability of ecosystems. Therefore, concrete and sustainable efforts are needed to reduce the impacts of climate change. Climate change occurs when the values or patterns of weather parameters change, either naturally or due to human activities that deviate from the average conditions that usually occur (Malino et al., 2021).

In the Quran, Ar-Rum chapter, verse 41, it is explained that corruption has spread on land and sea due to human

actions, as a consequence of their deeds. This serves as Allah's effort tomake humans feel the effects of their actions and return to the right path. Islam, as a religion,places great importance on the environment and the sustainability of life on Earth. Many verses in the Quran and hadiths explain, recommend, and even mandate every human to maintain the sustainability of their own lives and the lives of other creatures on Earth (Bassam, 2017). One effort to address climate change is through adaptation and mitigation (Andriyani et al., 2020).Mitigation involves steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sources. One way to do this is through education and the dissemination of information, both formally and informally. Integrating religious values into efforts to reduce the impacts of climate change is importantbecause religion plays a significant role in shaping human behavior and sustainable mindsets.

Islam is the predominant religion practiced by the people of East Java. In East Java, various religious and educational centers have been growing rapidly. One of the significant educational institutions is the pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). Additionally, various Islamic organizations have also been established in the East Java region. East Java province includes important cities such as Surabaya, Malang, and Gresik, which are centers of industryand trade (Rosyana & Soelistyo, 2020). Industrial activities, including factory production,transportation, and air pollution, contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change impacts.

As caliphs on this Earth, humans have a responsibility to maintain the balance of nature and prevent any form of

damage or danger that can threaten life. This responsibility is based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad SAW: "The leader of the people is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects" (HR. Muslim). Additionally, there is a principle in fiqh that states *"Adh-dlarar yuzal,"* which means any form of harm or danger must be eliminated. Furthermore, the principle in fiqh states that any form of harm or danger must be eliminated based on the saying of the Prophet SAW: *"Laa dharara wa laa dhiraara,"* which means do not harm yourself or others (Bassam, 2017).

Result and Discussion

The impacts of climate change have significant consequences for the environment, the global economy, and human health, with long-term implications that will affect future generations. Therefore, it is crucial to implement sustainable development as an effective mitigation effort against climate change. Not only are future generations at risk, but some communities in certain areas, such as small islands and developing countries, have already experienced the tangible impacts of climate change. To address this issue, concrete steps need to be taken, such as focusing on justice and sustainability in development by involving various levels; engaging in constructive international cooperation; and enacting strong national policiesas well as individual actions (Landon, 2006).

One impact of climate change is the alteration of rainfall patterns in some regions. This is marked by seasonal uncertainties, with increased rainfall during the rainy season potentiallycausing floods and landslides, which can damage

agricultural lands. Conversely, during the dry season, there is drought and a continuous decrease in water availability, affecting water supplies in urban and agricultural areas and increasing the risk of forest fires (Hairiah et al., 2016). Changes in rainfall patterns in low-latitude regions are one of the indicators of climate change in tropical areas (Los et al., 2021).



Figure 1. Research Area: East Java Province

As a province located on the island of Java, Indonesia, East Java is particularly vulnerable to climate change phenomena. Climate change refers to long-term changes in average weatherconditions in a region or on a planet. Global climate change is related to the increase in global average temperatures caused by the rise in greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile, regional climate change includes variations in weather patterns, rainfall, and temperatures in a specific region. East Java province has unique characteristics that are important to understand in the context of climate change.

In recent years, rainfall trends in East Java province have become a major concern. Addressing these unstable rainfall trends requires us all to increase awareness of climate changeand take necessary adaptation steps (Ajr & Dwirani, 2019). Collaboration between the government, community, and private sector is key to facing the challenges posed by climate change. Below are observations of climate elements at the Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) observation stations in East Java province from 2019-2021 (BPS, 2020).

Tabel 1. *Climate Elements in East Java Province*

Unsur Iklim	2019	2020	2021
Suhu (^{0}C)			
Minimum	20,2	19,1	21,4
Rata-rata	28,0	28,2	27,1
Maksimum	36,7	35,6	32,7
Kelembaban (%)			
Minimum	35,8	38,9	53,3
Rata-rata	75,0	78	79,7
Maksimum	93,4	99,2	97,4
Kecepatan Angin (m/det)			
Minimum	Calm	Calm	Calm
Rata-rata	...	...	3,6
Maksimum	33	29	16,2
Tekanan Udara (mb)			
Minimum	1007,7	1006,9	979,6
Rata-rata	1011,6	1010,5	984,5
Maksimum	1015,9	1013,5	989,4
Rata-rata Curah Hujan per bulan (mm)	...	...	210,5
Rata-rata Hari Hujan per bulan (hari)	...	...	13,5
Rata-rata Penyinaran Matahari per hari (%)	77	74	48,5

Source: Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (2022)

By using satellite imagery technology, we can obtain accurate and up-to-date sea surfacetemperature data in East Java province (Alfajri et al., 2017). This data is an essential resource for understanding sea dynamics and provides valuable insights for the government and stakeholders in decision-making related to the marine sector and coastal environment (Zulkhasyni, 2015). Continuous monitoring and analysis of satellite imagery of sea surface temperatures help us gain a better understanding of sea dynamics in East Java province. This information forms the basis for efforts in marine conservation, climate change mitigation, and sustainable marine resource management.


SST 2013 @ SST 2013+first
SST 2014 @ SST 2014+first
SST 2015 @ SST 2015+first
SST 2016 @ SST 2016+first
SST 2017 @ SST 2017+first
SST 2018 @ SST 2018+first
SST 2019 @ SST 2019+first
SST 2020 @ SST 2020+first
SST 2022 @ SST 2022+first

Figure 2. Changes in Sea Surface Temperature in East Java Province
Source: Processed by Authors (2023)

In the effort to monitor and understand climate characteristics in East Java province, satellite imagery technology has contributed significantly. One type of data obtained from satellite imagery is the average wind speed in the region. Average wind speed is an important element in evaluating atmospheric and environmental conditions (Nugroho et al., 2021). A good understanding of the average wind speed in East Java province aids in planning and decision-making across various sectors. This data is a crucial resource in facing the challenges of climate change and preparing necessary adaptation steps to mitigate its impact.

Climate change occurs slowly over long periods and is difficult to avoid. This phenomenon will have significant impacts on various aspects of life (Irawan et al., 2022). The extreme impacts of climate change are mainly seen in rising temperatures and changing seasonal patterns (Diposaptono et al., 2009). This temperature increase is caused by industrial activities, the use of fossil fuels, and land-use changes that occur worldwide The extreme impacts of climate change include an increase in diseases such as typhoid, malaria, and fever; increased frequency of natural disasters and extreme weather events such as landslides, floods, droughts, and tropical storms; threats to water availability; changes in seasonal patterns and rainfall patterns; reduced agricultural productivity; increased risk of forest fires due to rising temperatures; threats to biodiversity; and rising sea levels causing permanent flooding and infrastructure damage in coastal areas (Malino et al., 2021).

Development of Islamic Law: Environmental Fiqh

The existence of religion, doctrine, and religious figures has recently been recognized as influencing perceptions of pro-environmental behavior. However, this influence tends to be limited to basic behaviors related to individual lifestyles rather than having broader and more significant impacts on policies and ecosystem preservation (Mubarok & Haryanto, 2020). Discussions about the environment are not specifically covered in separate studies but are scattered across various topics of fiqh knowledge (Yafie, 2006). In the framework of fiqh, four pillars regulate the order of life: worships (ibadat); transactions (mu'amalat); marriage (munakahat); and criminal law (jinayat). These four pillars regulate the main aspects of human life intending to create an environment that is clean, healthy, prosperous, safe, peaceful, and happy, both physically and spiritually, in this world and the hereafter.(Ghufron, 2010).

In this modern era, globalization has a significant influence on extreme climate change. This climate change is primarily caused by human activities, especially the use of fossil fuels and land-use changes in the industrialization process (Mokhov, 2022). Therefore, environmental fiqh has an important role in providing a new understanding and approach to managing the environment based on religious principles that align with Sharia law. In the context of the ecological crisis caused by human greed and negligence in the use of technology, we need to formulate and develop environmental fiqh (fiqh al-bi'ah).

An Indonesian Islamic law expert explains the basic principles related to responsibility in maintaining

environmental sustainability from a fiqh perspective (Yafie, 2006). Some of these principles include: (1) the preservation of Life (Hifdh al-Nafs) referring to human life as a basic asset that must be maintained and preserved as best as possible to fulfill its functions and values. (2) The second principle states that life in this world is not the ultimate goal but rather a means to compete in doing good and obtaining Allah's pleasure toward eternal life in the hereafter. (3) Moderation in production and consumption (Hadd al-Kifayah) must be adjusted to the appropriate standard of human needs. Excessive, greedy, and unreasonable exploitation of nature will cause damage and harm. (4) Harmony and balance must be maintained to sustain ecosystems and prevent damage must maintain harmony and balance. (5) Every living creature has dignity and the right to live and maintain its existence. (6) Humans have a role as managers of the universe and will be held accountable for every action taken.

In the effort to build environmental fiqh, two important methods are *mashlahah* (public interest) dan *maqasid asy-syariah* (objectives of Islamic law). These two concepts are interrelated because *mashlahah* serves to maintain and preserve *maqasid asy-syariah*. *Maqasidasy-syariah* is divided into five aspects: *hifdz al-din* (preservation of religion), *hifdz al-nafs* (preservation of life), *hifdz al-aql* (preservation of intellect), *hifdz al-mal* (preservation of wealth), dan *hifdz al-nasl* (preservation of progeny). These five aspects are the objectives of Sharia that must be maintained and considered (Mahmud Syaltout, 1966). Dr. Al-Qardhawi, in his book *"Ri'ayatul Bi'ah fi Syari'atil Islam"* explains that protecting the environment is an effort to achieve public interest and

prevent harm, which aligns with the principle of *maqasid asy-syariah*. In the context of environmental preservation, Yusuf Qardhawi emphasizes the importance of imposing penalties such as imprisonment (At-Ta'zir) for those who cause environmental damage according to the decisions made by the government (*waliyyul amr*) (Al- Qardhawi, 2001).

As a result of the interpretation of fiqh scholars, environmental fiqh shows adaptive andcontinuously updated characteristics to keep up with changing times and existing needs. However, it is important to remember that fiqh is not a result of thoughts that are entirely freefrom the foundation of revelation; it also maintains its flexibility (Mahfudh, 2012). Contextual understanding of Islamic law integrates the ideality of law with the reality of life. A contextual fiqh approach facilitates dialogue between religious texts and the reality of life.Contextualization of fiqh is an understanding based on thought that prioritizes public interest without ignoring the established legal framework. Public interest is considered the main essence of this view (Sanusi, 2015). Furthermore, contextual understanding is not a result of random thinking, nor is it detached from the basic framework of Sharia. Thus, this contextualization concept does not mean completely abandoning fiqh (Mahfudh, 2012).(Mahfudh, 2012).

To respond to contemporary issues integral to the daily life of Muslims, such as extremeclimate change, a new ijtihad (independent reasoning) approach is needed. This approach aligns with the basic principle of usul al-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) "*al-Syari'ahal-Islam Shalihah li Kulli*

Zaman-in wa Makan-in" (Islamic law is suitable for every time andplace) or "*al-Syari'ah al-Islam li Maslahat al-'Ibad fi al-Darain*" (Islamic law for the public interest in this world and the hereafter). In facing climate change, a contextual fiqh approach becomes important. Fiqh scholars need to be brave in socializing and presenting ideas about awareness of the importance of the environment for human survival. They should campaign about the obligation to preserve and protect the environment. The balance and sustainability of the environment play a crucial role in achieving well-being.

As stated in the Quran, Al-Baqarah chapter (2):143 commands achieving al-tawassuth (moderation) and Al-Hadid chapter (57):25 emphasizes at-tawazun (balance) in all aspects of life, whether material or related to human aspects such as thought, reason, emotions, desires, and feelings. Environmental components such as water, animals, plants, and other objects need special attention. The balance and harmony between all these elements significantly impact human rational attitudes, fostering an open mind, broad understanding, and focus on the public interest of all living creatures (Mahfudh, 2012).

Integration of Environmental Fiqh in the Climate Change Phenomenon

Integrating environmental fiqh with climate change is a crucial effort in addressing current environmental challenges. In this context, environmental fiqh serves as a legal framework and guidance for understanding and addressing the increasingly extreme impacts of climate change. Through a more contextual understanding of environmental fiqh, scholars and Muslims can contribute

significantly to environmental preservation and ecosystem sustainability (Zuhdi, 2015). By integrating environmental fiqh with climate change, we can develop a holistic and sustainable approach to environmental protection. This involves awareness of our dependence on nature, appreciation for God's creation, and a commitment to act responsibly as caliphs on Earth. Implementing environmental fiqh can also encourage cross- religion and cross-sector cooperation in addressing climate change. To tackle these challenges, joint efforts involving the government, community, religious institutions, and the private sector are needed to adopt sustainable practices and contribute to environmental restoration and protection. Such collaborative efforts are essential for creating a more sustainable future and effectively mitigating the impacts of climate change.

Here are some examples of behaviors that reflect the integration of environmental fiqh in addressing extreme climate change, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions by reducing fossil energy consumption, adopting energy-saving practices like using energy-efficient lamps,turning off unused electrical appliances, using sustainable transportation such as walking, cycling, or using public transportation, and reducing excessive use of air conditioning or heating. The next is utilizing renewable energy sources such as solar panels or wind power canhelp reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change. Another way is water conservation by using water wisely, reducing water wastage, and collecting rainwater for non- potable needs can help reduce pressure on water resources and maintain ecosystem sustainability. The last is greening and tree planting for maintaining forest

sustainability which are crucial steps in reducing carbon dioxide emissions, improving air quality, and preserving biodiversity.

Additionally, waste sorting and recycling are practical actions that help reduce environmental pollution and the excessive use of natural resources. There is also education and outreach through lectures, teaching, and community outreach, scholars and religious leaders can educate the public about the importance of protecting the environment and raising awareness of our responsibilities towards it. Furthermore, scholars and religious leaders can advocate for sustainable policies and actions, including environmental protection, emission reduction, and adaptation to climate change. Protecting environmental sustainability is a collective obligation (*fardhu kifayah*). This means every individual and group has a responsibility to maintain the environment and participate in minimizing environmental damage. The government plays a crucial role as an initiator and policymaker in preventing environmental damage. Meanwhile, the community also has a duty to assist the government in addressing environmental issues (Yafie, 2006). By practicing the principles of environmental fiqh, we can actively participate in preserving environmental sustainability and creating a balanced and sustainable ecosystem. These actions, guided by religious teachings and a sense of collective responsibility, contribute to mitigating the impacts of climate change and promoting a healthier, more sustainable world.

Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, this paper identifies several points of conclusions. The principles of environmental fiqh have proven to be relevant and can be combined with data and information obtained through remote sensing. This integration provides valuable religious guidance in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. The integration of environmental fiqh with remote sensing reflects the alignment of religious values with environmental protection. The principles of environmental fiqh align with the goals of environmental protection and preservation. This reinforces the importance of incorporating religious dimensions in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, focusing not only on technical and scientific aspects but also on ethical and justice values This research has significant policy and action implications. The integration of environmental fiqh with remote sensing provides a strong foundation for developing more effective and sustainable environmental policies in East Java province. This can help policymakers formulate more targeted mitigation and adaptation steps by considering religious values, and local wisdom, and utilizing important information obtained from remote sensing technology. This paper has shown that integrating environmental fiqh with remote sensing is a beneficial approach in addressing climate change in East Java province. Additionally, it provides significant contributions by combining religious, scientific, and technological perspectives to achieve environmental sustainability in facing climate change challenges.

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CHAPTER 3

GENDER, CULTURE, AND RELIGIOUS MODERATION

Minangkabau Matriliny under Customary Shariatization in Today's Globalized World

West Sumatra Today

Kalau karuah aia di hulu, karuah juo sampai kamuaro. Kalau kuria induaknya rintiakanaknyo, tuturan aia atok jatuah kapalambahan juo. If women are despicable, then despicable children will also be born (Jamil, 2019a, p. 24). That is the meaning I quoted from the *Bundo Kanduang* book. It was a bit different when I asked a Minang woman in a discussion session about the proverb meaning. In the Minangkabau oral tradition, according to her, the proverb has a broad sense to emphasize that everything has a cause-

Mardian Sulistyati

and-effect relationship. Thus, the induak parable above means both parents (female and male), grandparents, and relatives, where the context emphasizes the origins. As discussed with Rezki Khainidar, a Minang woman and humanitarian activist who is the Head of the Indonesian Planned Parenthood Association in Bukittinggi. So, why is this parable now only connoted to women or mothers?

In West Sumatra today, custom and sharia (Islam) are the two primary tools governing the ideology of society's moralism. Even daily, Minang people often use the term 'custom,' especially when discussing their way of life (Jamil, 2018, p. 1). The philosophy of life of the Basandi Syarak Adat-Syarak Basandi Kitabullah, commonly known as ABS-SBK, is the actualassimilation of customs and sharia, which are increasingly being strengthened in the spaces ofMinang society. Until very recently, in June 2022, the DPR RI formalized the West Sumatra Province Law, which de jure accommodates ABS-SBK as a character and basis for life. ABS-SBK nowadays is not just a consensus of some groups or a political mission of certain parties but has become a necessity realized in every aspect of West Sumatran society's everyday life.

ABS-SBK enthusiasm now underlies various political decisions and has given rise to many sharia regulations that often target the safeguarding (or controlling?) of women's self- expression (Huda, 2013; Salim, 2013). ABS-SBK, originally an unwritten norm, has been transformed into a written norm in the last six years and published in several derivative series. Three of the series, Bundo Kanduang (Jamil, 2019a), Padusi Minang (Jamil, 2019b),

and Sumbang 12 (Jamil, 2018), specifically discuss the character and obligations of women, which are considered by Minangkabau wisdom.

In feminist critical consciousness, local customs and wisdom can be a double-edged sword: dominating or liberating women. What often happens is traditional views and (shariatization of) local wisdom tend to lead to the subordination of individual women to their final status; closing their free choices and vitality to see themself as historical creatures who are constantly becoming. One of the impacts is the psychosocial rules (because it is not always written rules) for Muslim and non-Muslim women to wear the hijab. Several academic publications show how Minangkabau traditional wisdom manifested in the form of ABS-SBK became a catalyst for the unification of Minang and Islamic identities (Sudarto 2008; Huda 2013; El Guyanie and Tamtowi 2021).

The problem is, Islam in this context is more monopolized by a technical-symbolic way of thinking and displaces several crucial issues of West Sumatran society, such as sexual violence, disability welfare, maternal and newborn deaths, environmental sanitation, waste management, abandoned dog population, and diversity. My previous study showed that the shariaization of local wisdom increasingly emphasizes the regulation of women's sexuality in the name of glorifying custom (Sulistyati, 2022). One of the cases of traditional contestation and free choice of Minang women can be seen in Fahmi Marh et al. (2022)'s study about women who play calempong music. Traditionally, they are subordinated because women playing music in public spaces

are considered inappropriate/disrespectful, especially if they were not accompanied by male family members. However, they are also respected by some groups as emancipatory women. In this context, the calempong performance becomes a process of becoming Minang women who break through traditional values independently and autonomously.

The Discursivity of Customs and Sharia on the Body and Morals

The most worrying thing about the dynamics of West Sumatra these days is the rise of religious sentiments in political and cultural areas, which narrow-minded the meaning of ABS-SBK. Narrow-minded in the sense of being final and only; which favors one religion and one belief in it, establishes one ideal outfit for women, prescribes one definition of the body, private parts, and good or bad criteria for womanhood. Based on the regional regulations track records I researched, the implementation of sharia regulations in West Sumatra began with an appeal to dress for Muslim women—which then continued to become an obligation and the enforcement of rules considered "sharia/Islamic in nature". As of this writing, there are at least fifteen sharia regulations in West Sumatra that target women's bodies and expressions—this figure does not include sharia regulations on other issues. This monopoly of knowledge on religion (Islam) and customs, which are sharia-centric and symbolic, distance society from its human-social elan vital.

This situation makes me wonder, perhaps in the Minangkabau domestic realm, morals, customs, and sharia are the highest values we can no longer question. It might be impossible to discuss culture if it was not based on the

Kitabullah. I address this skepticism to the essentialists that underlie the conservatism politics in traditional practice— which in conversations among West Sumatran elites is called 'cultural identity'. If my hypothesis is correct, this situation can easily be used to strengthen men's masculinity, which is often depicted in a vulnerable position in the Minangkabau matrilineal system. Additionally, Minang people often make an analogy of men's position with ashes on a wooden stump (abu di ateh tunggua) to illustrate the fragility of Minang men's.

To understand the contestation of Minangkabau men's desires for masculinity, the reality that Meiyenti and Afrida (2018) reveal in The Inequality of Rights and Obligations of Minangkabau Men in Matrilineal System is interesting to discuss. In fact, many Minang men are neglected in their old age. They experience an imbalance between obligations and rights in their kinship relations; men's social responsibilities are not accompanied by economic resource control— where whole control is on the woman's side. The position of men (husbands) is not considered that important in the family/ kinship of women (wives). Thus, according to Jelly et al. (2019), society creates an anticipation that can strengthen men's personalities in social spaces, one of which is a "door barrier" (palang pintu). However, Jelly et al. (2019) do not explain practically or historically the subjectivity of "society" here, whether society in the plural sense or the male sense.

This terminology implies the husband's social function (as a door barrier), which fences off and protects the wife (as a room/house) from the outside world. However, the door barrier analogy can work by also creating stigmas for

women, especially widows. Stigma works as a validator that the existence of a husband is important inmaintaining the dignity of a wife, and being widowed or unmarried means losing the barrier aswell as the authenticity of one's femininity.

The (counter-)stigma attached to women's femininity above can be understood as a form of masculine protest by men to restore the fact that their masculinity is not linked to ownership. Both ownership of the family and economic access—because everything belongs to the woman in the Minangkabau matrilineal system. The vulnerability of male masculinity is often projected and actualized in the form of control over others, namely female femininity. Thus, body and morality are usually not natural processes but are part of power in custom and culture. However, power here operates not as an ideology but at the level of discourse, which is why the body and morality are discursive issues.

Another discursivity that is also interesting to discuss is that women are considered successfulin taking on the role of true mothers if they can give birth to generations of hafiz and hafiza (Jamil, 2019a, p. 26). This validation comes from the view that a mother's value is seen from the generation she was born and raised in. Creating a benchmark for the presence or absence of validity in the mother, through the Islamic generation she was born into, is one way to validate the mother's function and simultaneously shariatize maternal sexuality in Minangkabau culture. The phenomenon of men's vulnerability and women's validity shows thecontestation of relations within custom and community spaces. However, as it happens, the unification of sharia and matrilineal

customs provides little benefit for the masculinity desire. From my observations in several customary discussions, "interestingly," I do not see that control and regulation of women's bodies and morals are solely interpreted negatively. Quite the opposite, discourse on women's bodies and morals is ultimately interpreted positively even by the women themselves in the perspective of preserving their dignity.

Women's Morals and Family-Nation Sentiment

Religious fundamentalism through the customs shariatization and regional regulations on women forms an interdependence between morality, sexuality, and the nation. Long after the New Order was abandoned, today, the state still uses women and mothers as the etymological and pragmatic basis for keeping discourses of morality and nationalism--a pattern that is also widely used by nation-states regardless of geographic, religious, tribal differences, and even layers of prosperity.

In the smaller Minangkabau context, women and mothers are given traditional functions as the key to their lineage, the key to their family inheritance, and the key to the dignity of their tribe. Customs emphasize the dignity (burden) of women's femininity, along with such regulations and restrictions (Sulistyati, 2022). There are twelve inappropriate traits/activities that Minang women must avoid to avoid embarrassment (sumbang duo baleh). A woman's shame in Minangkabau culture characterizes her respectability. The greater her shame sensitivity, the greater her feminine dignity. This customary concern regarding "moral degradation" later became a consideration in drafting

sharia regulations. It means that even in a matrilineal space and system, women are not truly seen as a whole. The strengthening of religion (Islam) in the public sphere is directly proportional to the strengthening of the women's sexuality issue, whichis moralized and then shariatized.

However, even though sharia regional regulations have been in existence for the past two decades, I also need to emphasize that power over women's bodies and morals does not alwaysexist in a binary and hierarchical pattern through state versus citizen mechanisms. This power actually works "naturally" through relationships and not domination. I want to relate how this relationship pattern works in the case of Christian students in Padang who were indirectly accustomed to wearing the hijab in their state schools. Two years before the case went viral inmid-2021, in a workshop in Bukittinggi, I sat with a mother whose daughter "chose" to wear the hijab at school even though she was not Muslim. I asked if it was a school rule, and the mother answered no. The only reason her daughter wears a hijab is because of the gaze of herfriends and teachers.

Whether we realize it or not, one of the issues and conflicts over women's bodies stems from the construction and shackles of the gaze. Continuous gazing will make each individual being stared at aware that they are always being watched. This mechanism does not require rules or physical coercion because the individual being stared at will feel responsible, so they will subdue themself and enter into a staring relationship. The power relations function automatically here. In this way, the individual being stared at puts the burden on themself. This is exactly what happens

to female students who are not Muslim but wear uniforms that symbolize Islam. In social and cultural spaces, the gaze mechanism will create "the real subject" who unconsciously internalizes the customary ideas within themself. This process has no equality because the person being stared at has no right to that gaze (Foucault, 1995).

In the larger nation-state context, the gaze mechanism operates through marital relations. The family is the first institution that rejects women who have no womb and are childless (Candraningrum, 2013). The state defines a woman's dignity and morality in her wife's status and her ability to give birth and raise her children—see the definition of a woman in the KBBI(Indonesian Dictionary) and compare it with the definition of a man. It means that no matter how each individual interprets marriage, whether as an agreement between two families like the traditional pattern or as a conscious and independent choice to care for love like the modern pattern, marriage will always be closely linked to conceptions of nationalism, morals, and ownership. Because how can a state control its geographic territory if it doesn't control the bodies and sexuality of its citizens demographically?

Postscript

Five years of living in the Minang realm have made me increasingly aware that from the life experiences of women, wives, mothers, and widows, we can feel how mastery of body- sexuality is in line with the neglect of autonomous and contextual thoughts. If globalization makes these already marginalized experiences remain as if they do not exist,

then hearing and feeling is the least we can do. Moreover, we can continue to examine the significance of sexuality in broader academic conversations. As long as humans do not try to examine and dismantle the moral discourse of the body and sexuality over themselves, shadows of injustice and weakening will follow.

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Multiple Intelligences of Indonesian Muslim Women in Abdullah Assegaf's Arabic Novel *Fatat Qarut*

Introduction

Literature is a manifestation of social and cultural reality, constructed through the interplay of symbols and meaning, expression and thought, and internal and external aspects (Latifi, 2021). This makes literature an effective medium for understanding how one group perceives another openly and without harmful intent. Teew (via Latifi, 2018) asserts that literature is the fourth path to truth, following religion, philosophy, and scientific knowledge. Literature often reflects the current social and cultural conditions of

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society, capturing nuancesand truths that are rarely conveyed as accurately by other media.

Mukarovsky, as cited by Latifi (2021), mentions that literary works specifically, and artworks generally, are forms of semiotic facts. One significant issue that frequently arises in literature as a semiotic fact is gender. Generally, the images of women in literature, whether in Western or Eastern works, are often portrayed as inhumane, negative, and inferior characters. Various studies affirm that women in Arabic literature are also frequently depicted as inferior, troubled, miserable, marginalized, and discriminated characters, serving merely as objects rather than subjects of the story (Latifi, 2021).

Previous research on the image of women in various media, including Arabic literature, provides strong arguments about how women are depicted in literary works. For instance, a study by Hilal Al-fath Sakti (2018) focusing on the novel *Al-Shahaz* by Najib Mahfuz, showed that women are considered second-class, lower than men, which allows men to treat women as they wish, even when women are faithful. Another relevant study examines the representation of Indonesian women using data collected from mass media (Sobari & Silviani, 2019). The results show that women are portrayed as weak, marginalized, poor, and flawed, with men depicted as subjects and women as objects. Additionally, research by Novarisa (2019) focuses on Indonesian soap operas, known as *Sinetron*. The findings reveal that male dominance overwomen is depicted in various ways, including domestic obligations and women being portrayed as sexual objects, highlighting the existence of symbolic violence.

This paper attempts to reveal the image of women in a distinct Arabic novel Fatat Qarut with a focus on the main character, Neng. She is a woman of Arab-Sundanese descent, born to a Sundanese mother named Minah. She was educated by her uncle in Mecca and pursued further education in Egypt. Neng is proficient in Sundanese, Malay, and Arabic; however, she deliberately conceals her linguistic abilities to prevent others from discovering her proficiency in Sundanese and Malay. The novel belongs to the romantic genre, with the main character's love struggles serving as the central axis of the narrative.

The novel Fatat Qarut is interesting not only because of its compelling plot centered around a love struggle but also because it explores multi-ethnic life. Arabs, Europeans, and Indonesians are united in one narrative, highlighting their individual and cultural distinctions. One unique aspect of this novel, as the main focus of this study, is the image of Indonesian Muslim women as portrayed by a male Arab writer. The novel does not merely emphasize their beauty but also their intelligence and courage.

A distinctive phenomenon in the novel is the portrayal of the female protagonist as a positive character with many strengths. In this novel, women are actively engaged as subjectswho exercise control over various matters. Another unique feature is the setting of the story, which takes place in Indonesia, specifically in the Pasundan region of Garut. Additionally, the main character is an Indonesian Muslim woman. This portrayal is likely influenced by the author's background, having lived in Indonesia for a long time.

The author, Ahmad Abdullah Assegaf, is one of many Arab writers born in Yemen wholoved to travel to different countries. His journeys eventually led him to Indonesia, where he immersed himself in the history and civilization of the region. In terms of education, Assegaf established numerous madrasas in various locations across Indonesia. He also wrote many works, both literary and non-literary. Therefore, he is recognized not only for his contributionsas a scholar but also a writer.

The depiction of Indonesian Muslim women in the novel *Fatat Qarut* reflects Ahmad Abdullah Assegaf's views, shaped by his observations and social interactions during his stay inIndonesia. The representation of Indonesian Muslim women in Arabic novels can offer fresh perspectives on gender and Islam as practiced in Indonesia, a pluralistic, democratic, and moderate country. Although this novel was written in 1927, its themes remain relevant and intriguing for a critical examination of how Indonesian Muslim women are portrayed in Arab literature. Moreover, literature does not merely convey general perceptions that represent hegemonic cultural domination. It is also believed to be a driving force for the creation of a more humanistic life and a dignified cultural order (Latifi, 2021). Literature teaches its readers wisdom and humanism in a deeply humanistic manner, encouraging a more empathetic and understanding view of different cultures and social dynamics.

This research focuses on the intelligence of Indonesian Muslim female characters in the Arabic novel Fatat Qarut. This is because the main female protagonist in the novel is portrayed as an intelligent woman, and her intelligence

is recognised by many characters, such as in the following quote:

هم ما أخبرتك به من أنّي أحب الاقتران لما فيك من النجابة والتعقّل وأراك أهلا لأن تكوني قرينة لي لما خصصت به من المحاسن وما جبلت عليه من حميد الصفات

(Page.79 .as-Segaf, 2021)

The quote above was spoken to Neng by Van Ridjik, a man of European descent, expressing his desire to live with Neng because of her kindness and intelligence. This admiration highlights the central role of Neng's intellect in shaping her character and interactions within the story.

Feminism and literature

Literary theory is considered important because representation can shape subjectivity and make certain identities and worldviews possible. Through these representations, people can shape their own identities and their world. Feminist literary theory, in particular, helps people to think about cultural identity differently, emphasizing that criticism can bring justice to the world. Feminism brings together several important ideas, namely that gender is a social construction that oppresses women more than men, and that women's experiential knowledge is fundamental to creating a non-sexist society in the future. In this regard, literature has a significant influence as it produces representations of men and women (Humm, 2009, p. 331).

Feminist Literary Criticism (FLC) is a discipline that focuses its analysis on all aspects related to women, including

the roles of women as portrayed in literature. Women, with all their inherent aspects, serve as a source of inspiration, making female characters one of the central themes of literary works. Various aspects of female characters can be studied, including their portrayal in literature. The image of women, as part of feminist literary criticism, encompasses positive or negative perceptions of women based on visual, emotional, psychological, and behavioral representations (Aspriyanti et al., 2022).

Multiple Intelligence

Multiple intelligence theory, formulated by Howard Gardner, identifies eight distinct categories of intelligence. The following is an explanation of these eight categories (Gardner, n.d.):

First, verbal or linguistic intelligence relates to a person's ability to process words, bothspoken and written. Individuals with high verbal-linguistic intelligence excel in reading, writing, storytelling, and memorizing words and dates. They tend to learn best through reading,taking notes, listening to lectures, discussions, and debates. They are also often skilled in explaining, teaching, and persuasive speaking. People with this intelligence often learn foreign languages easily due to their high verbal memory, recall, and ability to understand and manipulate syntax and structure. Suitable careers for those with verbal-linguistic intelligence include writers, lawyers, philosophers, politicians, and teachers.

Second, logical-mathematical intelligence pertains to logic, abstraction, inductive and deductive reasoning, and numbers. While individuals with this intelligence often

excel at mathematics, chess, computer programming, and other logical or numerical activities, the broader definition emphasizes reasoning, abstract pattern recognition, scientific thinking, inquiry, and the ability to perform complex calculations.

Third, visual-spatial intelligence involves the intelligence related to spatial vision and judgment. People with strong visual-spatial intelligence are particularly good at visualising and mentally manipulating objects. They have strong visual memories and are often artistically inclined. Those with visual-spatial intelligence also tend to have an excellent sense of direction and may also have excellent hand-eye coordination, although this is more commonly seen as a characteristic of physical kinesthetic intelligence.

Fourth, kinesthetic intelligence is associated with movement and action. People with strong kinesthetic intelligence excel at physical activities such as sports or dancing and often prefer activities that involve movement. They may enjoy acting or performing and are typically skilled at building and creating things. These individuals learn best by doing rather than by reading or listening. They use what is known as muscle memory, remembering things through their bodies rather than through words (verbal memory) or pictures (visual memory). This intelligence requires skill and dexterity in fine motor movements, such as those required in dancing, athletics, surgery, craftsmanship, and other physical tasks.

Fifth, musical intelligence relates to rhythm, music, and hearing. Individuals with high levels of musical-rhythmic

intelligence exhibit greater sensitivity to sound, rhythm, tone, and music. They are often skilled at playing musical instruments, composing music, and appreciating musical patterns.

Sixth, interpersonal intelligence pertains to interactions with others. People with strong interpersonal intelligence tend to be extroverts, characterized by their sensitivity to the moods, feelings, temperaments, and motivations of others. They excel in collaborative settings, work well in groups, and are skilled in discussion and debate.

Seventh, intrapersonal intelligence involves the introspective capacity and self- reflection of a person. Individuals strong in this area are typically introverted and prefer to work alone. They tend to be very self-aware, and able to understand their own feelings, goals, and motivations. They are often interested in intellectual pursuits such as philosophy and learn best when allowed to concentrate on a subject or task independently. There is often a high degree of perfectionism associated with this intelligence. Suitable careers for those with intrapersonal intelligence include philosopher, psychologist, theologian, and writer.

Eighth, naturalistic intelligence is characterized by a heightened sensitivity to nature. Individuals with strong naturalistic intelligence have the ability to nurture and grow things, care for, tame, and interact with animals with ease. They are also adept at recognizing and classifying different species. People with this intelligence often excel in fields such as biology, ecology, environmental science, and agriculture.

The Intelligence of Indonesian Muslim Women

The female protagonist in the novel Fatat Qarut is portrayed in two ways. First, physically, Neng as the main character of the story is described as a beautiful woman. However, the narrative does not frequently emphasize her beauty. One piece of evidence supporting this analysis is the following quote:

فأعجب بها إذ لم يكن قد رأى في تلك البلدة بل في جاوة كلها امرأة جمعت من المحاسن واللطف ما خصّ الله به هذه البنت. أماهي فلمّا رأت التفات عبدالله أطرقت إلى الأرض حياء

(as-Segaf, 2021, P.25)

The context of the story is when Abdullah, the main male character in the novel, sees Neng for the first time and is amazed by her. He notes that he has never seen a woman in Garut or anywhere else who possesses her beauty and tenderness. However, the novel does not delve into detailed descriptions of Neng's physical beauty. Instead of focusing on her physical attributes, the author emphasizes Neng's spiritual, emotional, and intellectual strengths. This approach is rare in Arabic novels, where authors typically describe physical features or specific body parts to convey a female character's beauty.

For example, in the following quote:

لكنه أحبّ أن يكتشف مل في ضميرها من جهة ويتلذذ بخطابها من جهة أخرى

The quote expresses Van Ridjik's desire to understand what is in Neng's heart and his enjoyment when she speaks. The word 'يتلذذ' in the sentence means 'to enjoy,' and it is usually used in a sensual context, such as enjoying food. However, the dialogue between Van Ridjik and Neng leads the researcher to hypothesize that what Van Ridjik wants to enjoy is Neng's intelligence, as conveyed through her words, rather than her physical beauty. The following evidence illustrates Van Ridjik's admiration after hearing the expression of Neng's heart.

إنّي أعجب يا نيع من وفرة معلوماتك وفصاحة لسانك وما كنت أظنّ أن في بنات المنداويين من هن بهذه الدرجة من الشجاعة الأدبية والتعقّل (as-Segaf, 2021, page. 28)

(والتعقّل االدبية) In the quote, Vand Ridijk expressed his admiration for Neng because of her vast knowledge and eloquence in speaking. He did not expect that among many Sundanese girls, there would be one who possessed the level of courage and intellect that Neng had.

As mentioned earlier, this research focuses on the intelligence that Neng possesses. By analyzing these aspects, the research aims to shed light on the multifaceted intelligence of the female protagonist in Fatat Qarut. Of the eight multiple intelligences previously discussed, four intelligences appear to be dominant in Neng.

1. Verbal-linguistic intelligence

There are a few evidence that show Neng has verbal intelligence, among them are the following:

a. Mastering 3 languages

كنت يا سّيدي تتكلّم مع أبي بلغة الملا يو وأنت تظنّ أنني لم أفهم شيئا ممّا دار بينكما ويجب أن تعلم الآن أنني كنت واعية لكل ما تكلّمتم به فاهمة لفظه ومعناه ولي عذر في إخفاء معرفتي بلغة الملايو حتّى عن أبوي

The sentence was spoken by Neng to Van Ridjik. She remarked that Van Ridjik spoke Malay to his father, assuming that Neng didn't understand a word. In fact, Neng was able to understand everything that was being said. She comprehended both the words and their meanings. This demonstrates that Neng understands Malay, even though she primarily speaks Arabic in her daily interactions in Garut.

b. Using tactics in speech

يا سيدي أوروبي وعهدي في الأوروبيين على العموم أنهم يهتمون بتربية أبنائهم وتغذية عقولهم بالمعارف في المدارس العالية مهما كلفهم ، وإن ما رأيته من أخلاقك ولطافتك جعلني لا أشك في أنك قد تربّيت تربية عالية وأنك قد أخذت بحظ وافر من العلوم وأن معرفتك بالتاريخ وما هو مخلد فيه من أحوال الأمم والشعوب لا تقل عن معرفة أمثالك من تلقوا العلوم في المدارس الراقية

Neng possesses a unique characteristic in her manner of speaking that captivates her listeners in various ways. One notable approach is how she begins her criticism of Van Ridjik by acknowledging the advantages of being European. She emphasizes that as a European, Van Ridjik is well-educated, as Europeans generally prioritize their children's education and equip them with knowledge in

high schools. She notes that his morals and extensive knowledge,particularly his understanding of history and the state of nations, are commendable. After this introduction, Neng proceeds to express her criticism. The praise she offers is not perceived as excessive because it is directly related to her critique of Van Ridjik's views on Arabs, which she believes to be incorrect.

c. Language courtesy

Verbal intelligence is not just a matter of one's ability to speak in different languages, it is also about choosing words that are appropriate for a particular context. In this case, politeness is also one of the means to measure someone's verbal intelligence.

وإئذن لي في إبداء رأيي بشأن العرب فقط بكل حرية

The sentence describes Neng's politeness in speaking; she always asks for permission first before expressing her opinion.

d. Fluency

إنّي أعجب يا نيع من وفرة معلوماتك وفصاحة لسانك

A person who possesses verbal intelligence is able to communicate effectively with their counterparts. They can express their ideas clearly and concisely, without rambling, and are easily understood by others. The context of the quote above is when Van Ridjik and Neng have finished arguing. Despite Neng's extensive criticism of Van Ridjik's thoughts, he admires her for her vast knowledge and fluency in speaking.

e. Ability to retain information

فاسمحا لي أن أذكر لكما ما تقوله جريدة مدرسة ادنبرج الكلية قالت: إنا لمدينون للعرب كثيرا ولو قال غيرنا خلاف ذلك فإنهم حلقة التي وصلت مدنية أوروبا قديما بمدينتها حديثا وبنجاحهم وسمو همّتهم تحول أهل أوروبا إلى أحرار المعارف واستقاموا من نومهم العميق في العصور المظلمة, ونحن لهم مدينون بترقية العلوم الطبيعية والفنون الصادقة النافعة والمخترعات

The quote above is Neng's remark to Van Ridjik, referencing the Edinburgh University newspaper. She highlights that Westerners owe a great deal to the Arabs, as they served as the vital link between past European progress and present advancements, success, and high spirits. Europeans turned to the Arabs to gain knowledge and awaken from their deep slumber duringthe dark ages. Neng also emphasizes that we are indebted to the Arabs for the development ofnatural sciences, useful arts, and inventions that have significantly benefited European science and civilization.

This show of intelligence caused people to admire Neng, including another European, Moldi, besides Vand Ridijk.

لابأس تكلمي أيتها السيدة النجيبة فإنني أعجبت بكلامك

In the quote, Moldi explicitly complimented Neng and called her a "clever young lady".

2. Logical-mathematical intelligence

As mentioned earlier, this intelligence is not limited to traditional mathematics but also includes reasoning, scientific thinking, and investigation. From some of the data findings, the character Neng in this novel has performed reasoning and investigation skills.

أعطاه ألف روبية. فهل أعطاك شيئا منها؟ فلماجاء إلى هن

In the quote, Neng tells Pak Haji that Van Ridjik gave his father 1000 rupiah and questions whether Van Ridjik gave Pak Haji anything when he visited. In reality, Van Ridjik only gave him 250 rupiah. Neng used her reasoning and investigative skills to deceive Pak Haji. She observed Pak Haji closely and discovered that he would do anything for money. Neng knew that Pak Haji would try to persuade her to marry Van Ridjik after her father gave Pak Haji 50 rupiahs. Neng critically thought about how to make Pak Haji dislike her father, as both men were equally unscrupulous. Ruslan, her father, set her up with Van Ridjik to gain money, while Pak Haji would persuade her to marry Van Ridjik for financial gain, despite knowing the religious differences between Neng and Van Ridjik

3. Intelligence of bodily gestures

إذ ربما يكون أبي عندك ، ولأي استأنس بمحادثتك بالعربية إذ ليس في بيتنا من يتكلم بها معي واراني بالحاج « مخطي « . سبحان الله أميل إليك مي خصوصا جدا لحديثك ؛ فبقيت ببيتك قريبة من بنتك وأمنيتي أسكن عندك لأتكلم كل يوم معك بالعربية لا أدري لم أجد روحي تسكن إليك لعل فيك

من قبيل كون الأرواح جنود مجندة ما تعارف منها ائتلف وما تناكر اختلف .

The context of the quote above is when Neng deliberately went to Pak Haji Mutih'in's house to carry out her deception. She pretended to like him in order to execute her plan. Through her gestures and words, she managed to deceive Pak Haji. Neng expressed her happiness in talking to Pak Haji, noting that no one at home could speak Arabic with her. Sheconveyed a special feeling of happiness towards Pak Haji and wished that her house was closerto his, or that she could live there to converse with him in Arabic every day.

The intelligence expressed in the quote encompasses not only kinesthetic intelligence but also verbal intelligence, as Neng uses carefully chosen diction to manipulate her opponent.At the end of her conversation, Neng said, "I also do not know why my soul tends to you, Sir.Maybe because souls are like directed troops. What you acknowledge, I would agree with, and what you dislike, I would disagree with."This statement reflects her verbal dexterity and ability to engage in persuasive communication. Moreover, logical intelligence is also implied in the situation, as Neng has thought critically and made careful observations of Pak Haji. She devised a plan to disrupt Pak Haji and his wife's relationship, believing that an unruly and greedy personmust face retribution. This combination of kinesthetic, verbal, and logical intelligence highlights Neng's multifaceted abilities in navigating complex social interactions and achieving her objectives.

4. Interpersonal intelligence

In the novel *Fatat Qarut*, Neng's character made dialogues and worked with several respected community leaders from time to time, including the high priest, as in the following quote:

وأخبرتني أنها رأتكم مرّة واحدة ثمّ سمعت عنكم أنكم راغبون في التزوّج بهل ولكنها لم تجتمع بكم إلّا تلك الساعة فرأت أن توكّلني في تزويجها منك وفعلا نطقت بالتوكيل وأشهدت عليه هذين رجلين ودفعت لنا مايلزم دفعه فقبلت منها الوكالة ثمّ طلبت منّي أن آت إليك هذه الساعة وأعرض إليك هذا الأمر.

The quote recounts a story from the high priest, who mentioned that Neng visited him after having met Abdullah once. Neng stated that Abdullah wanted to marry her and asked the high priest to be the marriage guardian and arrange the marriage contract if Abdullah agreed. This evidence demonstrates that, in addition to interpersonal intelligence, Neng possesses other types of intelligence, namely verbal and kinesthetic intelligence. Her dialogue with the high priest is delivered with convincing expressions and language, effectively persuading the high priest to visit Abdullah's house.

5. Intrapersonal intelligence

السعادة عندنا معاشر المسلمين – في الفوز برضا الله في الدنيا والآخرة, ومن علامات السعيد في الحياة أن يكون في أعماله وأقواله موافقا لما يرضى الله فإذا مات بعد ذلك على حسن الخاتمة فهو من السعداء

The context of the speech is when Van Ridjik asks Neng what happiness means to her. Neng responds that, according to Muslims, happiness is achieving the pleasure of Allah in this world and the hereafter. She explains that among the signs of a happy person is content with their life when their actions and words align with what pleases Allah and His Messenger, with hopes for husnul khatimah (a good ending).

This quote demonstrates that Neng possesses intrapersonal intelligence, as she is aware of the purpose of her life. Her answer is not generated suddenly or hastily but rather after deep contemplation and reflection on her life's journey. Spirituality is the fruit of long-term thoughts and routines. Additionally, the quote can also be classified as an example of spiritual intelligence, focusing on the pleasure of Allah in this world and the hereafter. This perspective characterizes Indonesian Muslim women in this context.

Furthermore, the researcher observes that in the novel *Fatat Qarut*, Neng possesses the power to achieve her goals. Using her intelligence, she succeeds in becoming an Indonesian Muslim female character capable of negotiating, deceiving, and ensuring that bad people face the consequences of their actions. It contrasts with the often-seen representation of oppressed women who accept their oppression or take refuge under gender biases that they perpetuate. Therefore, this positive portrayal of Indonesian Muslim women should be showcased in literature and read by domestically and internationally audiences.

Conclusion

Indonesian Muslim women are portrayed as intelligent and capable in the Arabic novel *Fatat Qarut*. The dominant intelligence possessed by Neng, the main female protagonist, is verbal intelligence. The researcher also identified other intelligences possessed by Neng, namely bodily-kinesthetic, logical-mathematical, interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligence.It is recognized that gestural and interpersonal intelligence often work synergistically with verbal intelligence. There is substantial evidence demonstrating Neng's verbal intelligence, including her proficiency in three languages (Arabic, Sundanese, and Malay), politeness in speech, tactical approach to criticism, eloquence, and skillful diction.

Female characters in Arabic novels are typically portrayed as oppressed, marginalized, and discriminated against. However, this novel elevates Indonesian women by portraying them as having subjectivity, the ability to make their own decisions, and the capability to achieve their goals through intelligence. Such portrayals of women are reflective of real life, yet literature often emphasizes the image of women as objects. Every story influences its readers, and literature should advocate for feminism, as written words often resonate more powerfully than spoken ones.

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Discrimination against Muslim Women without Hijab in Indonesia

Introduction

Discrimination against Muslim women who do not wear hijab happens in several cities in Indonesia (Antara 2022; Fahri Zulfikar 2022; Saubani 2021). This treatment occurs at various age levels, from teenagers to adults, and in some cases, even children. Among children,the use of hijab is seen as a form of early habituation (Adi Mirsan 2020; Dimyati 2021).

Nurbayti
Stara Arsita

This discrimination against women without wearing hijab has emerged after the country's transition from the New Order to a democratic state. During the New Order, religious symbols, including the hijab, were banned as the state institution separated itself from religious interests (Ingham & Dirgantoro 2007). Conversely, today, freedom of speech is used by dominant groups to oppress minority groups, including women who do not wear hijab.

Increasing news reports about the forced wearing of hijab in schools indicate that our social condition is not healthy. According to the news portal Tirto.id, Hailili Hasan, director ofthe Setara Institute, stated that any form of forced use of religious attributes on citizens is a violation of their constitutional rights, as Indonesian citizens have full authority over themselves to practice their beliefs according to their conscience (Riyan Setiawan 2022).

In addition, the radicalization of Islamic values in every aspect of Indonesian society places women as objects that must be regulated. Formally, women are compelled to wear hijab to be accepted by society, institutionalizing the hijab in a way that marginalizes and discriminates against those who do not wear it (Ingham & Dirgantoro 2007).

Another factor of the widespread use of the hijab in Indonesia is influenced by some female celebrities who decide to wear it with the slogan "hijrah" (alfa 2024; Muhammad HusniTamami 2023; Nabila Eka Putri 2022). Celebrities, seen as public figures or role models, influence societal attitudes towards the hijab. This influence is further

amplified by increasingly Islamic media productions, especially on Indonesian television (Ingham & Dirgantoro 2007).

Thus, the phenomenon of Hijrah becomes closely associated with the decision of women to wear the hijab. Moreover, the hijab becomes a visual benchmark of goodness, suggesting that a woman is considered pious (salihah) if she wears it (Akram Zaheer et al. 2023). In Ingham and Dirgantoro's writing, they note that an Indonesian cleric once compared a woman's body to a donut, saying a wrapped donut would be more valuable than an unwrapped one, using terms like "expensive and exclusive" (Ingham & Dirgantoro 2007).

Prior study results confirm that women remain objects controlled by social actors, where they are positioned without rights over their own bodies, equating them to inanimate objects. In several situations, women are not consulted about their own bodies, as male authority often unilaterally decides what they should and should not wear (Shirazi 2019).

Although the state guarantees the freedom of its citizens to practice their beliefs, the recent phenomenon of wearing the hijab is no longer about personal awareness; it has become a social demand that women must follow. Society pressures women to wear hijab in various aspects of their lives, from family and community environments to government institutions like schools and workplaces.

The objectification of women's bodies through religious dogma further distances democratic values glorified by the

state. Although the state strives to separate policies from the religious values prevalent in society, pressure arises from socially institutionalized but unwritten norms that result in psychological and social discrimination against women regarding the forced wearing of the hijab. As long as women's bodies are positioned as social objects, they will continue to face discriminatory interaction patterns. The notion that a good Muslim woman is one who wears a hijab underscores that women are restricted in their rights over their bodies to choose their own clothing (Aini & Siscawati 2023).

In response to this phenomenon, we interviewed ten Muslim women who do not wear hijab in their daily lives. The interview questions were designed to encourage the informants to provide comprehensive and in-depth explanations about their decisions regarding their bodies and their attitudes towards the current societal conditions that compel women to wear hijab in daily activities. The informants, from various cities and provinces in Indonesia, were categorized into two groups: five students and five workers, with their identities kept confidential.

Hijab as a Symbol of Piety

> "I was considered a naughty girl by the neighbors when I returned to Magelang without wearing a hijab" – Interview with UF (27)

The above excerpt is a confession from UF, one of the informants who is already working and married. UF currently works in Yogyakarta but originally hails from Magelang, Central Java. UF shares the difficulty of being accepted in the community when she returns to her hometown in Magelang. The strong and rigid Islamization

in Magelang regency causes almost all Muslim women there to wear hijab, making her decision not to wear it a serious violation as the hijab is seen as a mandatory religious symbol for pious Muslim women.

Like other cities in Indonesia, UF adds that the obligation of hijab was felt when she entered high school, where public schools generally do not mandate hijab. However, the changing social environment in Magelang began to unofficially enforce the hijab on all femalestudents by instilling values that women of mature age should be ashamed of not wearing a hijab. She adds that this societal pressure comes from various sources such as family, relatives, neighbors, and social circles. Due to the immense pressure and her adherence to her parents' views, UF had little choice but to conform at that time.

What UF experienced is also shared by two female students, MS (21) and LR (22). They narrate how their social environment views them differently because they do not wear hijab. They recount instances where their abilities were doubted and questioned because they did not wear hijab.

> "I felt the PPK Orma was very strict. They even told me to wear hijab. There was a schedule for teaching the Quran, and my friends asked, 'Can you teach the Quran? Do you pray? You don't wear hijab, right?' When I wanted to pray, my friends questioned if I had performed ablution." – Interview with MS (21)

LR (22) shares a similar story where her internship site treated hijab-wearing female students differently from those who did not wear hijab. The staff prioritized hijab-

wearing students for practical radio broadcasting sessions over her. There was even a moment when her non-Muslim colleague was required to wear a hijab.

These narratives indicate that the hegemonic value of piety associated with the hijab can strip women of their autonomy over their bodies. This dynamic establishes a social system that discriminates against women who decide to have control over their bodies and choose what to wear for their comfort. Such evidence shows that women's bodies are still positioned as social objects, a common occurrence in patriarchal societies. In these societies, changes in cultural values lead to changes in the values associated with social objects.

Given that Indonesian society still adheres to patriarchal culture, the norms of goodness are still centered on men. The image of women's bodies has undergone various evolutionary processes with different reasons, ranging from rituals to commodities. Women who have autonomy over their bodies are always associated with power. If a woman is autonomous over her body, she has the power to control it, but if not, the ruling social system will control women's bodies (Benedicta 2011).

Camouflage Identity: A Method to Reduce Conflict

Despite informants fighting to be themselves amid the onslaught of piety dogma through the hijab, certain conditions force them to negotiate their non-hijab identities due to the strong norms demanding hijab in their environments or from social actors in their personal lives.

This situation compels them to camouflage themselves by blending in and wearing hijab to avoid value conflicts.

TK (34) from Bengkulu, a married employee, shares that she reluctantly wears hijab when meeting her husband's family to avoid criticism from her husband's aunt. For TK, family gatherings are the most challenging moments because she is always criticized and forced to wear Muslim attire that meets her aunt's standards.

> "I have conceded to wearing hijab to avoid criticism, but my clothes still don't meet her standards, whether it's my pants being too tight or my shirt not long enough." – Interview withTK (34)

TK adds that if Eid used to be a moment she looked forward to, it has now become the most exhausting time because she knows she will face criticism. UF (27) shares a similar experience; to avoid conflict with her mother when returning to Magelang. She reluctantly wears hijab because otherwise, she would face her mother's anger and curses. Additionally, UF wears hijab when returning home as part of her effort to maintain her mother's reputation in the community, as she was previously considered a naughty girl for not wearing hijab.

> "Every time I return to Magelang, I almost cannot be myself, but what can I do? I just blend into avoid conflict that would ultimately target my mother." – Interview with UF (27)

To reduce conflicts, UF is forced to wear hijab when returning to Magelang, which negatively impacts her visits to her mother, causing her to visit less frequently. UF adds

that her decision to be herself also affected her friendships, as her former school and college friends distanced themselves, viewing her as someone who dared to violate the obligation, potentiallybringing negative impacts on their lives.

While UF and TK are disturbed by the forced hijab in their environments and have to camouflage themselves to avoid conflict, ST (34), a married employee, recounts that she facessimilar conditions when returning to her husband's home in West Sumatra, where she is required to wear hijab. For her, this is not an issue, as it respects the surroundings. The same isfelt by student MSK (21), who reluctantly wears hijab when required, although it does not feellike herself.

Homogeneity Creates Intolerance

Two out of ten informants stated that they could be themselves after marriage. This data surprised us because, generally, women decide to wear hijab after marriage for various reasons,such as obedience to their husbands or at the husband's request. VD (38) and UF (27) claim they could be their best selves without having to pretend after marriage. They recount that theirfamilies, especially their parents, were very strict about them wearing hijab, but after marriage,they were free from their parents' control, as the responsibility shifted to their husbands.

> "My parents often compared me to my younger sister, who wears hijab, considering her more obedient. My sister's position was elevated by my parents, making me feel not treated asthe older sibling." – VD (38)

VD adds that she felt more herself and respected after meeting her husband and interacting with his family,

finding a more comfortable place than her own family. UF (27) shares the same sentiment, feeling more herself after marrying her husband, who does not demand her to wear hijab, nor does his extended family.

> "Because my husband's family accepts me more, I prefer to celebrate Eid with them rather than return to my parents' home." – UF (27)

Upon deeper inquiry into why husbands' families are more accepting of non-hijab women, we found that families with interfaith marriages are more tolerant of differing values than families with a single or homogeneous value system.

This data was also confirmed by other informants ST (34); LR (22); MSK (21); TK (33), who stated that their or their husbands' families do not all adhere to Islam, allowing them to accept differing views more flexibly. This tolerance translates into daily communication practices that do not discriminate against non-hijab women. Conversely, families with higher religious homogeneity produce higher intolerance towards differing values. This is reflected in the statements of informants VT (38); UF (27); BT(37); ART(23); NTM (22), who state that family pressure to wear hijab is high because most of the extended family is Muslim.

High homogeneity values influence behavior, attitudes, and mindsets, eventually affecting habits and believed rules (Rahma et al. 2022). Thus, for those who view hijab as a form of piety and goodness, non-hijab women are seen as not

yet fully faithful and practicing religion correctly, as hijab is viewed as a benchmark of female religiosity (Yulikhah 2017).

"You are prettier with hijab" Standard of Piety Beauty

All informants almost experience sarcastic and subtle hints about wearing hijab. The diction that hijab is beauty and piety is often used towards non-hijab women to encourage them to wear hijab. Such communication frequently comes from fellow women who believe their female peers need to be guided and brought to the right path. UF (27) recounts being pressured by her mother and some friends to wear hijab.

> "I was once lectured by a friend from my previous religious school who protested my decision not to wear hijab, saying that I am pretty but would be prettier with hijab." – Interview with UF (27)

What UF experienced is also experienced by two students, AR (23) and NM (22), who several times received sarcastic comments hinting and inviting them to wear hijab. Moreover, the diction that hijab is a form of female Muslim beauty is often expressed by their parents, especially mothers. This emphasizes that social agents pressing women to wear hijab often come from fellow women, with the strongest pressure coming from those closest to them, such as parents, close family, and even close friends.

> "The environment significantly influences our behavior. My mom often tells me to wear hijab when going out, 40% with direct commands and 60% with sarcastic comments." – Interview with NM (22)

NM adds that when she wears hijab, she is immediately praised by her mother with comments that she looks prettier with hijab. AR (23) also shares a similar experience, where a close relative suggests she wear hijab after getting married. The high popularity of hijab in Indonesia, combined with rigid social values, creates discriminatory conditions that silently rob women of their rights over their bodies.

Mainstream Islamic views that hijab is a female obligation stem from debates about women's *aurat* (body parts to be covered). The first group argues that a woman's entire body is *aurat* without exception. The second group believes that only the face and palms are not *aurat*. These groups base their views on the Qur'an (surah al-Ahzâb: 59 and an-Nūr: 31) and the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) (Yulikhah 2017).

Meanwhile, a third group views hijab issues as socio-cultural rather than religious. This group considers the historical context of hijab and women's aurat, noting that hijab was not originally a sacred phenomenon. In the Prophet's era, hijab was associated more with the lifestyle of upper-class groups to distinguish themselves from slaves. Hence, hijab was a tradition developing pre-Islam in Syria, becoming customary in Jewish, Christian, and Sasanian societies (Budiati 2011).

Conclusion

Women's bodies are social objects; when phenomena change, the values associated with women's bodies also change. As long as women's bodies are positioned as social objects, women do not have full rights over their bodies.

Peter L. Berger states that as long as women remain social objects, the values within them will be easily constructed by more powerful actors. However, if women have the strength to become subjects who construct their bodies and decisions, external values will not easily dominate their decisions.

The social construction positioning hijab as a symbol of piety can create discriminatory conditions for women who decide to break away from existing social controls. On the other hand, women often have limited choices when faced with rigid societal systems or more powerful social actors. Women sometimes have to camouflage their true selves to be accepted and avoid value conflicts. Nevertheless, women can return to being themselves when they have the opportunity to enter and engage in more dynamic systems. Dynamic systems are influenced by the heterogeneity of values within them. This leads to the conclusion that the more diverse the values within a group, the higher the level of tolerance produced. In contrast, homogeneous belief systems tend to create high intolerance.

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Muslim Logosphere in Southeast Asia

A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF JAWI AND THE JAWIZATION OF CAMBODIA

Introduction

Southeast Asia, home to several Muslim-majority countries and some of the largest global Muslim populations, is underrepresented in Islamic knowledge transmission and rigorous research of Islamic studies and Muslim societies (Formichi, 2016, pp. 696–697). Muslim communities living in the Mainland of Southeast Asia are perhaps even more overlooked compared to myriad studies on the Archipelago (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, and somehow also Southern Thailand). Islam is

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historically rooted majority religion in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, while those adherents have been minorities in Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Mekong Delta between Cambodia and Vietnam. For eons, Southeast Asian Muslims belong to the *umma,* regardless of their population, and have historically mutually connected and participated in the global Muslim network through knowledge transmission, trade network, diplomacy, and pilgrimages (Azra, 1995; Bruckmayr & Hartung, 2020; Feener et al., 2021; Feener & Laffan, 2005).

Studies on Southeast Asian Islam have always been shadowed by the unifying categories of perceiving Islamic texts and Muslim societies within the Middle East as the standard form. From that pointview, Islam is perceived as Arabocentric, and anything non-Arabic is seen as a deviation from the 'true' Islam. Therefore, many scholars centralize the Middle East as the heart and 'center' of Islam, while locating other regions as the syncretic, heterodox, and 'peripheral' nodes of Islam. Chiara Formichi (2016) argues that Islamic studies, following the geohistorical origin of Islam and its institutional history, has been embodied by Near and Middle Eastern studies and formed under area studies (Formichi, 2016, pp. 703–4). Naturally, the early development of this discipline isolates the research on Islam and its scholarly endeavor in the Persio-Arabic world. Jaclyn Michael (2024) and Verena Meyer (2024) propose that Muslim societies in Asia have been overlooked compared to those in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) regions. They also mention how the "Orientalist paradigm" in Islamic studies belittled Asian Muslims' knowledge transmission, authority,

religious texts and heritage (Meyer, 2024; Michael, 2024). Such a derogating paradigm in studying Islam and Muslim societies in Asia ignores the sheer population of Muslims living in that landmass which constitute 62% of all Muslims worldwide. Quoting data from Pew Research Center (2009), approximately 50% of Asian Muslim population resides in South Asia (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Iran) while the remainder lives in Southeast Asia (26%) and Central-Western Asia (24%) (Pew Research Center, 2009, pp. 12–14).

In contrast to data, the highly heterogeneous landscape of Muslim societies in the mainland of Southeast Asia has been underrepresented in modern Southeast Asian studies. This mainland is characterized by the division of its mountain ranges by a series of major river valleys and deltas that surround the region, mostly in its northern and southern counterparts. The mainland features Muslim-minority states of Thailand (5.8%), Myanmar (3.8%), Cambodia (1.6%), Vietnam (0.2%), and Laos (<0.1%). This vast landmass borders the densely Muslim-populated states of Bangladesh and India to the northwest, while its southern region connects with Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. In the particular region as diverse and far-flung such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, Muslim minorities are frequently accused of being inherently heretic and anti-national which pose a threat to the stability of the nation and represent a problem that must be addressed (Eng, 2013, pp. 346–347; Michael, 2024, p. 7). In the case of Cambodia, those assumed as deviant and immigrant Muslims, sometimes accused of terrorists, are characterized

by their language and identity. Cham Muslims in Cambodia, in particular, have experienced terrorist stigmatization for their unregulated Islamic revival, weak secular education, and poor living standards by international agencies (Eng, 2013, pp. ii–iii).

Highlighting minority Muslim communities in Mainland Southeast Asia regions, this essay takes into account Islam and Muslim societies in Cambodia. It questions how early Cham Muslims embraced Islamic identity and have been interacting with trans-Southeast Asian Muslim networks, especially the Arabic- and Jawi-speaking communities. It critically examines Phillip Bruckmayr's (2019) notion of *Jawization* of Southeast Asian Muslim societies, especially Cambodia's Muslim (Bruckmayr, 2019; Ricci, 2011). The research consists of literature reviews on Cambodia's Muslims, added with archival reviews of Islamic manuscripts written in Cham and Jawi. By analyzing the distribution and factionalism of Cham Muslims and its relations to the globalized Muslim world, this essay seeks to contribute to the study of language and identity of a minority Muslim group in a Buddhist-majority country. However, considering the limited space, it unlikely covers a throughout explanation of Cambodia's Islam and the Cham Muslims. Instead, this essay hopefully complements some important research on early Islamization in Mainland Southeast Asia and its neighboring regions.

Islam in Cambodia

UN Security Council, in October 2004, issued a press conference report that "*Cambodia's Muslim community in the*

south had been discriminated against, and that there had been reports of violence in that part of the country" (Press Briefing by Chairman of Security Council's 1267 Sanctions Committee, 2004). According to the Pew Research Center (2023), 97% population of Cambodian citizens are Buddhists and the majority of them note the link between religious and national identity to the extent of religion-state integrationism. Opposing the secular state system that separates religious institution from governance, 96 percent of Cambodia's Buddhists favor the basing of state law on Buddhist dharma and 76 percent of them stress the importance of Cambodian citizens to be 'true' Buddhists (Miner, 2023). Naturally, according to data, Cambodian Muslims as the minority do not speak Khmer, Cambodia's national language, and are not in favor of Buddhist religion-state integrationists. Therefore, the Camp-speaking Muslims, the biggest Cambodian Muslim society, are in a fragile position to be seen as less nationalist than Buddhist Cambodians for their negligence of Buddhist *dharma*-sourced state law. The US government estimates 1.9 percent of the population in Cambodia is Muslim (340,000 lives), while one Cambodian Muslim leader estimates the number to reach 800,000 population or almost eight percent of the population (Office of International Religious Freedom, 2024).

Area/Province	2008				2019			
	Buddhist	Muslims	Christians	Other	Buddhist	Muslims	Christian	Other
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Total	**96.9**	**1.9**	**0.4**	**0.8**	**97.1**	**2.0**	**0.3**	**0.5**
Urban	**97.4**	**1.6**	**0.8**	**0.2**	**97.7**	**1.6**	**0.4**	**0.2**
Rural	**96.8**	**2.0**	**0.3**	**0.9**	**96.7**	**2.3**	**0.2**	**0.8**
Banteay Meanchey	99.2	0.5	0.3	0.0	99.3	0.4	0.2	0.0
Battambang	98.3	1.3	0.3	0.0	98.3	1.4	0.3	0.0
Kampong Cham	97.6	2.3	0.1	0.0	97.6	2.3	0.1	0.0
Kampong Chhnang	94.7	4.2	0.4	0.7	93.1	5.8	0.3	0.9
Kampong Speu	99.7	0.1	0.2	0.0	99.8	0.1	0.1	0.0
Kampong Thom	99.0	0.6	0.4	0.0	98.6	1.0	0.3	0.0
Kampot	97.1	2.7	0.2	0.0	96.9	2.8	0.2	0.0
Kandal	98.0	1.2	0.7	0.1	98.3	1.2	0.4	0.1
Koh Kong	95.2	4.6	0.2	0.0	95.1	4.6	0.2	0.0
Kratie	94.0	5.6	0.4	0.1	93.1	6.6	0.2	0.1
Mondul Kiri	54.7	5.5	4.4	35.5	70.4	4.4	4.0	21.2
Phnom Penh	97.5	1.5	0.8	0.1	97.8	1.6	0.5	0.1
Preah Vihear	99.4	0.3	0.3	0.0	99.1	0.5	0.3	0.0
Prey Veng	99.5	0.1	0.2	0.1	99.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
Pursat	97.4	2.4	0.2	0.0	96.9	3.0	0.1	0.0
Ratanak Kiri	49.3	1.3	2.3	47.2	73.4	1.3	2.1	23.2
Siem Reap	99.7	0.2	0.1	0.0	99.3	0.2	0.4	0.1
Preah Sihanouk	94.5	4.7	0.7	0.1	96.2	3.6	0.2	0.0
Stung Treng	96.1	1.3	0.4	2.2	93.6	4.7	0.4	1.3
Svay Rieng	99.7	0.1	0.2	0.0	99.8	0.1	0.1	0.1
Takeo	99.1	0.7	0.2	0.0	99.2	0.6	0.1	0.0
Otdar Meanchey	99.8	0.1	0.1	0.0	99.5	0.2	0.3	0.0
Kep	98.7	1.2	0.0	0.0	97.5	1.7	0.7	0.1
Pailin	99.1	0.7	0.2	0.0	98.3	1.0	0.7	0.0
Tbong Khmum	88.9	11.0	0.1	0.0	88.1	11.8	0.1	0.0

Picture 1. Official census of the 2008 and 2019 population of Cambodia by religion and area(NIS Staff, 2020, p. 24)

Most Cambodian Muslims are ethnically Cham, although not every Muslim speaks Cham language and not all Cham are Muslim. Eng (2013) quotes the 2008 national census that Muslim population reached 1.92 percent or 257,280 population, while later 2018 national census suggests that the Muslim population increased to around 2 percent or approximately 312,000 population of the total population (Eng, 2013, p. 33; NIS Staff, 2020). However, that estimation must be read with a grant of salt because there was never any specific survey on the Muslim population in Cambodia but sheer estimations accounted

for by the state and NGOs by excluding the number of Theravada Buddhists, Hind, Christians, and animists from the total population. Most surveys also erroneously define Cambodian Muslims as Cham, the biggest Muslim community in Cambodia (Eng, 2013, p. 31).

Cham Muslims typically live in urban and rural fishing villages along the banks of Tonle Sap Lake and the Mekong River. Some also can be found in big towns like Kampong Cham, Phnom Penh, and Kampot. The US survey mentions that almost 90% of Cambodia's Muslims are Sunni and adherents of the Shafi'i school of Islamic jurisprudence, whereas the rest follow Wahabi Sunni as well as other minority sects like Bahā'i, Ahmadi, and Kan Imam San (Burhani, 2015; Taufik, 2023).

The Diplomat (2024) posts that the Kan Imam San sect—a syncretic ethnolinguistic group that performs weekly prayer on Friday (also called *kaum tujuh,* or people of the seven) instead of five times daily—was once followed by almost all of Cambodia's Chams and Muslims, but their number decreased to 30,000 population (Zak & Tith, 2024). or 10% compared to the total population. While members of Kan Imam San are called *kaum tujuh*, the Sunni Muslims are called 'people of the five' (*kaum lima*) for their daily prayer time and their five pillars of Islam (*arkān al-Islām*) (Bruckmayr, 2017).

Kan Imam San members also speak the national language of Khmer, while the majority of Cambodia's Muslims speak the Cham language and adopt Arabic script in their religious texts. Similar to many other regions in

Southeast Asia, starting from the 1600s, the adaptation of Arabic script and usage of the Malay language, known as the *Jawi* script and language respectively, was integral for Islamic scholarship and instruction. The usage of Jawi language signifies the full immersion of the community into the Southeast Asian Muslim network, which cultural and religious immersion process is termed by Bruckmayr (2014) as the *Jawization* of Cambodia.

The *Jawization* of Cambodia's Muslim

Some primary scholars on that subject are Kok-Thay Eng and Philipp Bruckmayr. Jawi language, as suggested in this book, refers to the language that "did not just refer to Malay but to that Malay written in the local adaptation of Arabic," which writing culture and regime is referred to as the Jawization (Bruckmayr, 2019, 2023). Kok-Thay Eng defended his doctoral dissertation entitled "From the Khmer Rouge to Hambali: Cham Identities in a Global Age" (2013) at Rutgers University. It explores how Cham Muslim identity evolved through time and fragmented into core and peripheral. Cambodia's Muslim identity is centered on Cham descent Muslims whose main language is Cham, while those of peripheral identity are stereotyped as sectarian and immigrant, and even linked to transnational terrorism, whose main languages are either Khmer, Arabic, or Malay (Eng, 2013, pp. 123–127). On the other side, Phillip Bruckmayr (2014; 2019) elucidates the global dynamics of Cambodia's Muslim and Islamic factionalism from the nineteenth to twenty to the present. It questions how the Cham and Khmer-speaking Muslims, made the community relevant in an evolving trans-Southeast Asian

Muslim scholarly and social world in the time when Arabic, Persian, and Malay-speaking communities dominated the region (Bruckmayr, 2014, 2019). Clearly, those publications highlight the pivotal role of trans-local language in bridging the regions by means of religious education, trade networks, and international relations.

Southeast Asia is one of the most linguistically diverse and privileged regions in the world, with over 1,200 spoken languages. People living in Mainland and Peninsular Southeast Asia have distinctive forms of communication in their communities. Therefore, every ethnolinguistic region represents its peculiarity as a cultural and religious cosmopolis. This diversity, nonetheless, also presented significant challenges for inter-group communications in trans-Southeast Asian regions, especially for trading, diplomacy, and literary exchange. At the dawn of 18th century, scholarship on Southeast Asia witnessed a significant shift in local citizens toward the socio-religious and linguistic aspects of Malay Muslim culture. Among those are the Dutch Orientalists François Valentijn (d. 1727) and George Werndly (d. 1744) (Laffan, 2011, pp. 78–81). This transformation is epitomized by the once widely known notion of *masuk melayu* [to enter Malay, or to embrace Malay-ness]. While the notion has been popular since the 19th century, it still prevails among Malay-speaking Muslim communities in Southern Thailand (Patani & Kelantan) and Peninsular Malaysia (Bruckmayr, 2019, pp. 12–14). which indicated the integration of many trans-Southeast Asian societies into a meta-ethnic Malay identity, including its intellectual and trading network.

Following the fall of the Champa Kingdom in 1471 and the Melaka Kingdom in 1511, a meta-ethnic identity of Malay strived around the Southeast Asian Peninsula and Mainland. Under the intense Jawi's homogenizing and unifying role as a supra-language of Muslim communities in Indochina and Malay Peninsula, Bruckmayr's study elucidates Jawization's local and global social dynamics in the Cambodian Muslim community which is split into two factions: Austronesian-speaking Chams and Khmer-speaking Chvea. He poses a research question on "how and why a non-Malay-speaking Muslim community immersed itself in an evolving trans-Southeast Asian Muslim scholarly and social world." This research is commended by Leiden University's Professor of Islam and Southeast Asia, Nico Kaptein, as one of the finest he had encountered on the Muslim networks, texts, and persons circulating in mainland Southeast Asia (Kaptein, 2020, p. 418).

Studying Cambodian Muslims' language and factionalism between late 1800s and 2000s, this research combines an extensive archival review of Islamic polemic literature and *fatāwa* treatises written in four languages with fieldwork in Cambodia, the USA, and Malaysia between 2010 and 2012 (Bruckmayr, 2014, p. 158). Bruckmayr introduces a novel theoretical framework of "Islamic logosphere" by combining Barthes and Bourdieu's postmodern concept of language and society with Asad's concept of "discursive tradition" and Arkoun's "unifying *weltanschauung*" and "many *Islams* "(Bruckmayr, 2019, pp. 4–8).

Other theories adopted here are those of M.C. Ricklefs's idea of "Javanization" (2006) and Michael Laffan's theory of *Jawi* ecumene (2011) which underline the preservation of Islamicate identity in the non-Arabic-speaking world (Laffan, 2011, pp. 33–37). The discussion explains the involvement of lithography, written regimes, hegemonic discourses, migration, imperialism, modernity, and social development in intensifying internal polarization among Cambodia's Muslims. Among his striking findings on Muslim factionalism in Cambodia is that it has been an inextricable part of Cambodia's Muslim history for centuries prior to the globalization process (Bruckmayr, 2019, pp. 3, 154–158).

Jawi as (Islamic) Logosphere: A Critical Remark

Bruckmayr uses Jawi/Malay interchangeably while dissociating them in some places. The former referred to "had Islamic connotations" (Bruckmayr, 2019, p. 9) and "came to denote … the *Melayu* language as written in an adapted Arabic script" (Bruckmayr, 2019, pp. 9–10), whereas the latter "came to denote much of Southeast Asian Muslim culture and its bearers"(Bruckmayr, 2019, p. 9), while may also denote "becoming Christian in some parts of Eastern Indonesia" (Bruckmayr, 2019, p. 14), especially when Malay became the *lingua franca* of both the Netherland East Indies and the Portuguese in the Archipelago for diplomacy, literary, and trading networks.

Picture 2. 19th-century Jawi manuscript containing conversion account to Christianity.
Source: British Library Or. 3942(Gallop, 2018)

Bruckmayr's preposition of Jawi as an Islamic logosphere, however, contrasts with several historical documents of Jawi manuscripts that contain non-Islamic teachings. Such is found in the 17th-century *Njanjihan Terpoudji dari Anak Dara Maria* [Glorious Ode of Mary the Virgin](Gallop, 2018) as well as 19th-century Jawi manuscripts of conversion to Christianity (Vries, 2018). There are also Hindu philosophical ideas in Jawi texts like *Hikayat Perang Pandawa Jaya* and *Hikayat Maharaja Boma* found in Indonesia and Peninsular Malaysia (Gallop, 2015). Therefore, it is likely that Jawi writing culture and written regimes should not be seen as exclusive to Islam

and nor unique to Cambodia's Muslims but rather as part of wider supra-languages and logospheres, comparable to Arabic, Persian, Turkic, and Roman scripts in the globalized Muslim world (*The King's Dictionary*, 2000, pp. 1–48). In a simple term, Jawi is unlikely exclusive to Islam and nor Southeast Asian Muslims. Nevertheless, Bruckmayr's research on the *Jawization* of Cambodia offers valuable primary sources and theoretical frameworks to understand the broader sociolinguistic, religious, and geopolitical dynamics of Islam and Muslim societies in Southeast Asia. The introduction of Jawi script helped bridge the region's linguistic diversity which fosters a shared Muslim identity while accommodating various local identities and cultures.

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The Great Mosque of Sumenep

A CULTURAL MEMORY OF RELIGIOUS MODERATION IN MADURA

Introduction

The collective memory of a historical event is not solely preserved through folklore passed down from generation to generation (Danandjaja, 1986, p. 02). Obelisks, monuments,street names, mosques, inscriptions, and temples serve as artifacts of official memory. These material forms of memory acquire significance as sites of social interaction within the local community. Such sites can embody the collective identity of a community, social group, ornation (Talentire, 1999, p. 202). Viewed from this

Rahmat Hidayat
Raisatul Mufahamah

perspective, the Great Mosque of Sumenep,as a cultural site, and its associated memories will continue to be reproduced by stakeholders.

This extended abstract positions the mosque as a repository of the cultural memory of the Madurese people. As a memory site, the mosque encompasses numerous attributes, which may include myths. These myths serve as a cultural-political strategy to ensure that local people remain connected to their past (Finley, 1965, p. 302). What was written in historiography is a canonization of memory that cannot escape the selection process. Thus, remembering and forgetting activities in society are intertwined with the negotiation of interests or the politicization of memory (Santos, 2007, p. 77). For this reason, the memory that lives in societyis ratified by community tradition as its canonical memory line (Poole, 2008, p. 158).

The memory of the Great Mosque of Sumenep has been shaped by the culture and religiosity of the local community. Memory rooted in cultural ethos is more normative than cognitive. The normative framework of memory not only conveys insights from the past but also instills a profound sense of duty towards the forthcoming generations. According to Poole (2008, p. 152), memory is a burden from the past. To a certain degree, memory serves as a reminder message that directs the future trajectory of a community or nation. Thus, there is a phase where memory transforms into a history of mentality. It is not surprising that the attributes associated with the mosque are post-factum in nature.

Literature Review

Numerous studies on the Great Mosque of Sumenep have been conducted, focusing on its architectural, socio-cultural, theological, and artistic aspects. Andika (2022, p. 180) argues that the mosque is a symbol of religious tolerance. A review of Qur'anic values in the architecture of the Great Mosque of Sumenep has been examined by Lukman Fajariyah and Iwan Kuswandi. Both said that the mosque's gate, influenced by Chinese and Islamic architecture, symbolizes Allah's forgiveness. (Fajariyah, 2021, p. 189; Kuswandi, 2022, p. 18). The same notion also exists in Widiatami's writing (2017, p. 102) which emphasizes that Chinese, Javanese, Arabic, and European architectural designs in mosque buildings are a form of cultural acculturation.

Moreover, Selviana (2013, p. 442) focuses her discussion on the history of the construction of the mosque during the Panembahan Natakusuma I period. The study of the Great Mosque of Sumenep is also mentioned in Moh. Abu Na'im's research which reviews theIslamic theological values contained in Sumenep's urban planning. He emphasized that the palace, square, and grand mosque which are in a straight line are symbols of the relationship with God (*hablun minallah*), relationship with humans (*hablun minannas*), and relationship with nature (*hablun minal'alam*) (Na' im, 2018, p. 368). Even though this writing discusses the same material object, we use a memory approach to position the Great Mosque of Sumenep as a repository of local community cultural memory. All previous studies had been taken into account as precedents to see the process

of interpreting society's cultural heritage according to the zeitgeist of the time.

Methods

This article employed descriptive-analytic methods in examining the Sumenep people's memory of the Great Mosque of Sumenep. To analyze the data, we combined social history and memory approaches. The historical site (monument) serves as an important marker of a social event that occurred in the past. Then, memory brings remembrance of past events through oral tradition as a responsibility. These two approaches are interconnected in seeing the past and present realities represented by collective memory. In collecting data, we conducted documentation, interviews, and secondary sources related to the Great Mosque of Sumenep.

Discussion

From the Palace to the *Pesantren*: The History of the Great Mosque of Sumenep

The Great Mosque of Sumenep was erected by the First Tumenggung Aria Asiruddin Natakusuma or Panembahan Sumala in 1781. He is the adopted son of Raden Ayu Tumenggung Tirtanegara who married Panembahan Sumala's biological father Bindara Saod. The First Panembahan Natakusuma 's father is the son of Kiai Abdullah/Bindara Bungso from his first wife, Nyai Ezza, a descendant of Prince Katandur (Ihsani, 2020, p. 42; Selviana, 2013, p. 443). Bindara Saod's marriage to RA. Tirtanegara was a symbol of the unification of the aristocracy with the santri group.

Thenceforth, the *pesantren* students or *santri* group has become the ruler. The leadership of Bindara Saod was passed down to Panembahan Somala (Natakusuma I), Sultan Abdurrachman Pakunataningrat, Panembahan Mochamad Saleh (Natakusuma II), and so on (Bustami, 1990, p. 66). Since the 18th century, historians believe that the relationship between the *pesantren* leader or *kiai* and the king in Sumenep was harmonious. The power of the two complemented each other and the Tirtanegara Dynasty became a local government led by a king who was also a clergyman. In fact, the king's subsequent leadership employed religious elites as orderlies (Mutmainnah, 2004, p. 220).

وصية الأولى
(wasiat pertama)
YANG MEMBANGUN MASJID INI ADALAH PANGERAN NATAKUSUMA DI NEGARA SUMENEP, DAN MASJID INI SELESAI DI BULAN RAMADHAN TAHUN ZI DAN DIJADIKAN WAKAF DI JALAN ALLAH (SABILILLAH) DIDALAM MEMULAI PEKERJAAN KEBAJIKAN UNTUK SHALAT YANG BERTUJUAN TAAT KEPADA ALLAH. INI TAHUN TARIKH WAKTU SELESAINYA MASJID TAHUN SERIBU DUA RATUS ENAM HIJRIYAH NABI SAW
وصية الثانية
(wasiat kedua)
MASJID INI ADALAH BAITULLAH, BERSABDA PANGERAN NATAKUSUMA, PENGUASA WILAYAH SUMENEP, SESUNGGUHNYA WASIATKU KEPADA WALIRAJA-RAJA/PENGUASA-PENGUASA DAN KEPADA ORANG YANG MAU MENEGAKKAN KEBAJIKAN, JIKA TERDAPAT PADA MASJID INI SESUDAHKU PENCEMARAN, MAKA LURUSKANLAH. KARENA SESUNGGUHNYA MASJID INI WAKAF, TIDAK DIWARISKAN, TIDAK DIJUAL DAN JANGAN DIRUSAK

Picture I: Inscription on the construction of the Great Mosque of Sumenep by Panembahan Natakusuma I. (Personal documentation on site, July 11, 2023)

Given the historical explanation above, the local kingdom (Cakraningrat) in West Madura has different characteristics from the kingdom in East Madura. The rulers of East Madura (Sumenep) are not only experts in governance but also in religion. Before constructing the Great Mosque of Sumenep, Prince Natakusuma I, representing the king's students, first erected the Sumenep Palace. The establishment of the Great Mosque of Sumenep can be interpreted as a symbol of the equality of the *santri* group with the aristocracy. The two of them are in a bond that strengthens each other, not subordinates one another (Ihsani, 2021, p. 18).

The establishment of the Great Mosque of Sumenep cannot be separated from the socio- cultural conditions that developed in the Sumenep area. Since the mid-18th century, Islamic teachings have strengthened, and the majority of the population there have become Muslims. However, the teachings of their ancestors are still rooted in their daily lives (Selviana, 2013, p.442). The development of Islam during the reign of Natakusuma I can be proven by the spreadof small mosques or *langgar* owned by each *tanean lanjheng*. The pattern of household settlements consisting of three, four, five families and even more in one largeyard that is bordered by a decorative fence. The existence of tanean lanjheng in Sumenep-Madura, confirms the blurring of the administrative boundaries of the villages on Madura Island. (Leunissen, 1989, p. 233; Rifai, 2007, p. 49). This *langgar* then became the forerunner to the growth of the *pesantren*. When the progress of religious life reaches its peak, it is certain that creativity in Islamic art (architecture) reaches

its perfection (Muchlis, 2009, p. 02). The splendor of the building of the Great Mosque of Sumenep, which consists of a gate, garden, main building, and the roof of the mosque arranged like a pyramid, is a manifestation of the welfare of the local community.

Administratively, this mosque is situated in the center of the kingdom, namely Sumenep City. The mosque is located to the west of the Sumenep Palace and directly facing the main square. According to Onghokham (2017, p. 16), this city shows traces of quite strong influence from the culture of the Chinese people. The palace and mosque in Sumenep were made by Chinese craftsmen. The Chinese architect who played a role in the construction of this mosque was Lauw Piango. In the 18th century, Chinese craftsmen were ordered by panembahan to build the palace and the Great Mosque of Sumenep.

Religious Moderation in the Memory of the Sumenep Grand Mosque

The gate of the mosque contains elements of Chinese culture. The pillars and roof of the mosque adopt the Javanese-Madura building model. The *mihrab* and windows of the mosque display Arabic elements. The large pillars of the mosque represent elements of European culture (Widiatami, 2017, p. 101). The construction of the Great Mosque of Sumenep was adapted to the heterogeneous environment and culture of the local community at that time. Therefore, the design of mosques in the archipelago is local-traditional (Ambary, 1998, p. 39).

Picture II: The gate of the mosque.
(Personal documentation on site, July 11, 2023)

The fact that cultural acculturation in mosque buildings is apparent, indicates that the reign of Prince Natakusuma I was religiously moderate. This religious moderation can be represented by the plurality of the Sumenep people. The presence of Chinese designers who built the Sumenep palace shows that they managed to blend in with the local community. Furthermore, they expressed their Chinese intuition in the building of the Great Mosque of Sumenep (Onghokham, 2017, p. 16).

The city of Sumenep is essentially a residential cluster for the Foreign Eastern community (*vreemde oosterlingen*) namely Chinese, Arab-Hadrami, and Indo-European (Jonge, 1989, p. 12). The Chinese who worked as masons proved their loyalty to Panembahan.However, these workers did not only come from the Chinese, indigenous people are required to provide labour (*pancen*) to panembahan (Kuntowijoyo, 2017, p. 124). It is possible that the Arabs

also contributed to the construction of the Great Mosque of Sumenep. This can be legitimized by the strong elements of Arabic architecture in mosque buildings. Consequently, the magnificent mosque has become a shared space to build harmony and social interaction.

This moderation does not only occur at the external level but also appears internally atthe local community level. Religious moderation in indigenous peoples ensues among the students and the nobles in Sumenep. Moderation can be interpreted as a diminishing gap between the two classes which was later embodied in the establishment of the Great Mosque of Sumenep. The umbrella symbol, as the identity of the aristocratic class, is found in the mosque building, which represents the process of forming religious moderation among the *santri* and aristocratic classes.

Referring to the Javanese concept of religion by Geertz (2013, p. xxxiii), the *santri* group is the aristocratic/priyayi class. This dichotomous view is not present in the collective memory of the Madurese people. In their memory, the religious leader (*ghuru/kyai*) and the king/nobleman (*ratoh*) were a unit and not mutually exclusive. *Ghuru/kiai* is *ratoh* in many senses (Mansurnoor, 1995, p. 25). This means that besides being a political figure, the king in Sumenep is also a religious figure. This can be traced from the local slogan *bhepak-bhebhuk- ghuru-ratoh* where *ratoh* and *ghuru* are the determinants of social, economic, political, and cultural dynamics of Madurese society (Dzulkarnain, 2023, p. 45).



Picture III: The Mihrab and Sacred Sword of the Mosque.(Personal documentation on site, July 11, 2023)

For this reason, Sumenep is the only district in Madura that is relatively quiet from social conflicts (Aziz, 2018, p. 78). Various cases of intolerance often arise in other areas, such as the case of Shia-Sunni conflict, the case of the Nipah Reservoir conflict in Sampang, and *carok* case in Bangkalan (Wiyata, 2013, p. 158). Panembahan Natakusuma I left an inclusive cultural legacy for the cultural diversity of the Sumenep people. This can be seen visibly in thelayout of the city of Sumenep and the Great Mosque of Sumenep as a memory artifact of religious moderation in Sumenep.

In addition to memories based on historical events, there are several myths-based memories of the Great Mosque of Sumenep. The mosque is often considered a sacrosanct andsacred mosque. The sacredness of the mosque is associated with the prohibition to renovate mosque buildings. Refurbishing mosques in favor of modernization is considered taboo. A nobleman, R.T. Prabuwinoto, replaced

the mosque's fence with iron because of modernization. After the restoration of the fence, RT. Prabuwinoto died suddenly. Another myth is about the sacredness of the sword that is hung in front of the mihrab of the Great Mosque of Sumenep (Handoni, 2018, p. 204). One day, someone stole the sword. The sword thief always had bad luck. In the end, he surrendered to the mosque management and to the police (Handoni, 2018, p. 204). The belief of a curse, that can be inflicted on anyone who violates these taboos, is a memory that lingers forever in Madurese society. The mythical story is preserved as a political culture of the local community. This will bring the hope that the next generation will have historical awareness of the importance of caring for this noble cultural heritage as a symbol ofreligious moderation.

The Politics of Memory in the Great Mosque of Sumenep

The memory of the contribution of the Chinese people in the construction of this mosque is still embedded in the collective memory of the Sumenep people. Ms. Fifin, a residentof a district in Sumenep City, still has memories of Lauw Piango's great contribution as the architect of the Great Mosque of Sumenep (Fifin, personal communication, April 7, 2024). As a collective memory, the story of Chinese artisans can be used as a basis for seeing the harmony that occurs in the social dimension of Madurese society. This argument can be supported by the philosophy of the layout of the Sumenep city which represents a symbol of a harmonious relationship with humans, God, and the universe (Na'im, 2018, p. 368).

Cultural acculturation in mosque architecture is interpreted by the community as the refinement of the culture of the Sumenep people who possess richness in culture. This cultural memory directly dispels colonial stereotypes about Madurese. The Madurese in the colonial archives were always portrayed as rough, stiff, fierce, cruel, and fearless. In fact, Esser views the Madurese as ruder and more barbaric than the Javanese and Sundanese (Jonge, 2011, p. 63). These biased colonial memories also reflect the negative perspective of Madurese by outsiders towards the Madurese.

The harmony of Chinese, Madurese, Arabic, Javanese, and Dutch culture that covers the Great Mosque of Sumenep building has major implications for presenting a memory of the true image of Madurese who is affable with other ethnicities. As a cultural memory, mosque architecture can be associated with the attitude of harmony, tolerance, and friendliness that exists in the Madurese people. The mosque not only reminds the next generation about the heyday of Islam in the 18th century but also passes on the importance of moderation and harmony in social life. This cultural memory can be used as a counter to negative colonial memory in depicting the Madurese people.

The negative view of the Madurese living today is a legacy of colonial memory. Colonial archives are knowledge production, not knowledge sources, which are full of biases. Archiving itself is a process of memory selection (Stoler, 2002, p. 94). What is remembered and what is forgotten today about the Madurese cannot be separated from the negotiation of colonial political interests for the colonized

people. Therefore, the Great Mosque of Sumenep as a collective memory site becomes relevant to uncovering the historical reality of the Madurese who had been masked up by the colonialists.

Conclusion

The Great Mosque of Sumenep serves as a memory site for the people of Sumenep- Madura, representing religious moderation established when the *santri* became rulers in the Sumenep Kingdom. In the collective memory of the Madurese people, the position of *santri* and nobles is on a par status, with neither being subordinate to the other. The unification of the*santri* and aristocratic classes is actualized in the cultural heritage, of the Great Mosque of Sumenep. Based on the diversity of cultural elements that cover the building, the mosque represents a monument in memory of the harmonious, moderate, and tolerant Madurese society with non-Maduran residents such as Chinese, Arabs, and Indo-Europeans. As a symbol of religious moderation, the memory of the Great Mosque of Sumenep can be used as a tool to counter colonial stereotypes about the Madurese people. As a memory site, many new myths have grown around the mosque regarding the sacredness and sanctity of this great cultural heritage.

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Religious Moderation in Kalipasir Tangerang

HUMANIST ISLAM AND CHINESE TRADITION

Introduction

Throughout human history, civilization has witnessed countless conflicts arising from friction and clashes between different religions and ethnicities. This contradicts with the teachings of all religions, which fundamentally promote peace and harmony (Mawa, 2018: 9). Research conducted by the Centre for Islamic Studies and Society at UIN Syarif HidayatullahJakarta (Tim, 2016) highlights how some teachers in Islamic Religious Education (PAI) at primary and secondary levels hold exclusive views and

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show intolerance. A significant portion of these teachers rejects non-Muslim leaders, with 89% opposed to non-Muslim district heads, 87% against non-Muslim school principals, and 80% unwilling to accept non-Muslim chief ministers. Additionally, 81% of PAI teachers disagree with the establishment of non-Muslim places of worship in their area.

Acts of intolerance have become a significant issue that demands collective attention and action. In 2020, the Equala Institute recorded a troubling number of violations, highlighting the severity of the problem. There were 39 instances of intolerance, which included 32 cases of religious defamation, 17 cases where the establishment of worship places was denied, and 8 instances where worship activities were prohibited. Additionally, several cases escalated into violence: 6 cases of destruction of a church place, 5 cases of rejection of activity, and 5 violentepisodes (Guritno, 2021). Furthermore, over the past few decades, numerous terrorist acts have shaken communities and instilled fear. The recent attack occurred on March 28, 2021, when anexplosion rocked the area near the Makassar Cathedral Church (Rizal, 2021).

The data and various incidents of intolerance underscore the importance of promoting moderation at all levels of society. Indonesia is a nation composed of diverse ethnicities, races, tribes, and religions. Therefore, it is crucial that religious and ethnic life reflects tolerance, solidarity, and peace. The attitude of religious moderation needs to be instilled and nurtured as a shared worldview. In some regions, religious moderation has deep roots, built by the ancestors based on local wisdom. These areas have historically served

as melting pots for different tribes, nations, and ethnicities since the formation of Indonesia. For instance, Batavia became one of the primary gathering sites for various nations trading in the Nusantara region, alongside Banten. The ownership of several coastal territories, rivers, and canals is crucial, but it will be meaningless if it does not contribute to strengthening the country's resilience. Banten's main rival in the 17th century was the Dutch merchants, who in 1619 built a settlement base, a port, and a defense in Jayakarta, which was later renamed Batavia (Haan, 1935: 20).

According to Michrob (1993: 146), several coastal areas around Batavia have become the crossroads of traders from various countries. Tangerang has been one of the sites of such intersections since the Batavia period. Civilization in Tangerang is known for the acculturation of Malay, Arab, Chinese, and Sunda cultures. The process of acculturation in the Tangerangs took place for quite a long time, along with the existence of Batavia. Therefore, some of the architectural buildings in the area of the old town of Tangerang, including the place of worship, consist of a mixture of cultures. Banten, with its fortress on the west bank of the Cisadane River, has been built since the reign of Maulana Hasanuddin (1527-1570).

Originally, the building was constructed in a simple shape, just a pile of stones arranged in a basic form. As time passed and clashes with the VOC increased, the fortress was reinforced with various weapon accessories, likely cannons, to withstand the enemy's attacks. In addition to purchasing cannons, Banten was also capable of producing them in the 17th century. This capability was revealed when parts

of cannon-casting tools were discovered in the villages of Sukadiri and Kepandean.

One of the historical buildings depicting religious moderation in Tangerang City is the Jami Kalipasir Mosque, an Islamic worship house located on the edge of Kali Sand Road, justeast of the Cisadane River. Cultural acculturation can be seen in the architecture of Chinese- nuanced mosques. One of the most visible is a pagoda-like mosque tower. This Muslim place of worship, which has been in place since 1608, also has a small dome on the roof resemblingthe shape of a typical Chinese ornament. Another interesting thing is the location of the mosquewhich was built next to the Boen Tek Bio Klenteng. It is less than a hundred meters from the establishment of the two houses of worship, and they are both in the Old Market of Tangerang(Pratiwi, 2017).

Kalipasir is one of the multicultural and multi-ethnic districts in Tangerang City, with indigenous peoples dominated by Betawi and Sunnah. On the other hand, there are also ethnicChinese who have long lived in the area. This ethnic diversity accompanies religious diversity, especially between indigenous Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese. This ethnic diversity coincides with religious diversity, particularly between indigenous Muslims and non-Muslim Chinese. While this diversity enables them to live side by side, it is also true that acts of intolerance continue to persist among some individuals.

The portrait of the pluralism of the Kalipasir community represents a valuable asset that requires a comprehensive study. This is to ensure that the values cultivated by the

Kalipasir society can become shared principles in fostering a nation that embodies Bhineka Tunggal Ika.The focus of this study is to objectively answer two following questions: 1) How are the strategies employed by communities to build a moderate society? 2) How is the uniqueness ofKalipasir society in building religious moderation? Thus, the objective of this study are 1) to identify the patterns and strategies of society in building religious moderation in the Kalipasir, Tangerang, which can serve as a model for fostering religious moderation in the diverse context of Indonesia. 2) To understand the typology of the construction of the religious moderation within the Kalipasir community.

The Indonesia's Formation based on Diverse Society

Indonesian society consists of various races, tribes, religions, and nations. (Suparian, 2004: 243). Wekke identified two patterns of cultural acculturation with religion: dialogic andintegrative. In Java, the dialogic pattern is more prevalent, whereas in Malay traditions, the integrative pattern dominates (Wekke, 2013: 31). According to As'ad Said Ali (2013: 12), theIndonesian national identity is built around a shared mission, vision, values, and sentiments that rely on these commonalities rather than on blood, tribe, or religion, as Ernest Renan argued. This framework fosters a culture that embraces multiculturalism or pluralism (*ta'adudiyah*). Therefore, the founding fathers of this nation formulated the term "*bhineka tunggal ika*" meaning "unity in diversity."

Syaiful Arif (2013: 12) formulates the concept of religious moderation through reflection on KH

Abdurrahman Wahid's thought (Gus Dur). The *first* concept is *pribumisasi* distinguishing Islam in Indonesia from Islam in the Arab region. Essentially, it views culture as a "repository" that holds the essence of law (sharia) and doctrine (aqidah) without becoming dissolved in it. Early Islam also experienced the encounter of ancient Greek culture, especially in the *Abbasiyah* period. These cultural encounters formed the science that was the basis of modern civilization and the success of Islam at that time with the process of translating the work of Yunani philosophers. This religious-nationalist way of thinking should be the paradigm for religious people in Indonesia. For that reason, for Gus Dur, Culture is not contradictory to religion. On the contrary, culture is precisely the spirituality of a nation that iscontextual to the empirical needs of society. *Pribumisasi* in Islam relates to the locality. Syaiful Arif concluded that the *pribumisasi* of Islam occurred under two conditions, that is: 1) the manifestation of Islamic teachings through local culture, that is to say, to proclaim the teachings of Islam by "borrowing" the local pre-Islamic culture that is associated with the media. With this pattern, the *pribumisasi* of Islam is not meant by religious merger (syncretism), but merely by borrowing cultural casing as a medium of publicity. 2) Contextualization of Islam, that is the development of interpretation contextually without changing the provisions of religious doctrine (*nash*). *Pribumisasi* of Islam becomes a method (*manhaj*) to meet reality by using theprocedures of science contained in the sacred texts of religion (*nash*) and Islamic jurisprudence(*fiqh*).

Second, is civilizational cosmopolitanism, an openness to the truth and other civilizations. The struggle for

fundamental human rights in its time requires the tools of its time. From this framework, universalism is born.

Third, is universalism, human and universal values found within religious teachings. These values are considered universal because they are set as the *maqashid asy-syari'ah* (the primary purpose of the law of religion). In Islam, the essence of humanity is encapsulated in safeguarding the five fundamental human rights (*kulliyat al-khams*). The process of *pribumisasi* (localization) and universalization of religious teachings is further contextualized within the framework of Indonesianism. Any endeavor to modernize a society must be rooted in the cultural values of the local community to ensure that reforms remain deeply connected to tradition. When examined historically, moderation emerges as the mainstream within Islam. However, a thorough understanding of Islamic doctrines reveals that the normative characteristic of Islam is inherently moderate.

Kalipasir Mosque: Humanist Islamic Portrait in Tangerang

The Kalipasir Mosque is one of the ancient Muslim worship houses, serving as a cultural reserve in Tangerang City. This mosque is located in the old town of Tangerang. Historically, this mosque is a place that has been visited by Ki Tengger Jati in Tangerang. After 1608, Prince Kuripan of Bogor fixed the place by setting up a small *mushalla* with black ground and a pillar of coconut trees supported by a coconut leaf roof. Ahmad Syairoji of the Council of Advisers of the Kalipasir Mosque (2021) explained that the man who founded the Kalipasir mosque was the leader in Tangerang at the time. The Kalipasir Mosque underwent

several renovations by the leaders of Tangerang at that time. The Kalipasir Mosque building was enlarged by Temenggung Paku Wijaya in 1671. Tumenggung Pamit Wijaya continued his father's agenda of expanding the Kalipasir mosque after Prince Kuripan died. In 1712, he was taken care of by Tumenggung Pamit Wijaya's son, namely Raden Wiradilaga Kuripan Bogor. In 1740, he was cared for by Raden Uning Wiradilaga's son, namely Tumenggung Arya Ramdon. In 1830, Raden Arya Idar Dilaga continued to administer the Kalipasir mosque. Nyi Raden Djamrut and her husband, Raden Abdullah, became administrators of the Caliphate Mosque in 1865. In 1904, under the care of Raden Jasin Judanegara, Raden Jasin began to build a mosque tower that resembled a pagoda.

The existence of Kalipasir Mosque is not only a place of worship for Muslims but also a center of the spread of Islam and a witness to the struggle of the children of the nation against the invaders. The Kalipasir Mosque's dome has a Chinese ornament with the shape of a gold-colored pineapple on it. The form of the dome of the mosque is deliberately made like a Chinese pattern to facilitate the spread of Islam. The Kalipasir Mosque's tower built in 1904, also has its own uniqueness. When you look at the tower of the mosque, it is like a pagoda with a height of 10 meters (Fadilla, 2019: 12-13).

The existence of the Kalipasir Mosque reflects the tolerance of the ancestors at that time. According to Syairoji's statement (2021), during the early construction of the Kalipasir Mosque, Chinese ethnic people assisted. It was a time when the land was low, so the prayer line *(shaf)* of the

Kalipasir Mosque was made inclined and did not follow the direction the mosque was standing. If the Kalipasir Mosque had been built in the *kiblat* direction, then the houses of the people around it, including the Chinese houses, would have been demolished. However, the founders of the Kalipasir Mosque highlighted the aspects of tolerance and moderation in the construction of places of worship.

Image 1. Kalipasir Mosque



Syairoji affirmed that the Kalipasir community maintains a life of harmony amidst diversity. The communities in Kalipasir build religious moderation in everyday social activities. The most striking example of religious moderation is during the celebration of areligious day, where they interact with each other. For instance, when the Chinese community holds a parade near the Jami Kalipasir Mosque. In fact, during the celebration of the Chinese Great Day, one part of the mosque once served as a public kitchen. The Chinese, whose houses are near the Kalipasir Mosque, also respect every activity that takes place there (Syairoji, 2021)

For this reason, the Kalipasir Mosque has become a symbol of religious moderation and inter-ethnic relations in Tangerang City. The Kalipasir Mosque, built in the 16th century, is a witness to the history of Islamic civilization in Tangerang. The mosque, located on the banks of the Cisadane River at Merdeka Road No. 1, Sukajadi, was built in 1576 by Islamic scholars.The religious moderation established by the Kalipasir community was evident not only duringthe Dutch occupation but also during the 1998 riots, when many ethnic Chinese took refuge in Kalipasir village. The Kalipasir Mosque has been adjacent to the Boen Tek Bio Temple for almost four centuries (Wiryono, 2012).

Boen Tek Bio Temple and *Cina Benteng*

The oldest mosque in Tangerang City is close to another ancient place of worship, the Boen Tek Bio Temple. The distance between the mosque and the temple is quite close, approximately 100 meters. This inter-religious and

cultural coexistence has been maintained for quite a while. The close distance of these houses of worship illustrates the closeness of thetwo religions and ethnicities in Kalipasir.

Image 2. Distance between Boen Tek Bio Temple and Kalipasir Mosque



In Tangerang, there is the term *Cina Benteng*, which refers to Chinese people inTangerang who have integrated with the natives. The term *Cina Benteng* is synonymous with Chinese settlements around Pasar Lama and several areas of Tangerang. In Haryani's research(2020: 402) it is stated that there are several models of cultural and religious acculturation of the *Cina Benteng* in Indonesia. First, they maintain their religion while fostering a culture of nationalism. Second, they merge with the majority culture and religion. Third, they maintain their cultural and religious identity.

According to Thresnawaty, the existence of *Cina Benteng* in Tangerang is a manifestation of the success of cultural acculturation in Indonesia. The *Cina Benteng* community developed a Chinese culture with an Indonesian style that is full of meaning (Thresnawaty, 2015: 34). Sugianta stated that since 1830 CE, the *Cina Benteng*

community began to settle on the outskirts of the Cisadane River. In fact, Sugianta quotes Tome Pires, who revealed that the *Cina Benteng* have lived in Tangerang since 1513 CE. On one hand, the *Cina Benteng* community is loyal to preserving the traditions and customs of their ancestors. On the other hand, the community can adapt to the local culture (Sugianta, 2012: 7).

Another source mentions the arrival of the Chinese in Tangerang around 1407. Tjen Tjie Lung (Halung) led the arrival of the Chinese, *Cina Benteng*, to Tangerang by a boat. At that time, the Cisadane riverside was part of the Padjadjaran Kingdom, with its local ruler named Sanghyang Anggalarang. Sanghyang Anggalarang was attracted to a beautiful girl on the boat. He gave nine plots of land to the Chinese immigrants so that he could marry the woman (Haryani, 2020: 402). However, according to Donald E. Willmott, as cited by Darmayana, the Dutch had a project of marrying Sundanese-Betawi, Chinese, and Dutch tribes

Image 3. Boen Tek Bio Temple

Source: https://news.detik.com

by placing Chinese people around the Cisadane River. This marriage was expected to give birth to a new race that had high loyalty to the Dutch (Darmayana, 2017).

According to Al-Ayubi (Ayubi, 2016: 358) there are two groups of acculturation among the *Cina Benteng* tribe, namely the integration group and the assimilation group. The assimilation group expects the *Cina Benteng* tribe to blend into other communities by merging culture and identity. As for the integration group, they blend in with society without losing their identity.

Religious Moderation in the Perspective of the Kalipasir Community

Religious moderation in Kalipasir is a legacy that needs to be maintained and emulated by all social groups in building the Indonesian nation and state. Life in Kalipasir is not built on disputes and conflicts but is based on dialogical religious and social life. Every region has its own pattern and variety in building a pluralistic social structure. It is the same with the people in Kalipasir, who are unique in building religious moderation there.

According to Jajat Sudrajat (2021), an interfaith youth activist in Tangerang sub-district, the moderation model in Kalipasir Village has long been established. The moderation carried out by the Kalipasir community departs from mutual awareness regarding the practice of moderation in their respective religions. The practice of moderation in religion must be implemented in real life, not only in the rhetorical aspect. When interviewed, Sudrajat explained the following:

> *"Starting from moral awareness in implementing the teachings of the founders of NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), who agreed on the values of moderation in religion, which later became the breath of NU, I want to manifest that tolerance in real life, especially in Tangerang. I visit and communicate with other religious leaders. Whoever honors humanity has honored his creator (God). Conversely, whoever dishonors humanity has dishonored his creator (God). Because all humans are essentially the creation of Allah, Iquote from the teachings of Gus Dur (KH Abdurrahman Wahid)."*

As such, building religious moderation requires a shared awareness of tolerance. The social interaction that is built is to maintain the unity of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). With a shared awareness in the context of the state, it will give birth to and strengthen nationalism. Anderson (Anderson, 2001: 10) explains that the existence of third-world nationalism is a "logical" result of imperialism and is influenced by the idea of nationalism. The feeling of solidarity is built on a shared vision of building togetherness and brotherhood to be free from colonialism. Therefore, this feeling of solidarity needs to continue to be developedfor the next generation, so that religious harmony and moderation will continue to be implemented by future generations.

For Sudrajat (41 years old), open-mindedness is the first attitude that a person must have to build religious moderation. With an open mindset, one will not be allergic to differences oreven commit acts of violence because of them. An open-minded person will see everything universally and prioritize the human side rather than the exclusivity aspect of religion. Sudrajat(2021) explains that:

> *"Open-mindedness is the foundation, so I have open-mindedness towards differences. The first attitude that a person must have when having a moderate character, especially in religion, is open-mindedness, not being allergic to differences, not feeling that everything must be the same, not being apathetic. If you already have an open mind, everyone at one point, when someone meets someone, no longer looks at the color of his skin, his cultural customs, or what he worships, but what he sees is the same creation of God. But if you don't have the foundation of open-mindedness, then the first thing you see is his physique, his background, the color of his skin, and his religion."*

An open-minded attitude has been implemented by the ancestors of the Kalipasir community. This can be observed in the proximity of the Klenteng Boen Tek Bio and the Kalipasir Mosque, which are only 100 meters apart. Additionally, the architectural form of the Kalipasir Mosque is Chinese-style. The establishment of these two houses of worship is also close in time; the Boen Tek Bio Temple was founded in 1694, and the Kali Pasir Jami Mosque was founded in the 1600s. In fact, in the Boen Tek Bio Temple, the names of non-Chinese men who are not figures from Buddhism or Taoism are written. The names written in certain rooms include Raden Surya Kencana, Aki Jenggot, Haji Umar, and others. According to the temple administrator, they are not Chinese or their religious figures but have played an important role in the existence of the Boen Tek Bio Temple (Ayubi, 2016: 342).

The owner of one of the cafes in Tangerang, Jajat Sudrajat, also emphasized that love is human nature,

while hatred is the result of wrong teaching. Sudrajat provided a small example: when there is an accident on the road, people who see it immediately feel pity, even if they do not necessarily help. This feeling of pity does not stem from considering the person's religion, tribe, or other characteristics but from human nature.

> *"I cited what Nelson Mandela said: that love is the natural hatred that is taught. So actually, human nature is to love, to have compassion for others, whoever they are. For example, we are driving on the road. Then there is an accident, so our instinct as humans to see an accident on the side of the road must be that, even if we don't help him, at least in our hearts we feel sorry without knowing what religion he is, who he is, or what tribe he belongs to. If there are people who have hatred towards differences, it is more the result of improper teaching."*

Sudrajat (2021) explained that the youth and community in Kalipasir do not see differences in religion or ethnicity in social interactions. For them, religion does not teach hatred of differences. He quoted the opinion of Gus Dur (KH Abdurrahman Wahid), that the more a person delves into religious teachings, the greater his compassion should be so that there is no room in his heart to hate anyone. This was also confirmed by Syairoji (2021), who said that Kalipasir residents have never had conflicts based on religious or ethnic backgrounds. This is because the communication patterns and relationships built between residents are well established. Religious and community leaders in Kalipasir often hold meetings and discussions together.

The Chinese Benteng community also has no problem interacting with other religious and ethnic communities. They do not mind if some of their family members are Muslim because they believe that every religion, without exception Islam, has similar doctrines in social aspects to Chinese beliefs (Ayubi, 2016: 345). Therefore, non-Muslim Chinese in Cina Bentengare not all Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism; some of them are also Muslims. There are approximately 3,000 Chinese people who embrace Islam out of around 500,000 total Chinese descendants in Tangerang. City (Haryani, 2020: 416).

Sudrajat (2021) also explained that positive activities should be made viral, such as those that promote interfaith dialogue and highlight inspiring figures who uphold diversity. In this way, the next generation can continue the legacy of those who have established values of moderation. The advancement of social media should be utilized as a medium for religious moderation campaigns. Considering that tolerance often becomes a focus only after acts of intolerance occur, it is crucial to popularize the concept of moderation proactively. The Kalipasir Mosque and the Boen Tek Bio Temple represent a long history of tolerance in Tangerang City, which must be collectively maintained. Indonesia has strong historical roots in moderation among various ethnicities, religions, and tribes. The old market, with the Kalipasir Mosque and the Boen Tek Bio Temple, should be promoted not only as a culinary destination but also as an icon of tolerance and a house of moderation in Tangerang City.

Conclusion

Religious moderation must be continuously upheld and nurtured. However, maintaining and implementing such moderation is challenging, as it requires an open-minded attitude and a shared awareness of diversity, recognizing that all religions promote peace and harmony. Therefore, the wise practices established and demonstrated by our ancestors must be constantly studied and actualized. The presence of two historical places of worship, Klenteng Boen Tek Bio and Kalipasir Mosque, stands as a testament to the long-standing practice of moderation and tolerance embedded in the culture of the Indonesian Nation.

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
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YOGYAKARTA – INDONESIA

The term Southeast Asian Islam refers to a mosaic of Islamic practices, traditions, and interpretations in Southeast Asia that is distinctive and unique when compared to other regions. This distinctive character is the result of a historical dialogue and complementarity between Islam, global values, and pre-existing local practices and traditions in Southeast Asia. Consequently, Islam in Southeast Asia has taken on a moderate, inclusive, and diverse character that varies from one region to another. This variety of Islamic practice and interpretation is attributable to numerous factors, including influences and networks from Arabia and the Middle East, India and Persia, Western colonialism, and local beliefs in Southeast Asia. Consequently, Southeast Asian Islam has evolved into a distinctive and unique Islamic mosaic. However, the region is also characterized by numerous complex issues, which are discussed in this book. These issues encompass a wide range of subjects, including democratic populism, migration, literature, gender, culture, legal issues, and conflict. This book is a collection of writings from several academics and researchers who try to present the latest issues on Southeast Asian Islam.

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